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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 










RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 




CASE NO. C U ~ at, - 41:J. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR .JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff R. Drew Thomas, by and through his attorneys of record, the 
law firm of White Peterson, P.A., and for cause of action against the above-named Defendants 
hereby complains and alleges as follows: 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - I UUU023 
PARTIES 
1. At all relevant times herein mentioned the Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff"), is and was a resident of the State ofIdaho, residing in Emmett, Gem County, Idaho. 
2. At all relevant times herein mentioned the Defendants, Ronald O. Thomas and 
Elaine K. Thomas, are and were residents of the State of Idaho, residing in Emmett, Gem 
County, Idaho. 
3. At all relevant times herein mentioned the Defendant, Thomas Motors, Inc. has 
been a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Idaho, with its principal place of 
business in Emmett, Idaho. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. All of the acts complained of herein occurred in Gem County, Idaho making 
jurisdiction proper in this court. 
5. Venue is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
6. In 1997, Plaintiff worked at Lanny Berg Chevrolet in Caldwell, Idaho as the 
manager of the New and Used Car Department. 
7. In late 1996, Plaintiff was contacted by Defendant Ronald Thomas, his father, 
about a business proposal revolving around Defendants Ronald and Elaine Thomas' desire to 
purchase a new car dealership in Emmett, Idaho. 
8. Defendant Ronald O. Thomas was inexperienced in operating a new car operation 
and sought the advice and assistance of Plaintiff, proposing that if Plaintiff would leave Lanny 
Berg Chevrolet and manage and operate the new dealership, at a greatly reduced salary, he 
would give the proposed dealership to Plaintiff when he turned age 62 or 63. 
VL;UFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 U00024 
9. Defendant Ronald Thomas pledged to Plaintiff that he would transfer the business 
by age 63 if Plaintiff left his job and managed the new car business. 
10. In late 1997, Defendants Ronald and Elaine Thomas purchased Johannesen 
Motors in Emmett, Idaho and renamed it Thomas Motors, Inc. 
11. Plaintiff accepted Defendant Ronald Thomas' offer but repeatedly requested that 
their understanding be put in writing; however, Ron Thomas repeatedly informed Plaintiff he did 
not wish to do so. After numerous requests by Plaintiff, however, Ron Thomas reluctantly agreed 
to have an attorney prepare written documents. Plaintiff reviewed said documents and signed 
said documents, but was shortly thereafter advised by Ron Thomas that he (Ron Thomas) was 
not going to sign them, explaining: "Why would I sell you something that I was just going to 
give you?" Plaintiff then believed that the written agreement had not been agreed to nor was he 
ever provided any evidence or documentation to the contrary. 
12. In reliance upon his oral agreement with Defendant Ronald Thomas, Plaintiff quit 
his job at Lanny Berg Chevrolet and went to work at Thomas Motors; in so doing, Plaintiff took 
a significant reduction in pay under the understanding that pursuant to his agreement with 
Defendants he would receive the ownership of Thomas Motors when his father turned age 63. 
13. Even though Plaintiff managed the daily operations of the dealership, Defendants 
Ronald and Elaine Thomas controlled the money and assets of the dealership and, on information 
and belief, the Defendants consistently used assets and funds of Thomas Motors for their 
personal use. 
14. In early 2000, Defendants told Plaintiff that they were making double payments in 
order to pay down Thomas Motors' debts; however, because of a failure on the part of 
Defendants to keep up-to-date on the flooring line of credit, Wells Fargo referred the Thomas 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 000025 
Motors account to special assets (troubled accounts). On information and belief, Defendants had 
shifted portions of the Thomas Motors flooring line of credit for a used car lot that they operated 
called, Lot of Cars. 
15. After being referred to Special Assets, Plaintiff personally worked with Wells 
Fargo an extraordinary amount of hours at great personal sacrifice in order to maintain a flooring 
line of credit at Thomas Motors and assure that Thomas Motors remained an open and viable 
entity. 
16. In 2002, after bringing the loan with Wells Fargo up-to-date, Thomas Motors 
arranged with Key Bank for a new flooring line for used cars, a new flooring line for new cars 
and a new note on the real property upon which Thomas Motors was situated. 
17. During this period, out of frustrations due to the financial manipulations by the 
Defendants, Plaintiff had repeated discussions with the Defendants about leaving Thomas 
Motors; however, Defendants pledged to change how the fmances of Thomas Motors were 
maintained and reassured Plaintiff that everything with Thomas Motors was being done for his 
benefit and that it would be his after Defendant Ronald Thomas turned age 63. 
18. On information and belief, in October 2005, Defendants Ronald and Elaine 
Thomas began marketing Thomas Motors in an effort to find a buyer; however, the Defendants 
repeatedly denied this fact to Plaintiff as well as other family members and employees of 
Thomas Motors. 
19. In January 2006, Defendants entered into an agreement in principle to sell 
Thomas Motors at a substantial profit to a third party, Salmon River Motors in Salmon, Idaho. 
20. At no point prior to the sale did Defendants discuss this matter with Plaintiff. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 000026 
21. On or about, March 15, 2006, the sale of Thomas Motors to the aforementioned 
third party was finalized. 
COUNT ONE 
Breach of Contract 
22. Plaintiff hereby real leges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 21 of 
this Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 
23. Prior to the purchase of Johannesen Motors in late 1997, Defendant Ronald 
Thomas proposed to Plaintiff that if Plaintiff would leave his job at Lanny Berg Chevrolet and 
agree to manage and operate what would become Thomas Motors, Inc. at a greatly reduced 
salary, Defendant would give him Thomas Motors when Defendant turned age 63. 
24. Plaintiff accepted the Defendant's offer, and in reliance on the offer, took over the 
day-to-day operation and management of Thomas Motors, Inc. 
25. Plaintiff fully and adequately performed every requirement placed on him by the 
aforementioned agreement except where performance was prevented by actions and/or conduct 
of the Defendants. 
26. Defendants, however, have failed to perform and/or continuously frustrated the 
purpose of the agreement by, inter alia, diverting funds from Thomas Motors and/or creditor's of 
Thomas Motors Inc. to his and Elaine Thomas' personal use, diverting funds from Thomas 
Motors and/or creditor's of Thomas Motors Inc. to unrelated entities, and unilaterally selling 
Thomas Motors, Inc. to a third-party and, consequently, breaching the agreement with Plaintiff. 
27. As a result of this breach, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be 
proven with specificity at trial, but is in excess of $500,000. 
28. Plaintiff hereby reserves this paragraph for a claim of punitive damages pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 6-1604. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL - 5 000027 
COUNT TWO 
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
29. Plaintiff hereby realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 28 of 
this Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 
30. The Defendants breach of the aforementioned agreement with Plaintiff was 
motivated by bad faith and malice and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
implied in the parties' contract. 
31. Defendant's conduct was willful and intentional. 
32. As a direct result of Defendant's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount exceeding $10,000 to be proven with 
specificity at trial. 
33. Plaintiffs reserve this Paragraph for the inclusion of a claim for punitive damages 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604. 
COUNT THREE 
Quasi-Contract 
34. Plaintiff hereby realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 33 of 
this Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 
35. Prior to the purchase of Johannesen Motors in late 1997, Defendant Ronald 
Thomas proposed to Plaintiff that if Plaintiff would leave his job at Lanny Berg Chevrolet and 
agree to manage and operate what would become Thomas Motors, Inc. at a drastically reduced 
salary, Defendant would give him Thomas Motors when Defendant turned age 63. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6 000028 
36. Plaintiff accepted the Defendant's offer, and in reliance on the offer, took over the 
day-to-day operation and management of Thomas Motors, Inc. 
37. To the best of his ability, Plaintiff fully and adequately performed every 
requirement placed on him by the aforementioned agreement and in doing so conferred a direct 
benefit to the Defendants. 
38. Defendants were aware of and appreciated the benefit conferred upon it by 
Plaintiff. 
39. It is inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefit conferred on them by Plaintiff 
without being required to repay Plaintiff for the value of that benefit. 
40. Because of Defendant's failure to compensate Plaintiff for the actual value of the 
benefit he conferred upon them, the Defendant has been unjustly enriched in an amount in excess 
of $ 100,000 to be proven with specificity at trial. 
41. Plaintiff reserves this Paragraph for the inclusion of a claim for punitive damages 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604. 
COUNT FOUR 
Breach of Contract 
(In the Alternative)1 
42. Plaintiff hereby realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 33 of 
this Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 
43. After Plaintiff accepted Defendant Ronald Thomas' offer to leave Lanny Berg 
Chevrolet and come manage Thomas Motors, the Plaintiff repeatedly requested that their 
understanding be put in writing; however, Ron Thomas repeatedly informed Plaintiff he did not 
I While it is the Plaintiff's position that no written contract was ever validly executed between the parties, the 
Plaintiff offers this Cause of Action in the event that it is later detennined that a contract had been fonned between 
the Plaintiff and Defendants. By pleading this Cause of Action, however, the Plaintiff is in no way asserting that it is 
his belief that a validly executed contract was agreed to by the parties. 
VERiFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7 000029 
wish to do so. After numerous requests by Plaintiff, however, Ron Thomas reluctantly agreed to 
have an attorney prepare written documents. Plaintiff reviewed said documents and signed said 
documents which were then delivered to Defendant Ronald Thomas. 
44. Plaintiff fully and adequately performed every requirement placed on him by the 
aforementioned agreement except where the actions and/or conduct of the Defendants prevented 
his performance. 
45. Defendants, however, have failed to abide by the terms of said agreement and, as 
such, have materially breached it. 
46. As a result of this breach, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be 
proven with specificity at trial, but is in excess of $500,000. 
47. Plaintiff hereby reserves this paragraph for a claim of punitive damages pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 6-1604. 
COUNT FIVE 
Fraud 
48. Plaintiff hereby realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 47 of 
this Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 
49. Prior to the purchase of Johannesen Motors in late 1997, Defendant Ronald O. 
Thomas proposed to Plaintiff that if Plaintiff would leave his job at Lanny Berg Chevrolet and 
agree to manage and operate what would become Thomas Motors, Inc. at a drastically reduced 
salary, Defendant would give him Thomas Motors when Defendant turned age 63. 
50. Defendant Ronald Thomas made this offer in an attempt to induce Plaintiff into 
leaving his job and begin working for the Defendants. This offer was made in an effort to 
procure the Plaintiff's extensive knowledge and background related to the day-to-dayoperation 
and management of a large scale new car dealership. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL - 8 000030 
51. On infonnation and belief, when Defendant made these statements he knew that 
he had no intention of fully perfonning his obligations under the contract. 
52. When Defendant Ronald O. Thomas made the above-referenced offer he knew or 
reasonably should have known that Plaintiff would rely on his assertions and promises. 
53. In reliance on the Defendants promises and offer, Plaintiff quit his job and began 
working for the Defendant at a drastically below market salary with the understanding that when 
Defendant Ronald Thomas turned age 63 he would take over the ownership of Thomas Motors, 
Inc. and Plaintiff continued to perfonn in reliance of Defendants' promises for over eight and 
one-half years. 
54. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's fraudulent assertions, the 
Plaintiff has been harmed in an amount to be proven with specificity at trial, but is in excess of 
$100,000. 
55. Plaintiff reserves this Paragraph for the inclusion of a claim for punitive damages 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604. 
RESERVATION OF CLAIMS 
56. Plaintiff hereby reserves the right to include further claims that may be developed 
during the course of discovery in this matter. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
As a result of the Defendants' actions as set forth above, the Plaintiffhas been required to 
retain the law finn of White Peterson, P.A., to prosecute this action and has incurred and will 
continue to incur costs and attorney fees for which he is entitled to a separate award, pursuant to 
Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121, as well as any other applicable statute or rule, in an amount to 
be determined by the Court. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 9 000031 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury comprised of not less than twelve (12) persons on all 
issues so triable, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b). 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment, Decree, and Order from this Court as 
follows: 
1. For money damages from Defendants that fully and fairly compensates Plaintiff 
for Defendant's breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
and/or unjust enrichment in a sum to be determined at trial but exceeding $10,000; 
2. For money damages from Defendants that fully and fairly compensates Plaintiff 
for Defendants' fraud and/or misrepresentation in a sum to be determined at trial but exceeding 
$10,000; 
3. For costs and attorney fees under Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, and other 
applicable state laws; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this 011 day of June, 2006. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
BY:~Co~ 
William A. Morrow 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
R. DREW THOMAS, being first duly sworn, depose and say that he is the Plaintiff in the 
above-entitled matter, has read the foregoing COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL and verifies that the matters therein stated are true and correct, and as to those matters 
stated and information and belief, believes them to be true. 
DATED this~1 day of June, 2006. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this c;;J I day of June, 2006. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 7 --/7 - f) (,e 
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F t A.~ J£5 QM. 
John 1. Janis (ISB No. 3599) JUL 0 6 2006 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannoek Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 836.17-0188 
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136 
Fax No. (208) 365-'4196 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, 
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COMES NOW, the Defendants Ronald O. Thomas, Elaine K. Thomas and 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL - I 
ORIGINAfuOOU34 
Thomas Motors, Inc., by and through their attorneys of record, the law firm of Hepworth, Lezamiz 
& Janis, and H. Ronald Bjorkman, and in answer to the Plaintiffs Complaint, hereby states and 
alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff s Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief could be 
granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendants deny each and every allegation ofthe Plaintiff's Complaint not expressly 
and specifically admitted herein. 
Responding to the specific allegations in Plaintiff s Verified Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial, the Defendants respond, state, and allege as follows: 
1. The Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 3, 
inclusive. 
2. Responding to paragraphs 4 and 5 of Plaintiff s Complaint, the Defendants agree 
this Court has jurisdiction, and venue of this case is appropriate in Gem County. 
3. The general allegations stated in paragraph 6 through 9, inclusive, of Plaintiffs 
Complaint are denied. 
4. The Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
5. The allegations contained in paragraphs 11 through 21, inclusive, are denied. 
6. Responding to the allegations contained in Count One of Plaintiff's Complaint, 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 22 through 28, are denied. 
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7. Responding to the allegations contained in Count Two of Plaintiffs Complaint, 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 29 through 33, inclusive, are denied. 
8. Responding to the allegations contained in Count Three ofPlaintiWs Complaint, 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 34 through 41, inclusive, are denied. 
9. Responding to the allegations contained in Count Four of the PlaintiWs 
Complaint, the allegations contained in paragraphs 42 through 47 are denied, other than the 
Plaintiffs admission that he reviewed the written agreements with the Defendants, and that the 
Plaintiff signed said documents. 
10. Responding to the allegations contained in Count Five of the PlaintiWs 
Complaint, the allegations contained in paragraphs 48 through 55, inclusive, are denied. 
11. Responding to the "reservation of claims" stated in paragraph 56 of the Plaintiff s 
Complaint, the Defendants specifically object, and deny that the Plaintiff can properly reserve the 
right to include further claims in the Complaint document in this manner. Plaintiff is obligated to 
state any and all causes of action in the original Complaint, and to the extent the Plaintiff seeks to 
add any further causes of action, such must be accomplished by a motion practice consistent with 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute offrauds provisions under Idaho Code 
§ 9-505. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff's causes of action are barred by the applicable statute of limitations 
under Idaho law, including Idaho Code § 5-217, 5-216 and/or 5-218. 
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs claims in this action are barred by the doctrines of waiver. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs claims in this case are barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff s claims in this case are barred by the doctrine of laches. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The parties entered into written contractual agreement which superseded any prior 
oral agreements, promise and/or representation. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs did enter into written contractual agreements with the defendants, but 
the Plaintiff breached material provisions of said contracts, and thereby forfeited all contractual 
rights attendant thereto. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent the Plaintiff seeks equitable relief, such of Plaintiffs claims are barred 
by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs claims are barred due to an impossibility of performance. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff s claims are barred by the doctrine of release and/or accord and 
satisfaction. 
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
The Plaintiff s claims are without entirely merit in this action, and the Defendants 
are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in defense of this action 
pursuant to Idaho law, specifically including, Idaho Code § 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123. The 
Defendants are also entitled to recover such attorneys fees pursuant to the written contractual 
agreements between the parties in this action. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
The Defendants hereby demand a trial by jury of 12 persons, in accordance with Rule 
38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Defendants and each ofthem respectfully pray for judgment in 
this matter as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejUdice, and the Plaintiff 
take nothing thereby; 
2. That the Defendants recover judgment against the Plaintiff for all costs and 
attorneys fees incurred in defense ofthis action pursuant to Idaho law and/or 
the contractual Agreements between the parties; and, 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this ~'~ay of June, 2006. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this ~,/!:; day of ..:J1.tJl.. ,2006, he caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
William A. Morrow 
WHITE, PETERSON, PA 
5700 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
[XJ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[,.(J Telecopy (Fax) 
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William A. Morrow 
James M. Vavrek 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No.: 2451, 7256 
wam@whitepeterson.com 
jvavrek@whitepeterson.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[F II IL ~ [Q) 
··11: 'i3AM __ PM 
SEP , ~ 
dS~~~~~~ARD,CLERK 
~ ____ ~~~~~b~-DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 










RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. 
VA VREK IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
JAMES M. VA VREK, having first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter 
and have personal knowledge of all facts contained herein. 
2. That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference is a 
true and correct copy of PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. VAVREK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL - I 
SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, which was served upon 
Defendants, on July 7, 2006. 
3. That attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by this reference is a 
true and correct copy of DEFENDANTS RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. 
4. That attached hereto as Exhibit "c" and incorporated by this reference is a true 
and correct copy of a letter sent by Plaintiff's counsel to Defendant's Counsel to confer about, 
inter alia, access for inspection and testing of documents at issue in this motion. 
5. That attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated by this reference is a true 
and correct copy of the letter sent by Defendant's counsel to Plaintiff's counsel in response to the 
above-referenced letter. 
6. That attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated by this reference is a true 
and correct copy of a letter sent by Plaintiff's counsel to Defendant's counsel again attempting to 
confer about access for inspection and testing of the documents at issue in this motion. 
7. That attached hereto as Exhibit "F" and incorporated by this reference is a true 
and correct copy of a letter sent by Defendant's counsel to Plaintiff's counsel again denying 
Plaintiff access to the documents at issue in this motion. 
8. That Plaintiff has substantial need for the documents requested; as they are to be 
used in the preparation of its case and the Plaintiff is unable, without undue hardship, to obtain 
the substantial equivalent of the material contained therein by any other means. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
AFFIDA VIT OF JAMES M. VAVREK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL - 2 000041 
DATED this 11 day of September, 2006. 
J M. Vavrek 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / May of September, 2006. 
"" ....... ", 
"", 0 W DlJ II,#, 
.. " """ C IJ '", ~ ..... ~ ...•.... ""'", .: 'v,. .. '" "" b: • • ~ 
I~· ",RY". -; : c;,,! 0"( ,-i' :: 
(SEAi-) I .;;:. ,.' (.,: S 
':. "'..;. 0 .. 
-::. ~... P\J~ .l::t: i 
~ ••• •• C'\ "t' .: 
'", S' •••••••• G. 'v ...... 
_~K~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
My commission expires: 7-/"1.--1 d-
. "'''',,,, 7'.1 TE o~ ,,,,,, .. 
",'" ..... ',' CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this!1!!: day of September, 2006, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
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William A. Morrow 
James M. Vavrek 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No.: 2451, 7256 
wam@whitepeterson.com 
jvavrek@whitepeterson.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
PROPOUNDED TO DEFENDANTS 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, in accordance with Rule 33 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, you are hereby required to answer in writing the following 
interrogatories and requests within thirty (30) days from the date of service hereof. 
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I. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Procedure. You have a duty, pursuant to Rule 26(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to reasonably supplement and amend your responses. 
2. Dermitions. As used herein: 
2.1 Document. The term "document" means all writings of every kind 
pertaining to the subject matter of this litigation, including, but not limited to, the original or a 
copy of all records, letters, correspondence, appointment books, diaries, files, notes, statements, 
memoranda., reports, reports on investigations, telegrams, summaries, memoranda or minutes of 
meetings, conferences and telephone calls, receipts, written reports or opinions of investigators 
or experts, status reports, drawings, charts, photographs, negatives, brochures, lists, schedules, 
manuals, manuals used by investigators, expense accounts, fmancial statements, tax returns, 
estimates, inventories, contracts, agreements, drafts, working papers, tapes, data sheets, or data 
processing matter, including data recorded and/or stored electronically, however produced or 
reproduced, within your possession or subject to your control, of which you have knowledge or 
to which you now have or have had access, or of which any of your agents, attorneys, 
accountants or consultants have knowledge. 
2.2 Identify - Individuals. The term "identify," when used in reference to an 
individual person, means to state his or her name, including any aliases or former names, 
residence address and telephone number, occupation, employer, job title or position, business 
address, business telephone number, and present and/or last known whereabouts. 
2.3 Identify - Documents. The term "identify," when used in reference to a 
"document," means to state the date of preparation of the document, its author, the sender, the 
recipient (if any), the nature of the document (e.g., letter, memo, tape, etc.) and other means of 
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identification sufficient to identify the documents for purposes of a request for production, and 
its present location and custodian. If any such document was, but no longer is, in your 
possession or custody or subject to your control, state what disposition was made of it and give 
the name, address and telephone number of the person presently with possession, custody or 
control of the document. 
2.4 Identify - Business or Other Entity. The term "identify," when used in 
reference to anything other than a human being, including, without limitation, a corporation, 
partnership, joint venture, association, labor union, or other business, social or legal entity of any 
kind, means to state: 
(a) Full lawful name, and all other names or styles 
used, at any time, and for any purpose whether or 
not registered; 
(b) Business address and telephone; 
(c) Registered office and name and address of 
registered agent; 
(d) State and foreign countries where qualified to do 
business; 
(e) All business addresses and telephones in this State; 
(f) State and date of incorporation; 
(g) Name and address of chief executive officer; 
(h) Name and address ofIdaho agent for service of process; 
(i) Name, principal office, state and date of incorporation, and name 
of chief executive officer of: 
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(1 ) Any controlling corporation; 
(2) Any subsidiary corporation; 
G) Name and address of all persons owning a controlling interest, and 
a description of the extent of such interest. 
2.5 State the Sources of Your Information. The tenn "state the sources of your 
infonnation" means to "identifY" the person and the document from which infonnation was 
obtained when your answer to any question is not based on infonnation within your actual 
knowledge. 
2.6 Contact. The word "contact," in either the present or past tense, means 
conversations, telephone calls or conferences, conferences, meetings and correspondence. 
2.7 Instance. The word "instance" means each occasion a "contact" was made, 
and you are to state the date and circumstances surrounding the "contact," including the names 
and addresses of all "persons" involved. 
2.8 Communication or Discussion. "Communication" or "discussion" means a 
conversation, meeting, message, telephone call, letter, memorandum or any means of 
transmitting a message. When you respond to a question about a "communication," please state: 
(a) The date when it occurred; 
(b) The place where it occurred; 
( c) All persons party to it; 
(d) The manner in which it occurred (such as a letter, 
telephone call, or conversation); 
(e) The subject matter; and 
(1) Identify all documents which record the fact that the 
communication took place. 
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2.9 Person. "Person" means, without limitation, human beings, corporations, 
partnerships, joint ventures, associations, trusts, labor unions, or any form of business, social or 
legal entity. 
2.10 You. "You" means the party to whom these interrogatories are addressed, 
and your past or present attorneys, agents, employees, officers, representatives, adjusters, 
investigators, and any other "person" who is in possession, or who has obtained, information on 
your behalf. 
2.11 Gender, Number. As used herein, the singular shall include the plural, and 
anyone gender the others, as the context requires. 
3. Privilege. If, in responding or failing to respond to the discovery requested 
herein, you invoke or rely upon any privilege of any kind, please state specifically the nature of 
the privilege and the basis upon which you invoke, rely upon, or claim it, and identify all 
documents or other information, including contracts and communications, which you believe to 
be embraced by the privilege invoked. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Documents pertaining to this action. Please separately 
identify each document which pertains to any issue in this action. 
INTERROGATORY NO.2: Communications between you and each party to this 
action. Please separately identify each instance of a communication, discussion, or contract 
between you and your representatives and each party to this action which is relevant to any issue 
in this action or which you intend to offer in evidence at the trial of this action for any purpose. 
INTERROGATORY NO.3: Witnesses with knowledge of the issues. ect. Please separately 
identify each person who. according to your information or knowledge. or the information or 
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knowledge of your representatives, has knowledge of any of the issues or any of the occurrences 
which are relevant to this action. 
INTERROGATORY NO.4: Experts retained by not expected to testify. Please 
separately identify each person retained or specially employed by you as an expert in anticipation 
of this litigation or in preparation for the trial of this action whom you don not expect to call as a 
witness at the trial of this action. 
INTERROGATORY NO.5: Expert witnesses for trial. Please separately identify each 
person whom you may call as an expert witness at the trial of this action, and state the subject 
matter on which such expert witness is expected to testify, the substance of the facts to which 
such expert witness is expected to testify, and the substance of the opinions to which such expert 
witness is expected to testify. 
INTERROGATORY NO.6: Persons supplying answers hereto. Please separately 
identify each person who supplied answers to these interrogatories and designate the answers or 
answer or part thereof supplied by such person. For any answer or part thereof not within your 
actual knowledge, state the sources of your infonnation. (This interrogatory is intended to 
discover principal sources of infonnation and does not seek to ascertain the identity of mere 
draftsmen or persons responsible for the mechanical preparation of answers.) 
INTERROGATORY NO.7: Has you ever been party to any lawsuit or litigation? If 
your answer is anything other than an unqualified "No," then for each such case in which you 
were involved within the preceding fifteen (15) years, please set forth the following infonnation 
specifically and in detail: 
A. The title and nature of the action and a brief description of your role or 
part in it. 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION PROPOUNDED 
TO DEFENDANTS - 6 
00004~ 
to 
B. The name and address of the court and the case number. 
C. The resulting verdict or judgment. 
D. The name, address, and telephone number of all attorneys involved in the 
litigation. 
E. The name, address, and telephone number of each person or entity, other 
than yourself, who was a party to the litigation. 
INTERROGATORY NO.8: Please describe in complete detail all facts which form the 
basis of your denial of the allegation that: "Defendants, however, have failed to perform and/or 
continuously frustrated the purpose of the agreement by, inter alia, diverting funds from Thomas 
Motors and/or creditor's of Thomas Motors Inc to his and Elaine Thomas' personal use, 
diverting funds from Thomas Motors and/or creditor's of Thomas Motors, Inc. to unrelated 
entities, and unilaterally selling Thomas Motors, Inc. to a third party and, consequently, 
breaching the agreement with Plaintiff." By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons 
with knowledge, and any documents which support your denial. 
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please describe in complete detail all facts which form the 
basis of your denial of the allegation that: "Defendant Ronald Thomas made this offer in an 
attempt to induce Plaintiff into leaving his job and begin working for the Defendants. This offer 
was made in an effort to procure the Plaintiff's extensive knowledge and background related to 
the day-to-day operation and management of a large scale new car dealership." By this 
interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with knowledge, and any documents which 
support your denial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please describe in complete detail all facts which form 
the basis of your denial of the allegation that: "After being referred to Special Assets, Plaintiff 
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personally worked with Wells Fargo an extraordinary amount of hours at great personal sacrifice 
in order to maintain a flooring line of credit at Thomas Motors and assure Thomas Motors 
remained an open and viable entity." By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with 
knowledge, and any documents which support your deniaL 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please describe in complete detail all facts which form 
the basis of your denial of the allegation that: "In 2002, after bringing the loan with Wells Fargo 
up-to-date, Thomas Motors arranged with Key Bank for a new flooring line for used cars, a new 
flooring line for new cars and a new note on the real property upon which Thomas Motors was 
situated," By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with knowledge, and any 
documents which support your denial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please describe in complete detail all facts which form 
the basis of your affirmative defense that: "The Plaintiff's (sic) did enter into written contractual 
agreements with defendants, but the Plaintiff breached material provisions of said contracts, and 
thereby forfeited all contractual rights attendant thereto." By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks 
the facts, persons with knowledge, and any documents which tends to support this affirmative 
defense. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please describe in complete detail all facts which form 
the basis of your affirmative defense that: "The Plaintiff's claims are barred due to an 
impossibility of performance." By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with 
knowledge, and any documents which tend to support this affirmative defense. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please describe in complete detail all facts which form 
the basis of your affirmative defense that: "The Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of 
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release and/or accord and satisfaction." By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons 
with knowledge and any documents which tend to support this affinnative defense. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of a 
"Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement," "Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business 
Assets" and "Management Contract," which purportedly contains the signatures of Plaintiff and 
Defendants Ronald and Elaine Thomas. Please describe and explain in full and complete detail 
each and every effort made by you to comply with the requirements of this alleged Agreement. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please produce any and all documents related 
to the sale and/or auction of assets/inventory relating to Thomas Motors, Inc., Thomas Motors, 
Lot of Cars 2, Emmett Auto Parts (NAPA), Parts Plus, Emmett Auto Care, Thomas Auto Parts 
and any entity owned, operated, and/or controlled by either of the individual defendants in this 
action. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please produce copies off the tax returns for 
calendar years 1995 through 2005 inclusive. This request encompasses both the personal tax 
returns for the individual defendants as well as the corporate tax returns for any entity owned, 
operated, and/or controlled by either of the individual defendants during the referenced period. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please produce and/or make available for 
inspection/investigation the original document(s) which you claim and allege support your 
position that a valid written contract was executed between yourselves and Plaintiff. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Please produce copies of any and all exhibits 
you intend to use at the trial of this action. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: Please produce and attach copies of the 
educational and professional qualifications of all expert witnesses you will call at trial and also 
attach copies of each and every report generated by each expert witness referred to herein. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 1, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 2, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 3, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9: Please produce COpIes of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 4, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 5, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 6, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 7, 
including, but not limited to, all docwnents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all docwnents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce copies of any and all 
docwnents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Nwnber 8, 
including, but not limited to, all docwnents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 9, 
including, but not limited to, all docwnents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 10, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 11, 
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including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 12, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 13, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 14, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 15, 
including, but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and 
all documents which you identified in said answer. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21: Please produce any and all documents which 
document and/or demonstrate the transfer and/or sale of any item of inventory or asset between 
Thomas Motors, Inc., Thomas Motors, Lot of Cars 2, Emmett Auto Parts (NAPA), Parts Plus, 
Emmett Auto Care, Thomas Auto Parts and any entity owned, operated, and/or controlled by 
either of the individual defendants in this action. 
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.' 
DATED this ~day of July, 2006. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
By: 
a:es M. Vavrek 
ttomeys for Plaintiff 
-
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THIS COMMERCIAL LEAS! AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT ("Lease'" 
dated this 1 It day of September 2000, is CTltcred into by and bctwce.u RONALD O. THOMAS 
and BLAINE K. THOMAS. husband and wife, oltha County of Gem, State ofIcWlo 
(collectively referred. to herein as "Laadlord'1. THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation (''''teuaDt'), and R. DREW THOMAS, a single person, of the County of Gem., State 
ofIdaho (~'General Managert1. 
SeedOD 1. Real Property ad Improvements. 
1.1 Lease of Property. l..andlord hereby leases to Tenant, and Tenant hereby 
leases from Landlord, those two (2) certain parcels oftea1 property located m Gem County, 
Idaho, and more particularly descn'bed as Parcell and Parcel 2 on Exhibit A attaehcd to this 
Lease and incorporated by 1his reference as if set forth in full (collectively the "Leased 
Propertyj, Parcel 1 of which U:ascd Property conqi.ns an automotive sale$ and service facility 
(the "Premlsesj. and Parcel 2 of which Leased Property contains an automotive sales lot The 
Leased Property and the Premises are sometimes conectively rcfetred to as the "Property" in 
tbitLease. 
1.2 Substitution of Parcel 3. Parce13 ofrea1 property located in Gem 
County. Idaho and more particularly described on :Exlnbit A. which adjoins Parcell, shall be 
substituted for Parcel 2 under the terms ofScctionl.l at my tilDe prior to September I, 200S, 
which date of substitution sball be made by Tenant's assignee by giving Landlord at least ninety 
(90) days advance written notice. In the event ~ch notice has not been given at l~ ninety (90) 
days in advance of September 1. 2003. the parties shall review the space and property utilization 
plans of the dealership and mutually determine exaaly when the substitution shall occur. In 
recognition of'the fact that Parcel 3 is undeveloped real property, Tenant's assignee shall have 
the right to begin constrlletion of improvcmmts to prepare Paroel 3 to be an automotive sales Jot 
as soon as such notice bas been given, subject to the provisions of Section S. From and after the 
date of such notice,. the Leased. Property shall include ail three (3) parcels until the time of tho 
effective date of that notice, and thereafter the Leased Property shall include only Parcels 1 and 
3. 
1.3 Purcbase of Assets. The parties acknowledge that, concurrently herewith. 
Tenant and General Manager arc entering into that certain Management Contract (the 
"CoDtraef'), by which the General Manager first shall operate Tenant's automotive sales and 
SeMce business (the "Business") for a period of up to one (1) year from and after September 1, 
2000. The parties further acknowledge that, concwrcntly herewith, the parties arc entering into 
that certain Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets (the "Aereement''), by which 
General.Man.agcr thereafter shall acquire from Tenant all the asscts used by Tenant in connection 
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parcels of real property are sOmetimes collectively referred to as the 4'R.cal Property") in this 
Lease. The roll legal dcscdptiOllS for all thrcc (3) parcels of real property shall be insertccl into 
Bxhibit A within thirty (30) days after the date of this Lease. which legal descriptions shall 
reflect changes on the soutb boundary of Parcel I to straighten the property line thereby affecting 
the size olthe current bull p'cn. The commencement olthis Lease is conditioned upon the 
execution and delivery of the Con~c;t;md the A~t:T1t, 
Section 2. Term. 
2.1 lDldai Term. 'I'hc initial term of this Lease (the "Initial Term") is seven 
(7) years, beginning on September J, 2000 (the "Commencement Date") and. terminating on 
August 31, 2007. unless terminated carlier pursuant to the provisioJlS oitrus Lease. 
2.2 Termination upon Purchase. The Initial Term shall terminate 
cOD.CUtrCntly with the Gcncra1 Manager's purchase of Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real Property 
pursuant to the terms of Section 22.1 and Exhibit B of this Lease. 
SeedOD3. Rent. Tenant shall pay to Landlord. as tent for the Property, the following 
amounts, determined and payable in the manner and at the times set forth below: 
3.1 Secttl'ity Deposit. Initially, no security deposit shall be required of 
Tenant. However, should Tenant commit a material default under the terms of this Lease, 
Landlord shall then have tho right to require Tenanllo pay to Landlord a security deposit equal to 
two (2) months' rent. Ifa security deposit is paid, Landlord may usc all or any part of the 
security deposit foe the payment of any loss or damage occasioned by Tenant's default. If any 
portion of the security deposit is so used, Tenant shall, upon receipt of notice from Landlord, 
deposit cash with Landlord in an amount sufficient to restore the security deposit to 1ts Original 
amount. No interest shall be paid on the security deposit. and Landlord shan not be required to 
keep it separate from Landlord's genc:raJ funds. Upon full and timely:pcrformancc of Tenant's 
obligations under this Lease, the security deposit (Otremaining balance thereof) shall be returned 
to Tenant at the expiration oltho Initial Term througb the General Manager's purcbase of the 
Business and Parcels t and 3 of the Real Property. or upon the tennination oithe Contract. 
3.1 Real. Tenant shall pay to Landl~ without abatement or 
off-set unless expressly allowed by this Lease. the monthly ofTen Thousand and Noll 00 
Dollars ($10.000.00) for Parcell (and Pareel 3 when it is added to the Leased Property) and the 
monthly amount of One Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1.350,00) for ParceJ 2 as long 
as it is a part ofthc Leased Property ("Base Rent''). payable in advance on the first (bt) day of 
each calo.ndar month beginning on the Commencement Date. All rent shall be in law.tUl money 
or the United States of America. Each monthly payment of Base Rent is due on the first (1 st) 
calendar day of each month during the Lease term without the requirement of any notice or other 
reminder from Landlord to Tenant. The Base Rent shall be the same regardless of whether and 
when Parcel 3 is substituted for Parcel 1. 
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3.3 Additional Rent All amounts in addition to Base Rent which, pursuant 
to this Lease are to be paid by Tenant to or on behalf of Landlord, shall be considered 
"additloaal reaf' for all purposes under this tease. 
3.4 Late Fee. !fa monthly Base Rent payment is not received by Landlord by 
the tenth (10th) calendar day oltb.e month. Tenant shall be cb.lqcd a late fee ofOno Hundrec1 
and Nolioo Dollars ($100,00) per day (but not to exceed One Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars 
[$1,000.00] por monthly payment) retroactive to the first (1st) day of the month for each separate 
monthly Base Rent payment that is late. Late fees shall be additional rent due with the monthly 
Base Rent payment. TCI1II1t agrees that the late fee: (a) is a reasonable estimate of the costs that 
Landlord would incur by reason of a late payment, and (b) is in addition to aU other rights of 
Landlord and sbaU not prevent Landlord ftom exercising any other right or remedy available to 
Landlord by reason ofTenam's failure to pay rent when due. 
3.5 ApplleatioD of Payments. Payments made by Tenant to Landlord sball 
first be applied to late fees, if any, then to additional rent, if any, then to any other amounts duc 
fi'om Tenant to Landlord, ifany, and last to Base Rent, as adjusted.. 
3.6 Net Lease. The parties intend that this shall be a net 1ease and that an rent 
payablo by Tenant to Landlord hemmdor shall be net of all costs and expenses relating to the 
Property,. and that all such eosts and ~en$es paid or inClIlTed during the term of this Lease, 
including, but not limited to taxes. insurance, utilities. repairs and maintenance.. shall be paid by 
Tenant, unless otherwise expressly provided in this Lease. 
SectiOIl 4. Use of the Property. 
4.1 Permitted Use. Initially, the sole permitted. use of the Property under this 
Leese shall be the operation ot an automotive sales and service business (the "Permitted Usej. 
Any different use of the Property by Tenant shalt require the prior written consent of Landlord. 
wIrlch consent shall not be unreasonably withhcl~ conditioned or delayed. . 
4.2 LimitatioDs OD Use. Except with the prior written consent of Landlord 
(which consent shall Dot be unreasonably withheld. conditioned or delayed), no industrial. 
manufacturing or processing activity (except as is usual and incidental to the Pennitted Use) shall 
be conducted OD the Premises. Tenant shall not: (a) use the Property in any manner that would 
constitute waste nor shall Tenant allow the same to be committed thereon; (b) abuse walls, 
ccilin~ partitions, floors, woo~ stone, iron. work, landscaping or other parts of the Property; (c) 
usc plumbing, tire control, :fire sprinkler, electrical, security. telecommunications, beating, 
cooling, verttilation. elevator or other Property services. systems or facilities for any purpose 
other than that for which it was constructed; (d) make or permit auy noise or odor objectionable 
to tho public to omit from the Property; (e) (ifCate, maintain or permit a nuisance in or about the 
Property; (f) permit or do anything that is eontrary to any statu1eS, ordinances, rules, t'~gulation. 
and laws of any federal, state. or local governmental body or agency: (g) permit or do anything 







that is contralY to any applicable rules anel regulations of the National Fire Protection 
Association, the applicable Fire Rating Bureau and any s1mi1at bocUes; or (h) pennit or do 
anything that is contrary to any covenant. condition or restriction contained in this Lease. 
4.3 RaardOUJ Material Use. Tenant sball not cause or pennit any 
.-. U 1;)1 UC~ 
Hazardous Matcrlal to be brought upon, kept, or used in or about the Premises or Real Property 
by Tenant, its agents, employees, contractors, customers, clients, guests or invitees, except as 
incidental to Tenant's Pcnnittcd·Use of the Property. Tenant shall comply with all applicable 
laws and regulations regulating the use, reporting, storage, and disposal of Hazardous Material. 
4.4 Hazardous Materia] Definitloa. As used in this Lease, the term 
·~azardous MaterIal" means any bazardous or toxio substance. material or waste whicb is or 
becomes regulated by my federal, state or local governmental authority or political subdivision. 
The term ":Hazardous Material" includes, without limitation, any material or substance that is (a) 
dc.fincd as a 4lazardous substance" under applicable federal. state or local law. (b) petroleum, (c) 
asbestos, (d) polychlorinated biphenyl (""PCB''), (e) designated as a "'hazardous substance" 
pursuant to Section 311 oftbe Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. §1321), (1) 
defined as a "'hazardous waste" purswmt to Sccti0l11004 oftbe Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 
U.S.C. §6903), (g) defined as a "hazardous substance" pl.1ISWint to Section 101 of the 
Comprehensive E1'1Vi1'omnc:nta1 Response., Compensation and Liability Aet (42 U.S.C. §9601), 
(b) defined as a ~lated substance" pursuant to Section 9001 oftbe SoUd Waste Disposal Act 
(Regulation ofUndcrground Storage Tanks), 42 U.s.C. §6991, (i) considered a "hazardous 
chemical substance and mixture" pumwrt to Section 6 of the Toxic Substance Control Act (1S 
U.s.C. f 2605). or (J) defined as a "pesticide" pursuant to Section 2 of the Federal Insecticide. 
Fungicide and Rode:nticide Act (7 U.S.C. § 136). 
4..5 Disposal or Refu.se. Tenant shall store all trash and garbage within the 
Leased Property or in 811 area designed as appropriate therefor by Landlord. Tenant shan arrange 
for and bear the expense of prompt and regular removal of trash and garbage from ~e Leased 
Property. 
4.6 Approvals, Permits and Easemeats. During the term oftrus ~ 
Tenant shall have the right to apply for and obtain any approvals. permits or licenses from any 
governmental entity reqUired fot the use of the Pteinises as contemplated herein and, in 
connection therewith, Landlord agrees to cooperate. provided that all costs and expenses therefor 
shall be the sole obligation ofTcnant. 
4.7 Sec:a.rlty Servlces. Tawit acknowledges and agrees that Landlord bas no 
responsibility for security at the Property, and is not responsible for providing anncd or unanncd 
guards or watchnien. monitoring systems, security systems, fences, gates or any other security or 
security systems. Tcoant shalJ provide and maintain Security Services for the Property that are 
appropriate for Tenant's· use. The term "Security Services" includes, but is not limited to~ any 
watchmen, locks, fences, alarms, doors, or other services, devices, procedures, barriers or other 
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measures for the purpose of protecting, safeguarding, defending, or policing persons or property 
from 811)' theft, vandalism or other loss or damage. Tenant may use at install fences, loclcs. 
alanns, doors or other devices to provide Security Services, and the installation of any Security 
Services shall be (a) consistent with the overall design and use otthe Premises and Real 
Property, and (b) subject to the terms oftbis Lease regard.ing "alterations. improvements and 
additions" in Sectioa. S below. 
SectiOD 50 ImprovemeDts by TeD ant. Tenant shall not make any alteration. improvement 
or addition to the Property wi1hout the prior written consent of landlord, which consent may not 
be t.mrcaSOnably wi~cld, conditioned or delayed. All alterations, improvements, and additions: 
(a) sbaIl bo porfonned at the solo cost and expense ofTcmant in compliance with aU laws and 
regulations oiany federal. stat~ or local governmental body, and (b) shall become and remain 
tbe property of Landlord. In contracting fOr any alterations, improvements or additions, Tenant 
shall not act as the agent of Landlord. 
ScetlOD 6. Quiet Enjoyment. Landlord agrees that Tenant, upon paying the rent and 
performing the terms oCthis Lease, may quietly have, hold and enjoy the Property during the 
term hereof. 
Section 7. Taxes and Assessments. 
7.1 Payment ofTaDS and Assessments. During the term of this Lease, 
Tenant shall pay when due and before delinquency all ad valorem real property taxes levied and 
assessed against the value of tho Real Property and improvements ~ereon, and all personal 
property taxes levied. and assessed. against Tcnant~s trade fixtures and equipment and other 
personal property placed upon, or owned by Tenant in, on or about the Premises or the Real 
Property. 
7.1. Right to Contest. Tenant, at Tenant's cxpc.asc, shall have the right to 
contest the amowlt or validity of all or any part of the ad valorem rea) property taxes and 
assessments required to be paid by Tenant hereunder; provided, however. that Tenant shall 
indemnify Landlord against any loss or liability by reason of such contest. Notwithstanding such 
a contest, all taxes otherwise due and payable to Landlord by Tenant shall be paid upon demand, 
but any refund thereofby any taxing authority shall be the property of Tenant. 
7.3 New Taxes.. Tenant shall reimburse to Landlord promptly upon demand 
any a.nd all taxes and other charges payable by Landlord to any governmental entity (other than 
net income, estate and inheritance taxes) whether or not now customarily paid or within the 
contemplation olibe parties, by reason of or measured by the rent payable under this Lease, or 
allocable to or measured by the area or value olthe Premises and/or Real Property. or upon the 
usc and occupancy by Tenant ofthc P.n::miscs and/or Real Property, or levied for services 
rendered by or on behalf of any pubHe, quasil'ubJie or govenunentaJ entity. 
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Section 8. Malntenaee of Property; tJunties. 
8.t Routine Maintenance aDd Repair. Tenant shall, at its sole cost and 
expense, at all times be re&pODSl'blc for routine repairs and maintenance oftbe Property as shall 
be necessary to maintain the Property in the condition not less than the condition oCthe Property 
existing as oftbc commcnccmcnt of this Lease, normal wear and tear excepted. 
8.2 Stnlct1lral and Systems Maiatenanc:e. In addition to routine repairs and 
maintClWlCC as provided in Section 8.1 abovc, Tenant sbaU be responsible for paying for the 
struetura1 and systems maintenance oCthe Property and, in connection thelewith. shall (a) make 
thc repairs and replacements necessuy to maintain tho structural integrity of the Premiscs, 
including repairs and mainteDaDco oftbc foundations and load-bearing walls, (b) repair and 
maintain in good working order the roo~ paved parldng areas, and the heating, ventilating, all' 
conditiotUng, plumbing. and electrical systems. and (c) maintain the light ballasts. 
8.3 Tenant'. Liability for Repairs and Maintenance. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of this Lease. Tenant shall be liable for and shall promptly repair all damage to 
the Premises or Real Properly (:8.U$ed by Tenant or Tenant's partners, officers, directors, 
employees. invitees, guests, ~omers, elients or lieensees. regardless whether the damaae is 
caused by the negligence ofTCIWlt or such other persons. All repairs made by Tenant shall be at 
least equal to the original work in class and quality. tfTenant filils to so maintain or repair, (a) 
Landlord (or its agents) may. but is n.ot required to. enter the Premises at any reasonable time to 
perform maintenance or make repairs, and (b) Tenant shall pay to Landlord the cost of the 
maintenance or repairs perConned by Landlord as additional rent due with the next montbly Base 
Rent payment. 
8..4 Utilities. Tenant shall pay for all heat, air conditioning. water, light, 
power and/or other utility service, ineluding garbage and trash removal and sewage disposal, 
including all hookup fees or charges in connection therewith. used by Tenant in or about the 
Premises and Real Property during the term of this Lease. Tenant shall not be liable for any 
interruption or failure in the supply of any utility or service to the Property. 
, SeedoD 9. InsuraDce. 
9.1 Ten8llt's ObUgatioDB. Tenant shall purchase and kcep in force the 
following types ofinsuranee in the amounts specified and in the form hereafter provided: 
(a) Fire and Extended Coverage. A policy or policies of tire and 
extended coveragc insurance covering the Real Property and the Premises, in an amount not less 
than ninety percent (90%) of the full replaeement cost (exolusive of the cost of excavations, 
foundations and roofing), apinst any peril within the classification "fire and extended coverage" 
Oft at Landlord's election, "all-risk coverage." 1n addition, Tenant shall purchase and keep in 
foree rent insurance insuring Landlord against loss of rent durlng the period of repair or 
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rep1acc:ment of all or any portion of the Premises in the event of loss or damago. The insuranee 
provided for in this Section 9.1 (a) may be brought within. the coverage of a blanket policy or 
policies of insurance canied and maintained by Tenant. 
.(b) PubUc Llabmty ud Property Dama, .. A poliey or policies of 
comprehensive iCDcra1 liability insurance with broad form genetalliabllity en.dor$ement, or 
equivalent, with limits ornot less than One Million Dollars (S1,000,000) per person and One 
Million Dollars (Sl,OOO,OOO) per 0CCl1lTCIlCe ofbodily ~1JIy and property damage combined. 
Tho policy or policios shan also insutO against liability arising out oltho use, occupancy or 
m.aintcmancc olthe Premises and the Real Property. Said policy or policies shall designate 
Landlord as an additional insured. and shall speeifical1y insure theper.Fonnance by Tenant of the 
indemnity agreement(s) contained in Section 16.5 oftbis Lease. 
(c) Tenant'. Leuehold Improvements and Personal Property. 
Insurance covering all olthc items comprising Tenant's leasehold improvements, trade fixtures, 
equipment and personal property from time to time, in, 011 or upon the Real Property and. the 
Premises in an amount not less than ninety percent (90%) of their full replacement cost from time 
to time, providing protcctiOl1 against any peril included within the classifica.tion "fire and 
extended coverage," together with insurance against sprinkler damage, vandalism and malicious 
mischief and earthquakes. Any polley proceeds shall be used for the repair or replacemCllt of tho 
property damaged or destroyed. Landlord shall have no obligation to provide any insurance with 
respect to the Real Property or the.Premises. Bxcept as provided herein.. each of Landlord and 
Tenant (a) is not obligated to obtain, (b) is not obligated to be named in, (e) shall have no right to 
any proceeds of. and (d) waives all claims on, insurance purohased by or for the benefit of the 
other party. 
. 9.2 Poliey Form. All policies required to be provided by Tenant shall be 
issued in the names of Landlord and Tenant and evidence thereof shall be delivered. to Landlord 
within ten (l0) days after the date of this Lease and thereafter within 1hirty (30) days prior to the 
expiration orthe term of each policy. All policies shall be with an insurer with a Best's rating of 
13+ or higher, and shall contain a provision that the insurer shall give Landlord twenty (20) days 
notice in writing in advance of any cancellation or lapse or the effective date of any reduction in 
the amounts ofthc insurance. All public liability, property damage and other casualty policies 
required to bo provided by Tenant shall be written as primary policies, not contnbuting with and 
not in excess of coverage which Landlord may CarJ.'Y. 
9.3 Adjustmeat of Coverage. Not more frequently than every five (S)years 
during the term of this Lease it; in the opinion of Landlord based on industry and local standards 
and Tenant's use of the p.rc.mscs, the amount ofpubllc liability and property damage insurance 
required to be provided by Tenant is at that time not adequate, Tenant shall increase the 
In.su!ance coverage as reasonably dctennined by Landlord to be adequate. 
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9.4 Walvcr of Sobrogadon. To the extent permitted by their respective 
insurers, Landlord and Tenant (and each person claiming an intcrc5t in the Property through 
Landlord or Tenant. includinl all subtenants of Tenant) release and waive their entire right of 
recovery against the other for direct, incidental or consequential or other loss or damage arising 
out of; or incident to, the perils covered by insurance carried by each party, whether due to the 
negligence of Landlord or Tenant. If necessary, all insurance poHeies sball be endorsed to 
evidence this waiver. 
9..5 Failure to Insure. lfTcnmt shall &it to purchase and keep in force the 
insurance required by this Lease. (a) Tenant shall be in defimlt hereunder, sball be deemed to be 
self"insured aDd shall bear aU risk otloS! or damage, and (b) Landlord may, but shan not be 
required to, purchase and keep in force the required insurance, or any portion thereof; in which 
event Tenant sball reimburse Landlord the ft1I1 amount of LaDdlord' s cost with respect thereto 
within five (S) days aftc;r writtm demand therefor i$ delivered to Ttnant. 
Section 10. Damage or Destruction. 
10.1 Tcnnloatlon or Repair. If aU or any portion of the Premises or Real 
Property are damaged or destroyed by .tire or other casualty, Landlord shall deliver to Tenant 
written notice within thirty (30) days oftbe damage or destruction stating whether the Premises 
and Real Property can be tC:Storcd within. one hundred and eighty (180) days of tIle damage or 
destruction. Landlord sball have no obligation to expend more in repairing, restoring or 
rebuilding than the proceeds ofi.nsunmcc available for such purposes. ~ in Landlord's 
reasonable judgment., the insurance settlement. permit and construet:ion work for repairing and 
rebuildin,g the damaged or destroyed portion ofthc Premises or Real Property can be completed 
within the 180-day period with tho available insurance proceeds, Landlord shall promptly 
proceed to repair or rebuild 1hc damaged or destroyed portion of tho Premises or:Real Property. 
If; in Landlord' $ reasonable judgment, the insurance settlement, permit and eonstruetiOtt worlc for 
repairing and rebuilding the damaged or destroyed portion ofthc Premises or Real Property 
cannot be completed within the 180-day period with the available insurance proceeds, either 
Landlord or Tenant may terminate thls Lease upon thirty (30) days' written notice to the other 
party. 
. 10.2 Abatement or Apportionment of Rent. If the Lease is not terminated, 
and if the damage or destruction to the Premises or Real Property is not caused by the act or 
tailare to act of Ten ant. its partners, officers, employees, agents,. guests, customers, clients or 
invitees, then ajust portion olthe rent shall abate as altho dato of tho damage or destruction until 
the Premises and Real Property arC repaired or rebuilt. If the Lease is terminated. the rent shan 
be apportioned as of the date of the damage OT destruction. 
10.3 AJteradons, Improvements aDd Addldons. With respect to any damage 
or dcst:ruction ofTcnant's alterations, improvem~t. ot additions made to the Premises, (a) this 




Secti0J110 shall be inapplicable. (b) no abatement of rent sbaU 0CCUl', and (c) Landlord shan not 
be obligated to repair or rebuild Tenant's alterations. improvements, or additions. 
SecdOB 11. CoadcmDatioD. If aU of the Premises and/or ~eal Property are taken or 
condemned by 811 authority for any usc or purpose, t1UJ Lease shall terminate upon, and the rent 
shall be apportioned as ot; the date when actual possession of the Premises and/or Real Property 
is required for the condcrnnc:d usc or pmposc. Iflcss than all of the Pr=iscs are taken or 
condemned by any authority for any use or purpose, then (a) if the temamder of the Property is 
not reasonably sufficient for Tenant', business pmposes, then either Landlord or Tenant may 
terminate this Lease upon thirty (30) days' written notice of termination, or (b) the parties may 
continue the Lease and a just portion of tho rent will abate as olthe daW when actual possession 
of condemned portion of the Premises and/or Real Property is required tor the eondemned ~e Of 
purpose. All compensation and damages awarded for the taking of an or any portion of the 
Property shall be apportioned. between Landlord and Tenant on the following basis: (a) if 
awarded separately and not as part of tho general award to Landlord, Tenant shall be emitled to 
receive a sum equal to the exeess (if any) of the rental market value of the Property for the 
remainder of the Lease term over the present value (as of the date ofta.king) of the rent which is 
then payable fOT the remainder of the Lease term, plus compensation for the loss of Ten ant's 
trade fixtures, removable personal property. loss of business and good will, and relocation 
expenses, and (b) Landlord shall be entitled to the balance oCthe award. 
SeedOB 12. LaDdlord's Entry OD Property. 
12.1 Right OrEDtry. Landlotd, and.Landlord's authorized representatives, 
shall have the tight to enter the Property at all reasonable times at Landlord's discretion only for 
either of the following PUlpOscs: 
(a) To dctemdnc whether the Property is in good condition and 
whether Tenant is complying with this Lease; 
(b) To serve, post and keep posted any nouces required or allowed 
under the provisions of 1his Lease. 
12..2 No LiabUity. Landlord shall not be liable in any manner for any 
inconvenience, disturbance, loss of business, nuisance or other damage arising out of Landlord's 
cnby on the Property as set forth herein; provided, however, Landlord shall conduct its activities 
on the Property as allowed herein in a mlIJD.C!' that will cause the least possible inconvenience, 
annoyance or disturbance to Tenant. 
SeedOD 13. CoveDant Agamst Lieu. ' 
13.1 Liens Prohibited.. Tenaat agrees not to suffer or permit any lien 
(mcluding. but not limited to, tax liens and liens of mechanics or materialmen) to be placed 
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apinst the Premises or Real Property. If a lien is placed apinst the Premises or Real Property 
that is directly or indirectly related to an act or failure to act ofTenam. Tenant agrees to payoff 
and remove such lien within ten (10) days of receipt by Tenant ofnoticc oltho lien, regardless 
whether Tenant contests the validity of tho lien. Tenant has no authority or power to cause or 
permit any liM or other encumbrance created by act of Ten ant, operation of laws, or otheswise to 
attach to or be placed upon Landlord's title or interest in the Prcm.iscs or Real Property. Any lien 
or encumbrance shall attach only to Tenant's leasehold interest in the Property. . 
13.2 lallure to Pay Lie.. If Tenant shall default in the paying of a prohibited 
Hen an4 a suit to foreclose the same is 1i1ed, and. if Tenant has not given Landlord acceptable 
security to protect Landlord against any loss. damap and expense with respect to su.ch lien, 
l8t1dlord may, but shall not be required to, pay the lie.n and any related costs, and the amotmt so 
paid, together with reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection therewith, shaIl be 
immediately paid by Tenant to Landlord, together with intc:rcst thm;on at the prime rate of 
interest as 8.Dllounced ftom time to time by Pitst SeCurity Bank ofldaho, N.A. 
SectiOD 14. Default 
14.1 Default by Tenant. Tenant shall be in default under this Lease if any of 
the following shall occur (any one or more of the following herein. constituting an "Event of 
Default"): 
(a) Terumt fails to pay when due any monthly rent or other payment 
required to be paid by Tenant under this lease within ten (10) days of its due date; provided, 
however. that before declaring any default in the making of any payment required under this 
Lease, Lal1dlord shall provide to Tenant a written. notice spccifYiilg that there has been a default 
in the making of a required payment, and Tenant shan have three (3) business days after receipt 
of that notice within which to pay the delinquent amount and prevent a default hemmdcr. or 
(b) Tenant shall default in the observan~ or performance of any of 
Tenant's other covenants hereunder (other than the covenant to pay rent or any other sum herein 
specified to be paid by Tenant) and such default sbalI not have been cured within thirty (30) days 
after Landlord shall have given to Tenant written notice specifying such default; provided, 
however, that if the default complained. of shall be of such a nature that the same cannot be 
completeJy remedied or CUTCd. within such thirty-day period., th¢n such default shan not be a 
dcPault against Tenant for the purposes oftbis paragraph so long as Tenant shall have promptly 
eommenced. during such def3.ult and shall proceed with ail due diligence and in good faith to 
remedy the default complained of or 
(e) Tcnmt shall (1) file a voluntary petition in bankruptoy, or (2) be 
adjudicated bankrupt or insolveot, or (3) have a receiver or trustee appointed f-or all or 
substantially aU of its business or assets on the ground ofTe.aant's insolvency, or (4) suffer an 
order to be entered approving a petition filed against Tenant seeking reorganization of Ten ant 
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under the federal bankruptcy laws or any other applicable law or statute of the United States or 
any state tbereo( or (5) Tcmant shall make a gcocm1 assignment or general arrangement for the 
benefit ofits creditors. 01' (6) bankruptcy proceedinp shall have been instituted against Tenant 
which are not withdrawn or dismissed within sixty (60) days after the institution of said 
proceedings; or 
Cd) Tenant shall remove or attempt to remove, without the prior 
authorizationof'Landlord, any of'Tenant's fixtures, cquipmCllt, appliances or personal property 
fimn the Prcm.iscs for anyrcason othcrthan in the normal and usual operation ofTcnant's 
business; 01' 
(e) Tenant shall abandon t:h4 Premises. 
14.2 Remedies of Landlord.. Itt the event that Tenant commits. or allows to 
occur. an Event of Default. Landlord shall have the following remedies: 
(a) Legal and Equitable Remedies. Landlord. shall have all remedies 
available at law or in equity. 
. (b) Termination. Landlord shall have the immediate right, but not the 
obllgation,.to terminate Tenant's right of possession of the Property and/or, at Landlord's 
election, this Lease and all rights of'Tcnan1 hereunder, by giving Tenant written notice of 
Landlord's election to terminate. In the tNent that Landlord shall elect to so terminate this Lease, 
said election by Landlord sball, without being so expressly stated. be deemed an election by 
Landlord to accelerate all future rents payable under this Lease for tho Initial Term 01' then~ 
applicable Renewal Term to be .immediately due and payable, if such acceleration shall be 
required to permit Landlord to enforce any of tho ri,bts and romedies hereafter provided. In the 
event of such termination (and acceleration), Tenant agrees to pay to Landlord. and Landlord 
shall have the right to recover from Tenant the following: 
(1) The worth at the time of award or any unpaid rent which 
has been earned at the time of such termination; plus 
(2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the 
unpaid rent which would have been earned after tennination tDltil the time of award exceeds the 
amount of such rcntalloss Tenant proves could have been reasonably avoided; 1l1:Y.a 
(3) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the 
unpaid rent for the balance of the Initial Tenn or Renewal Tenn (as appHeabJe}after the time of 
award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that Tenant proves could be reasonably avoided; 
RlnI 
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(4) Any other amount ncccssa:ry to IX)tnpensat~ Landlord for all 
detriment, expense, Joss Of damage, including, but not limited to, all costs and expenses to re-
lease or sublet the Pl'Ol'erty, including the cost of alterations and remodeUnl required by a new 
tenant, attorneys' fees and real estate commissions paid or payable for this Lease or to re-lease or 
sublet the Property, proximately calJsed by Tenant's failure to perConn its obligations under this 
Leaw.nl»I 
(5) Any other amount ncoessary to compensate Landlord for all 
other demment, expense, Joss or damage, proximately caused by Tenant's failure to perform its 
obliga.1ions under this Lease (including. without limitation, the payment ortaxes, insuraDcc, and 
operating costs to the extent provided by this Lease); m 
(6) Anyothcr amounts owed to Landlord by Tenant. including, 
. without limitation. any sums of money or damages provided in Sections 1S.3, 15.4 or 21 otthis 
Lease. 
A3 used in this Section 14.2(b), the term "re.llt" shall be deemed to be and to mean the monthly 
.Base Rent and all other sums required to be paid by Tenant pursuant to the terms or this Lease. 
As used in paragraphs (1). (2) and (3) of this Section. the "worth at the time or award" is 
computed by allowing interest or discounting, as the case may be, at the rate equal to the 
discount rate afthe Federal Reserve Bank orSan Francisco at the time of award. All rental 
amounts received from any reletting of the Property during the balance of the then-appJicabJe 
tenn of this Lease (had tennination not oeeurred) shall be the property of Landlord. and Tenant 
shall have no right or claim to such rental amounts. The rental amounts received by Landlord 
prior to the time of tho award of damages as provided above shall constitute rental loss avoided 
by Landlord. 
(e) Advances. In thtrevent ofTcnant's breach beteo~ Landlord may 
remedy the breach for the acco1l1It and at the expense of Tenant. IfLandJord at any time, by 
reason of such breach, is compelled to pay, or elects to pay, any moneys or do any act which will 
require the payment of any moneys. or is compelled to incur any expense. including reasonable 
attomeys' fees and costs, in instituting or prosecuting 811y action or proceeding to enforce 
Landlordts rights under this Lease,. the moneys so paid by Landlord, with interest fi'om the date 
ofpaymimt, shall be addition rent and shall be due from Tenant to Landlord as provided in 
Section 3 hereof. 
14.3 Re-Elltry 011 Termination. In the event olthe termination of Tenant's 
right of possession and/or this Lease by Landlord hereunder, Landlord shall have the right to re-
enter the Property and remove therefrom all persons and property. 
14.4 Re-Entry on No.ll-Termination. In addition to the other rights of 
Landlord herein provided, Landlord shall have the right without terminating this Lease, to re-
enter and retake possession of the Property and collect rents from any subtenants and/or sublet in 
the name of Landlord or Tenant the whole or any part otthc Property for the account of Ten ant, 
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upon any terms or COnditiODS detc:nnined by Landlord. In tho event of such subleasing. Landlord 
shall have the right to collect any teI1t which may become payable under any sublease, and appJy 
the samo first to the payment of expenses incurred. by Landlord in dispossessing the Tenant and 
in subletting the Property, including attomeys' fees, real estate commissions and repairs and. 
thereafter, to the payment of the rent herein requinxl to be paid by Tenant, in mlfiDmcnt of 
Tenant's covenants hereunder, and Tenant shall be Hable to Landlord for the rent herein required 
to be paid, less any amount actually received by Landlord from a sublease and, aAer pa.yment of 
expenses in~ applied on account of the rent clue ht:reundet. In the event of such election, 
Landlord shall not be deemed to have tcnninatcd this Lease by taking possession of the Property 
unless notice ofterrnination, in writing, has been given by Landlord to Tenant. 
14.5 Right of EDUy-LleD. for PerformaDce. 111 addition to any other rights of 
Landlord as provided in this Section 14, upon the default of Ten ant, Landlord sball have the right 
to enter the Property, change the locks on doors to the Premises and exclude Tenant therefrom 
and, in addition, take and retain possession of any property on the Premises or Real Property 
owned by or in the possession of Tenant as and for security for Tenant's perfonnanee. Tenant 
hereby grants to Landlotd a. lien under applicable Idaho law on all of said property, which lien 
shall ICCUl'O the tUturepcrfonnancc by Te:J811t of this Lease. No property subject to said lien 
shall be removed by Tenant ftom the Property so IonS as Tenant is in detault of any monetary 
obligation under this Lease. No action taken by Landlord in connection with the enforcement of 
its rights as provided in this Section 14 shall constituto a trespass or conversion except as to 
pet'$ons holding prlOl' security interests in said property, and Tenant shalJ indemnify, save and 
hold Landlord harmless from and against any such claim or demand OJ18CCOU1lt thereot 
14.6 Enforeement. Tn the event ofa defau.lt by Tenant under this Lease. 
Landlord may at any time, and from time to time, without terminating this Lease, enforce all of 
its rights and remedies under this Lease, or allowed by law or equity, including the right to 
recover all rent as it becomeS due. The enforcement by Landlord of any rights or remedies 
pro\lided in thi. Section 14, Of allowed by law 01' equity. shall not constitute the election by 
Landlord to tenninate this Lease unless such election is in a writing signed by Landlord (or 
Landlord's authorized agent) and delivered to Tenant. 
14.7 Security Deposits. If'Landlord terminates this Lease because of the 
default of Ten ant as providecl in this Section 14, or if Landlord exercises its right ofpossession 
under Section 14.4 above. without terminating this Lease, then Tenant shall immediately transfer 
to LandJord all security deposits previously paid to Tenant by subtenants h.ving • right to 
bccupy the Property at the date of said termination; 
14.8 Additional Security. As additional security for Tenant·s perfonnanee of 
this Lease, Tenant hereby assigas and sets over to Landlord as security for the pcrfonnanec of 
Tenant's obligations under this Lease, all subleases entered into by Tenant with respect to the 
Property, and all rents due or to become due under said subleases, subject to the right of Ten ant, 
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by license granted to Tenant by Landloni, to collect and retain said rents, 8C) long as Tenant is not 
in default under this Lease. 
14.9 Mltlgatloa. Nothing herein contained shall relieve Landlord from tho 
obJiptfon to make reasonable etTorts to mitigate the Joss or damage occasioned by a default of 
Tenant, provided that said obligation to mitigate shall not relieve Tenant of tho burden of proof 
as required. in this Section 14 or othetwise a.ff'ect the rights and remedies available to Landlord in 
the event of a default by Tenant as provided in this Sect101l, or otherwise allowed by law or 
equity. 
14.10 Default by Laadlord. Landlord sball be in default under this Lease if 
Landlord f8.ils to perform. or observe any covenant, agreement or condition which Landlord is 
req,1lired to perfOnn or observe and the failure sha11 not be cured within thirty (30) days after 
delivery of written. notice to Landlord by Tenant of the fail'Ul'e. 
14.11 Remedies ofT.ant. In the CVC.D.t ofLandlord·s default as set forth in 
Section 14.10. Tenant shalJ have all rights provided at law or in equity, except Tenant expressly 
waives any right to the abatement or withholding of rent payable to Landlord llndcr this Lease. 
Tenant's obHgation to pa.y rent is independent of aU other rlglrts. and Tenant may not withhold 
rent payments to Landlord or pay reut to other parties or into any escrow or holding account 
because of the default or alleged default of Landlord. 
Section 15. TermiDatioL 
15.1 EvenCS ofTermblatioD. This Lease shall tenninat'e upon the OCCtP'T'el1oe 
of one or more of the following events: (a) by mutual written agreeme.a.t of Landlord, Tenant and 
General Manager; (b) by Landlord pursuant to this Lease; (c) by Tenant P1D.'SU8nt to this Lease; 
(d) upon lapse of tho Initial Term, (e) by reason of Sections 10 or 11 relating to dcstructiOil or 
condemnation oftbe Property, or (1) upon General Manager's purchase ofParc:els 1 and 3 of the 
Real Property pursuant to Seaion 22.1 and Exhibit B of this Lease. 
15.2 Surrender ofPossessioD. Upon termination of this Lease, otherthm a 
termination because the General Manager shall have pwcl1ascd Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real 
Property as provided in Exhibit B attached to this Lease and incorporated as if set forth in full, 
Tenant wi1J immediately sumndcr possession of the Property to Landlord. Upon termination of 
this Lease for any reaso~ Tenant will immediately Sll:.t'1'eI1der possession ofParee12 to Landlord. 
If possession is not immediately surrendered, LandJord may re-enter and repossess the Property 
and remove an persons or propmy using such force as may be necessary without being deemed 
guilty of, or liable for. any trespass, fotc1'blc entry, detainer, breach of the peace, or damage to 
persQD$ or property • 
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15.3 CoDditioD of Property UPOD Termination or AbandoDJDeDt. Tenant, 
upon tennination or abandonment of this Lease or termination of Tcnantt 8 right of possession. 
agrees as follows: 
<a> Removo Altcntto.... Tenant shall not remove any alterations, 
improvements or additiODS madc to the Property by Tenant or others without the prior written 
consent of Landlord. which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Tenant shall 
immediately remove, in a good and workmanlike matlnel' (a) all personal property ofTcs:umt, and 
(b) the alterations, improvements a.a.d additions made to the Property by Tenant as Landlord may 
request in writing to be removed. All damaae occasioned by the removal shall be promptly 
repaired by Tenant in a good and worlananlikc manner. U'tenant fails to remove any property, 
Landlord may (a) acc:ept the title to the property without credit or compensation to Tenant, or (b) 
remove and store the property, at Tenantts expense, in any reasonable manner that Landlord may 
choose. 
(b) Restore Premises. Tenant shall restore the Property to tho 
condition cxistiD,g on the commencement of this Lease, with the exception of (a) ordinary wear 
and tear, and (b) alterations. improvements and additions which Landlord has not directed to 
Tenant in writing to remove. If Tenant fails to properly restore the Property. Landlord. at 
Tenant's e%petlSc, may restore the Property in any reasonable mattnct that Landlord mayehoose. 
15.4 Holding Over. Should Tenant continue to occupy the Property, or any 
part thereot; after the expiration or earlier tcnnination of this Lease, whether with or against the 
consent of Land10rd, such tenancy shalJ be &om month to month. In the event of such a holding 
over. the obligations of Tenant shall be the same as were in effect at the date of said expiration or 
termination and the monthly rent to be paid by Tenant to Landlord shall be equal to one hundred 
twenty-five percent (12S%) ofthc monthly rent in force and effect for the last month of the tcr.m 
expired or terminated. 
Section 16. Oalms and Disputes. 
1'-1 Rights and Remedies Cumulative. Except as expressly provided in this 
Lease, each party's rights and remedies described. in this Lease are cumulative and not alternative 
remedies. 
16.1 NOD waiver ofRemedics. A waiver of any condition stated in this Lease 
shall not be implied by the neglect of a patty to enforce any remedy available by reason of the 
failure to observe orperlbrm the condition. A Waivei' by a party shall not affect any condition 
other than the one specified in the waiver and a'waiver shall waive a specified condition only for 
the time and in the manner specifieally stated in the waiver. The acceptance by Landlord of rent 
or other money from Tenant after termination of the Lease, after termination of Tenant' s right of 
possession. after the occurrence of a def3u1t, or after institution of any remedy by Landlord shall 
COMMERCIAL LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT· IS 
U000'74 
I 




,,,,",'''''''Il0l -'U.,I """0' 1'. U'f/Ul9 
not alter, diminish, affect orwaivc.r the Lease termination. te.tmination ofposscssion. default or 
remedy. 
16..3 Waiver ofNotlee. Bxeept as provided in Section 14.1{a), Tenant 
expressly waives the service of any demand for payment of rent or for possession. 
16..4 Waiver of Claims. Exclusive of direct damages caused by the ncsligcncc 
or willfUl misconduct of Landlord, Landlord and Landlord's partners, di:rcetors, officers, agents, 
servants and employees shall not be liable tor any direct or eonsequential damages (including 
damages claimed for actual or constructive eviction) either to the person or property sustained by 
Tctl811t or TCD8l1t's ~ officers, directors, employees, invitees, guests, customers, clients or 
liQenSeeS due to (a) any part of the 'Premises or Real Property not being in repair, or (b) the 
happening of ally incident on the Prcmisc::s or R.ca1 Property. This waiver shall include, but not 
be limited to, damage caused by cold, heat, water, snow, ftost, sewage, pt. or the mal.fi.mction. of 
any plumbing, fire control, .fire detection, fire sprinkler, electrical, electronic, computer, security. 
telecommunication, heating, cooling or ventilation systems, facilities or installations on the 
Premises or Real Property. 
16.5 lndellJllJfJcatioL To the extent caused by an act or fiUlure to act of 
Tenant OT Tenant's partners, officers, employees, invitees, guests, CUBtomers, clients or licensees, 
and regardless whether the act or failure to act is negligent, Tenant shall defend, indemni1Y and 
hold harmless Landlord and Landlord's partners, officers, directors, agents and employees from 
any liabilities, damages and expenses (including attorneys' fees and costs) arising out of or 
relating to <a) the Premises or Real Property. or (b) Tenant's use or occupancy oftbe Property. 
16.6 Hazardous Material Indemnification. Tenant shall indemnify, defend 
and hold Landlord harmless ftom any and all claims. judgments, damages, ·penaltieS. fines. costs, 
liabilities or losses (including, without limitation, diminution in value of the Premises or Real 
Property, damages for the loss or restriction on usc ofrcntable or useable space or any amenity of 
the Premises 01' RcaJ Property, damages arising from any adverse impact on marketing of space, 
and sums paid in settlement of claims. attorneys' fees. consultant fees and expert fees) which 
arise during 0"( after' the Tenn as a res .. t1t of Ten ant's breach of the obligations stated it) this Leue 
i'egarding Hazardous Material. This indenmiticatiol1 of LandlOrd by Tenant includes. without 
limitation, costs incurred in connection with any investigation of site conditions or any cleanup, 
remedia4 removal. or restoration work required by any federal, state. or local governmental 
agency or political subdivision because of Hazardous Material iIitroduced during the Lease term 
into the soil or ground water on ot Wlder the Premises 01' Real Property. Without limiting the 
preceding, if the presence of any Hazardous Material on the Premises or Real Property caused or 
penn.itted. by Tenant results in any contamination of the Ptemise$ or Real Property, Tenant shall 
promptly take all actions at Tenant's sole expense as are necessary to return the Premises or Real 
Property to the condition c:xisting prior to thc introduction of any Hazardous Material to the 
Premises or Real Property. 




<a> Notwithstanding any other provision oftbis Lease or any contrary 
provision of law, the oblipti01l$ ofTcnant pur&uant to this Section 16.6 shall remain in full force 
and efCect until the exphation of the latest period stated in any applicable'statute ofJimitations 
during which a claim, cause ot action or prosecution rcla.tin. to the matters dcscnDcd hcrdn may 
be brought, and until payment in fWl or sa.t:isfaction of any and all losses, claims, causes of 
action. damages, Habilities, cba:raes, costs and expenses .for which Tenant is liable hereunder 
shall have been accomplished. 
(b) II any claim, demand, action or proceeding is brought against 
Landlord which is or may be subject to Tenant's obligation to indemnifY Landlord as set forth 
Wldcrthis Section 16.6, Landlord shall provide to Tenant immediate notice of that claimt 
demand, action or proceeding, and Tenant thereafter shall defend Landlord at Terumt·s cxpcnsc 
using attorneys and other counsel selected by Tenant and reasonably acceptable to Landlord. 
16.7 Etrect ofLudJord Insunmce OD Tenant ObUeations. Prom time to 
'time and without obligation to do so, Landlord may purehase insurance against damage or 
liability arising out ot or related to the Premises or Real Property. The purchase or failure to 
purchase insurance shall not release or waiver the obligation of Tenant set forth in this Lease. 
TClUlllt waives aU claims on insurance purchased by Landlord. 
16.8 Disputes.. This Lease shall be governed by the laws of the State ofIdaho, 
without regard to contlicts oflawa principles. The Idaho courts have exclusive jurisdiction and 
Gem County is the proper venue. 
16.9 Teaao.t's Respoo.sibUity for Prior Contamination by Hazardous 
Substances. Tenant agrees to indemnify, defend, protect and hold harmless Landlord from and 
apiost any and aU criminal and civil claims and causes of action (incJuding. but not limited to, 
claims resulting from. or causes of action incurred in connection ~ the death of or injury to 
any person. or damage to any property), liabilities (including, not limited to, liabilities arimng by 
reason of actions taken by any govemmcntal agency), pcna1ties. forfeitures., prosecutions, losses 
and expenSes (including reasonable attorneys' fees) which directly or inttirectly arise from or are 
caused. by the presence, prior to andlor after the commencement of thc Lease, in. on, under or 
about the Real Property or the ~ of my Hazardous Materials. Tenant's obligations under 
this Section 16.9 shall include. but not be limited to, the obligation to bear the expense of any 
and all costs, whether foreseeable or unforeseeable,'ofany necessary (as required by the Laws) 
repair, cleanup. detoxification or decontamination of an or any portion of the Property (or any 
improvcmC1lts located th~n), and the preparation and implementation of any closure, remedial. 
action or other required plan or plans in connection therewith. 
Section J 7. Assignment aDd Subletting. 
17.1 RestricdollS 00. Assignment and SUbletting. Except as expressly 
provided in Section 17.2 below, Tenant shan not transfer, assign. subl~ enter into license or 
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concession agreements, change ownership or hypothecate this Lease 
to the Real Property or the Premises (hereinaf\er ''tnufcr") withou 
consent of Landlord, which consent may not be unrc::asonably witbht 
Any transfer oftbis Lease. the leasehold estate created hereby. the R 
any portion thereof; either vohmtarily or involuntarily, whether by 0, 
without the prior written consent ofLaDdlord, shall be null and void 
Landlord, eonstiuno a material default under this Lease. Tenant agre 
reasonablc attorneys' fees and othOI' necessary costs incurred in conn 
and documentation of any such requested tnmsfer of this Lease or Te 
Property. The transfer of a majority of the issued and outstanding CBj 
however, accomplished, shall be deemed an assignment of this Lease 
17.2 Permitted Assignmcl\t. Notwithstanding thc 1 
above, Tenant may and sha11 assign this Lease to the General Manage 
directly or indirectly controlled by the GCIlml Manager concurrently 
Agreement; and the term "control" (mcluding the term "controUec1 b 
directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of tI 
policies ofa business entity, whethcrtbrough the ownership of voting 
17.3 Consent to Modifications. The assignment of 
the consent oCLandJOtd shall, without being specifically so stated or al 
express agreement by Tenant that subsequent modifications of this ~ 
assignee shall not (a) require any prior consent or approval ofTcnant (l 
relieve Tenant (assisnor) &om liability hereunder; provided~ bowever, , 
inCl"eaSC the fent or other obligations otTenant bereunder, Tenant's (as; 
limited 'to the terms olthis Lease as the same existed on the date of assi 
ScctiOD 18. Waiver. The waiver by LandJordof any breach of any t 
conditions oCthis Lease shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any past, 
of the same or any othc'r term, covenant or oondition of this Lease. The 
Landlord hereunder shall not be construed to be a waiver of any teon 0' 
by Tenant of a lesser amonnt than shall be due accorc.ting to the terms 0 
deemed or constru.ed to be other than a part payment on account oftbe ' 
shall any endorsement OT statement on any cheek or letter accompanyit 
to create an accord and satismotion. 
Section 19. Relationship of Parties. Nothing contained in this Lea 
c;reating the relationship of principal or agent, partn~p or joint venn 
Tenant Neither the method of com.putation of rent nor any other provi 
act of the parties, shall be deemed to create any relationship other than 
Tenant. 
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Section 20. Notices. Any notice or demand given under the terms of'tbis Lease shall be in 
writina and shaI1 be deemed to be delivered on the date or delivery if delivered in person or by 
facsimile, or on the date ofrecef.pt if clelivCRd by U.S. Postal Service or express couric:t. Proof 
of delivery sball be by affidavit ofpOl'SOnal delivery, machine-generated con:fhmati.on of 
facsimile transmission, or return receipt issaecl by the U.S. Postal SaMce or express courier. 
Until changed by notice in writing, notices, demands and communications $hall be addressed as 
follows: 
LANDLORD: 
Ronald O. Thomas 
Blaine K.. Thomas 
1550 S. Washington 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
TENANT: 
Thomas Motors, Inc. 
2121 Service Avenue 
Emm~ Idaho 83617 
Attn: Drew Thomas 
GENERAL MANAGER 
R. Drew Thomas 
2121 Service Avenue 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Any party shall have the right to change its above address by notice in writing delivered to the 
other party in accordance with the provisions of this Section 20. 
SecdoD 21. Attoracy.' Fees .. d Costs. 
21.1 Gelleral De1'.a1lIt. It either party shall defim1t in the payment to the other 
party of any sum of money specified in this Lease to be paid, or if either party shall de!a'Ult with 
respect to any other obligations in this Lease. all attorneys' fees inctmed by the other party shall 
be paid by the defaulting party, and if said sum is collected or the default is cured before the 
Commencement of a suit thereon, as a part of curing said deJ.1..ult. reasonable attomeys· fees 
inctttTed by the other party shall be added to the balanco due and payable or, in the case of a non-
moncrtary dcf4ult, shall be reimbursed to the other party upon demand. 
21.2 Litigation. In the event either party to this Lease shan interpret or enf-orce 
any ottho provisions hen:ofby any action at law or in equity, the non-prevailing party to such 
litigation agrees to pay to the picvailing party all costs and expenses, including reasonable 
attomcys~. accoUllf:ants' and appraisers· fees incurred therein by the prevailing party. including 
all such costs and expenses .incuaed with respect to an appeal and such may be included in the 
judgment entered in such action. 
Section 22. Misee1JaDeOUs. 
22.1 Sale and Purchase of Pareds 1 and 3. General Manaser shall purchase 
Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real Property, including aU improvements located on those parcels. on the 
terms and conditions set forth on Exhibit :s attached to this Lease and incoporatcd by this 
reference as if set forth in rull. 
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12.2 Estoppel Cortificate. Either patty shan, at any time, upon not less than 
ten (10) days' prior written notice from the other party (1he '1'equutlne party''), execute, 
aoJc:nowled,ge and deliver to the other party a statement in writing (a) certUYing that this Lease is 
unmodified and in 1\111 force and effect (or, ifmodified, stating the nature of such modification 
and certifyin, that this Lease. as so modified, is in 1Ul1 force and effect) 1t14 the date to whicb the 
rent and other charges arc paid in advance, (b) aektlowledpg that there arc.not. to the other 
party's knowled.ae, any uncured defaults on the part of the requestin, party hereunder, or 
spccifyia.g such defaults if they are claimed,. aDd (e) containing any other certifications, 
aeknowledgments and representations as may be reasonably requested by the requesting party or 
the party for whose benefit such estoppel eertificate is rcqucstcd. Any such statement may be 
concluslvely relied upon by any prospective purchaser or CDCUmbran.ces of the Property or 
Tenant's leasehold estate therein. A party's failure to deliver such statement within said time 
shall be conclusive upon the said party (a) that this Lease is in tUn force and effect, without 
modi1ication except as maybe represented by the requesting party, (b) that there are no uncured 
defaults in the rectuesting party's performance, (c) that not more than an amount equal to one (1) 
month's rent has been paid in advance, and (d) that such additional certifications, 
acknowledgments and representations as arc requested under clause (c) of the preceding sentence 
are valid, true and col'l'CCt as shall be represented by the requesting party. If Landlord desires to 
finance or refinance the Property. Tenant hereby agrees to deliver to any lender designated by 
Landlord such financial statements of Tenant as may be teaSOnably requited by such lender, and 
ail such financial statements shall be received by Landlord in confidence and shall be used only 
for the purpose herem set forth. 
12.3 Tnmsfer olLaBdlord's lDterest. In the event of a sale or conveyance by 
Landlord of the Property, other than a transfer'for security purposes only, Landlord shall be 
relieved .&om all obligations and liabilities accruing thereafter on the part of Landlord (with the 
e:xeepti01l oltho obligations imposed on Landlord under Section 16.9, which shall be 
continuing), provided that any funds in the hands of Landlord at the timo of transfer in which 
Tenant has an interest shall be delivered to the successor of Landlord.. This Lease shall not be 
a:t'fected by any such sale and Tenant agrees to attorn to the purchaser or assignee, provided all 
Landlord obligations hereunder arc assumed in writing by Landlord successor. 
22.4 . Severability. If any teJ:m or provision of this Lease shaH be determined 
by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder o£this Leasc 
shall not be affected thereby and each term and provision of this Lease shall be valid and be 
enforCeable to the fullest extent permitted by lilw; and it is the intention of the parties that if any 
prov.is.ioll of this Lease is capable of two (2) cxmstruotions. one of which would render the 
provision void and the other oiwhieh would render the provision valid, then· the provision shall 
be interpreted to have the meaning which renders it valid.. 
22.5 Forco Majcu .. e. Any prevention, delay or stoppage due to'strikes, 
lockouts. labor disputes, court orders. acts of God. inability 10 obtain labor or materials or 
reasonable substitutes therefor, governmental restrictions, governmental regulations, government 
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controls, enemy or hostile government action, civil commotion, fire or other casualty and other 
causes beyond the reasonable control of the party obliga.tcd to perform shall excuse the 
performance by such party for a period equal to any such prevention, delay or stoppage, provided 
that this Section 22.S shall not be applicable to the obligations imposed with regard to rent and 
other charges to be paid by Tenant pursuant to this Lease. 
11:Cr-·-€pDStracdon. All parties hereto have either (a) been represented by 
--.. Il~aratc lep!..£9.UTlScI;"6r (b) have had the opportunity to be so represented. Thus, in a11 cases, 
_--l.D~ID this Lease shall be construed simply and in accordance with its fair meaning and 
not strictly for or against a party, regardless oCwhich party prepared. or caused the preparation of 
this Lease. 
22.7 Sueeessioll. This Lease and all obligations contained herein shall be 
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit oltho respective hclrs, personal representatives. 
successors and. assigns ofthc parties hereto; provided, however. that any assignment of this 
f . Lease or. any part hereof shall be subj.~ to the provisions of Section 17, above •. 
21.8 Recording. Landlord shall, promptly upon request by Tenant. execute a 
memorandum oflcase which may be .recorded by T~t in Gem County, Idaho. 
11.9 Geacnl. The defined tenn "Landlord" as used in this Lease, shall include 
the plural, as well as the singular. Words used in the neuter gender melude the masctlline and 
femimne, and words in the masculine or feminine gender include the neuter. The term 
"Landlord" shall mean only the owner or owners at the time in question of the fcc titlc to the 
Property (exCept for purposes of Section 16.9 t which applies to those persons initially executing 
this Lease as Landlord). With the exoeption of the obligations imposed under Section 16.9 
(which shall eontinue to be binding on the perSons initially executing this Lease as 
Landlord). the obligations containod in this Lease to be perftmned by Landlord shall be binding 
only during Landlord's respective period of ownership. 
22.10 SCdiOD Headings. The Section headings, titles and captions used in this 
Lease are for convenience only an~ are not part of this Lease. 
22.11 EDdre Agreement. This Lease. including the Exhibits attached hereto. 
and the Contract of even date herewith, contain the entire agreement between the parties as of 
this date concerning the subject matter hereof and supersede any and all prior asreements, ora' or 
written. between the parties concerning the subject matter berea! Tho execution hcrcofhas not 
been induced by either party, or any agent of either party, by representations, pl'Otnises 01 
undertakings Dot expressed. herein or in the Contract and, further, there 8le no collateral 
apements, sti:pulations, covenants, promises, inducements or UTld.ertaJc:jngs whal$oever between 
the respective parties concerning the subject ntBttcr of this Lease or the Property which are not 
expressly contained herein or in the Contract. 




~rHA}CU~ jb~ 4196 
'1) 
22.lZ Time Is of the Esseac!. T"tme is olthc essence with respect to the 
obligations to be performed under this Lease. 
P. 004/ OlE 
IN WlTNBSS WHBRBOF. the parties hereunto executed this Commercial Lease 
Agreement the day and year first above written. 
LANDLORD: RONALD O. THOMAS and ELAINE K.. THOMAS 
~~=----
onald O. Thomas 
dlk' k~ '.tftI+/. . 
Bla;ne K. Thomas 
TENANT: THOMAS MOTORS, INC. 
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SALE AND PURCHASE OF' PARCELS 1 AND 3 
IN CONSJDERATION ofthe aareement by Tenant to lease fi'om Landlord the 
Property covered by the foregoing Lease, and for other good and valuable consideration, TBB 
PARTIES AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
l. Right aDd ObUgatiOD to Purchase. Landlord and Gerleral M~"-
hereby agree that Landlord shaD sell, and General Manager shall purchase PaJ:Wls 1 d 0 
Y. UUIl/U~1j 
:leal Property (the "PDrdIased Real Property"), including all improvements 10 on those 
parcels. pwsuant to the ttmlS set forth in this Exhibit B. 
2. Exercise ofRlgbt aDd ObUgatioD to Purdlu~ At any time effective no 
earlier than September 1. 200S and no later than September 1. 2007. upon at least ninety (90) 
days advance notice to Landlord, and provided that Tenant is not in default under the Lease, 
General Man~er sbaJJ exercise his right a:nd obligation to purchase the Purchased Real Property. 
but ~thcr parcel alone. by delivering to Landlord a written notice to that effect (the "Notice of 
Purcbasej. 
3. Purdlase Prlee.. General Manager shall pay Landlord the total purchase 
price of Nine Hundred Thousand and Noll 00 DoUars ($900.000.00) for the Purchased Real 
Property. 
4. Commitmcat Cor Title Insurance. Within ten (10) business da.ys after 
Gcnoral Manager delivers to Landlord the Notice otPurchase pursuant to Paragraph 2, Landlord 
shall obtain. at Landlord's cost and expense, and deliver to General Manager a current 
commitment for title insurance ("Commltmentj issued by a title company selected by La11d1ord 
doing business in Gem County, Idaho (the "ntle Company"). Such Commitment shall 
evidence that the Purchased Real Property is free and clear of alllicns. encumbrances or 
cxeeptio~ excepting CUl1'eIlt general taxes. assessments, casements ofrceord, covenants and 
restrictions ofrecord, zoning regulations, and such other exceptions to title as are usual and 
normal on property of the type and in the vicinity of the Purchased Real Property and which have 
been speci.licaUy approved. by General Manager in writing. No exception that shall have been 
created by Tenant through the action or omission of the General Manager or that shall have been. 
created by General Manager during the term of the Contract sbaH be the basis for objection by 
General Manager to the condition of title of the Purchased Real Property. Said Commitment 
may also evidence an encumbrance or encumbrances which will be paid in fUJI by Landlord at 
the closing of the purchase. 
S. Condition ofPropcrty. The parties acknowledsc that General Manager, 
having been .respoJ1Sible fortbe actions ofTcnant as a party in possession oftbe property 
pursuant to the Lease, is fully familiar with and Imowledgeable oftha physical condition of the 
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land and improvements comprising the Purchased Real Property and shall purchase same in an 
"AS IS" condition, with all faults and witbollt representation or warranty of any kind from 
Landlord con.ceming condition, suitability or otherwise. 
6. C1osi.aa of the Purehue. 
Ca) The closing of tho purchase by General Manager shall occur not 
earJier than and not later than the dates specified in Paragraph 2 above. 
(b) At the closing, which shall be conducted by the Title Company 
issuillS the Commitment descn"bed in Paragraph 4 above, Landlord shall deliver a good and 
sufficient, executed and acknowledged Warranty Deed in favor ofGcncra1 Manager, and General 
Manager shall deliver to the Title Company as escrow/closing agent the purchase price, pJus all 
rent and. other amounts payable by Tenant or General Manager. Bach party sbal1 pay onc-half' 
(l12) of the fcc charged by the Title Company ror closing the transaction.. 
(0) R.cal estate taxes and assessments for the then CUIl'C.Dt year shall be 
paid by TCIWlt (as required under the Lease) and Landlord shall purchase and provide to General 
Manas.,.- a Standant Coverage Owner's Policy of Title Insurance (the Wfitle Polic:y"). whieb 
shall be in 811 amount equal to the purchase price, iDsuring General Manager's titlo to the 
Purchasccl ReaJ. Property. subjeot only to usual printed exceptions. and the exceptions to title as 
set forth in the Commitment (excluding any encumbrance which is to be paid by Landlord at 
closing), which. exceptions have been specifically approved by General Manager in writing, and 
any encumbrance or other exception caused by or attributable to Tenant through the action or 
omission of the Genera) Manager or caused or attn"utable to General Manager. In the cve.nt the 
Title Policy as provided by this Paragraph 6(c) cannot. following the closing, be issued by the 
Title Company in the form. required in this Exhibit B. the right and obligation to purchase and 
any subsequent agreement between Land1ord. and General Manager obligating Landlord to sell 
and General Manager to purcbase the Purchased Real Property shall be null and void, at General 
Manager's option. 
(d) lfthe transaction fails to close bocause olthe default ofa party. in 
addition 1.0 atly other remedies at Jav.o or in equity available: to the other party, the defaulting party 
shall reimburse the other party for aU costs and expenses incUITed by the other party in 
eonneetion with the transaction. mclud;ng. but not limited to. reasonable attorneys' tees, 
appraisal fees and Title Company cbarges, and the Lease shall continue in full force and effect 
for the remainder of its term, if any. 
7. TermlnadoD of Right and Obligation to Purchase.. The right and 
obligatiOl1 to seD and purchase the: Purchased Real Property shall terminate and be of no further 
force or effect upon the' occUlTence of tho following: 
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(a) The termination of the Lease between Landlord and Tenant, as 
described above. for any reason, inc:Juding, but Dot limited to, the default of Teo ant thereunder. 
(b) The early tennination of the Contract by Tenant. 
Upon such termination. the right and obligation to :fell and purchase the Purchased. Real Property 
shall end and the rights and obllgationa otthc parties hcrcundCl' sbal1 terminate and be olno 
fbrtberforee and. effeet. In the event the right and obligation to purcbase the Purchase Real 
Property terminates as provided in tbis Bxbibit B, the ~ght to purchase the Purchased Real 
Property shall no lonpr be available to General Manager, and Landlord shalt have no obligation 
to sell or convey the Purchased Real Property to General Manager. In the event the right arui 
obligation to purchase the Purebased Real Property terminates as provided herein, Landlord may 
terminate this Lease. which termination sball be effective six (6) months following delivery of 
Landlord's written notice to Tenant and General Manager ot such termination.. unless this Lease 
otha:wise terminates earlier by the expiration of the Inilial Term. 
8. Notices. Any notice requited to be given hereunder shall be in writing and 
shan be maiJed. OT delivered in the manner provi~ in Section 20 of the Lease. 
9. Assignment. General Manager shall not have the right to assign the right 
and obU,ation to p1l1:Chase the Purchased Real Property or any interest herein. except as provided 
in Section. 17.2 ot this Lease, without the prior written consent ofLandJor~ whieh consent may 
not be unreasonably withheld. 
10. TIme. Time is of the essence of tho rlgh~ and obliga.tion to pUJ."Chase the 
Purchased Real Property granted by Landlord to General Manager hereunder. 
11. Certificate Or NOD-Foreign Statu. Landlord Is not a foreign person, 
nonresident alicn, foreign corporation, foreign partnersbip, foreign trust or foreign estate, Q 
those terms are defined in the Intemal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the ~4Code") and the 
Income Tax Regulations promul,gatcd thereunder. At the close of escrow, Landlord shall deliver 
to GeD.cra1 Manager acertifieatc olnon-foreign status in a £onn satisfactory to General Manager 
('"Nou-Forc1p Certification"). 1n the event Landlord shall not deliver such Non-Foreign 
Certi1ieation to General Manager at the c10se of escrow, General Manager may withhold ten 
percent (lO%) of the purchase price and pay such withholding to the Internal Revenue Service 
pursuant to Section 1445 of the Code. . 
12. Escrow. On or before the date of the closing (as above provided), the 
patties shan deposit the funds and documents hereafter described into escrow: 
(a) LandlorcL Landlord shall deposit the follOwing: 







Y. UU 1/ UC:'J 
-r) 
(1) The duly executed and acknowledged Landlord's Warranty 
Deed; 
(2) Tho Non-Foreign Certification duly ex:ewted y Landlord 
under penalty or pctjluy, 
(3) Evidence reasonably satisfactory to Gmcral Manaaer that 
all necessary actio.o on the part of Landlord has been taken with respect to the execution and 
delivery of the Wamnty Deed and the other ancillary documents and instruments SO that all of 
said documents are or will be validly executed and delivered and wiD be binding on Landlord; 
and 
(4) Such other instruments and/or documents as may be 
required to cffi:ct the agreement h~ made. 
(b) General Manager. General Manager shall deposit the following: 
(1) The purcbase price of tho Purc;ba.sed Real Property; tmless 
the parties othctWisc mutually agree upon the tcnns by whieh Lattdlord shall receive instead 
General Manager's promissory note for some portion of the purchase price, which promissory 
note shall include a mutually agreed interest :rate and amortization schedule, and which 
promissory note shall be secured by a first deed oftmst on the Purchased Real Property; 
(2) Additional cash in the amount necessary to pay all amounts 
due and payable under the Lease and General Managers share of the closing costs and pro-
ratiOllS, as above set forth; and 
(3) Such other instruments and/or documents as may be 
req~ to effect the agreement herein made. 
13. Oose ofEserow. When the Title Company is in a position to issue the 
Title Policy, and all dOCtlIIlents and :fimds have been deposited with the Title Company as escrow 
holder, the Title Company shaD immediately'close the escrow as provided fot' hereafter. Tho 
failure of Landlord or General Manager to be in a position to close the escrow by the time set for 
elosing shall constitute a de:fiwlt hereunder. The Title Company as escrow holder. and closing 
agent shall close the escrow as follows: 
(a) Record Landlord's Warranty Deed with instructions for the Gem 
County Recorder to deliver such Deed to General Manager; 
(b) Pay the pun;hase price to be paid at the close of escrow, plus any 
amounts due and payable under the Lease, to Landlord (reduced by any amount paid to release 
all monetary encumbrances on the Property and by Landlord's share of the closing costs): 
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(0) Deliver the Title Policy to General Manager; 
(d) Deliver the Non-Foreign Certification to General Manager; and 
(c) Forward to Landlord and Genera1 Manager. in duplicate, a separate 
accounting of all f\mds reeeivccl and disbursed for each party and copies of all executed and 
recorded or tiled documents deposited into escrow, with such recording and file date endorsed 
thereon. 
14. Sectfon 1031 Excbange. General Manager agrees to cooperate with 
Landlord, ifso requested by Landlord, to facilitate the close of the Purchase Real Property in a 
tnamler that will permit Landlord to comply with the provisions of Section 1031 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of ~986. as amended; provided, however, that such facilitation by General 
Manager shall be at no additional cost to General Manager. 
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AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF BUSINESS ASSETS 
TID.S AGREEMENT POR. PURCHASB AND SALB OF BUSlNBSS ASSETS 
("AareeJDeDt'') dated this 1st day ofSeptembor2000, is entered into by and among THOMAS 
MOTORS, INC., an Idaho cOrporation ("SeUer"). R.. DREW THOMAS, a smJle person 
r'Buycr'j, and RONALD O. THOMAS and ELA1NB K. THOMAS, husband and wife 
("SlJ.areboJdenj. 
In consideration of and in reliance UpOn the mutual covenants contained in this 
Agreement, 1he parties hereby asrec as follows. 
SectioD 1. Premises. This Agreement is made and entered into by the parties in part upon 
the repn:scDtations and wamnties eontaine4 in this Section 1, Which representations and. 
warranties are not mere recitals. but fundamentll premises upon which the transaction descn'bed 
in this Agreement is based. 
1. t Seller is an Idaho business corporation engaged in the business of selling 
aa.d servicing Chrysler, Dodge. Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles and related parts and 
accessories from premises located at 2121 Service Avenue. Emmett. Idaho 83617 (the "Business 
Real Property"), under franchises issued by Daimler-Chtysler Corporation. 
1.2 Buyer wishes to purchase from Seller, and SeDer is willing to sell to 
Buyert all assets relating to Seller's Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep franchise for Emmett, 
Idaho. conditioned upon the granting to Buyer of an exelusive franchise for the sale of new . 
Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in the same geographical area as Sener's 
franchise. 
1.3 Buyer (or a business entity that Buyer shall own) also wishes to lease two 
(2) ofthc tbrcc (3) parcels of the real property and improvements which constitute the Business 
Real PropertY, and wishes eventually to purchase one (1) of those parcels and another adjoining 
parcel ofrca1 property. Consequently, the purchase ofSeUc:c's business assets shall be 
conditioned upon the execution and deUveay of the Conuneteill Lease and Purchase Agreement 
among the parties and Ronald O. Thomas and Elaine K. Thomas. husband and wife. dated 
September 1,2000 (the "Leasej . 
. ! I ,. 
SectiOD 2. Definitions. In this Agreemcn~ the following words shall have the indicated 
meanings: 
2.1 "Closing" shall refer to the consummation of the transaction. con.templated 
under this Agreement in accordance with the terms hereo( and "Closing Date" shall refer to 
September 1,2001. 
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2.2 "Seller's BDslaea" shall refer to any and aU activities conducted by Seller 
in Emmett, Idaho, relatina to the marketing and sale of new Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep 
motor vehicles and associated parts and accessories, and the repair and servicml of new or used 
Chrysler, Dodge. Plymouth and Jeep motor vohle)os. 
2.3 "Purcllued Assets!" shall refer to those assets which arc identified in 
Section 3 as being purchased and sold by the parties u:nder this A.grccmcnt. The Purchased 
Assets specifically shall not include SeUe(s accounts receivable and Franchisor holclbacks, 
which shall be retained by Seller. 
2.4 SeUer's "Equipment" shall rcfc:r to aU non-inventory items oftang;blc 
pe:rsooal property ptCSent1y owned or used by SeUer in connection with Seller's Business, 
including all of Seller's machinery. tools, sips, office equipment, computer equipment, 
computer pro,grams, microfichCSy parts lists.. repair manuals, sales 01' service brochures, fumiture 
and fixtures. and all of Seller's leasehold improvements to the Business Real Property. Within 
twenty (20) days after the Date of this A,grcement. SelJer shan provide to Buyer a list of the 
"Certain Excluded Equipment" being retained by Seller, which list shall be attached to this 
Agreement as :exhibit "An and whidllist shall include, without limitation, a grinder and a bmkc 
lathe. The parties rccogtrlzc and agree that Seller's Equipment does NOT include any assets of 
Thomas Auto Parts. Inc ... which also operates on the Business Real Property and whoso assets 
include its lixturcs. cquip.rilc:nt aDd inventory ofmotorvcbicle parts Ilid accessories. 
2.5 SeDer's "intangible Assets" shall reterto Seller's telephone and fax 
numbers. service customer lists. sales customer fists, vehicle sales records, vehicle service 
records, all rights of SeDer under contracts assiancd to and assumed by Buyer pursuant to this 
Agreement, all goodwiU associated with SeJIer's Business, and all other 1ntan81"le rights and 
interests otony value relating toSeUer's Business; provided, however, that Seller's Business 
name ("Thomas Motorsj is included within the Intangible Assets being sold by Seller 
hereunder. 
2.6 'CSasinm Real Property" shan refer to all of SeUer's rights under the 
Lease, including. without limitation, the rights"1o lease ccrtaia of the parcels described in the 
Lease and the rights and obligation to purchase certain oftbe parcels descn"ed in the Lease 
pursuant to the terms of Exhibit B to the Lease. . 
2.7 "Ftanchisor"shall refer to DaImIer..chrysler Corporation. 
2.8 "New Veldcle" shall refer to a Chcysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor 
vehicle which: (A) is unregistered. and unused, (B) is from the 1999,2000 Of 2001 model year, 
(C) has been driven for less than tw'O hundred (200) odometer innes, and (0) may be represented 
or wmanted to consumers as "new" under Idaho law. uRoDback Vehicle" shall mean an. 
unregistered vehicle from the 1999.2000 or 200t model year which bas been sold to a customer 
by Sener but returned because of the customer's inability to obtain financing for the purchase. 
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"Demoastrator Vehicle" shall mean an unregistered "ehic1e &om 1hc 1999.2000 or 2001 model 
year which has been used and operated. by ~encr on dealer plates for sales demonstration 
purposes. 44{].cd Vehicle" shall mean any vehicle which is not a New Vebicle, a Demons1rator 
Vehicle or a Rollback Vehicle as defined in the three preceding sentences. 
2.9 "Date or tills Agreemeat" shall refer to the first date upon which this 
Agreement has been signed by all of the parties. 
SeedoD 3. Purchased Assets. Sol101' asrees to sell to Buyer, and Buyer agrees to purchase 
fi'om SeUer, those assets of Corporation speclfically identified in Sections 4, 5,6, 7, 8,9,10, 11, 
12 and 13 of this Agreement (the "Purchased Assets;. Corporation's accounts receivable and 
Pranchisor holdbacks specifically arc cxclud=d from this transaction. 
SeedoD 4. IIIvcmtory ofNe", Vehicles, Demonstrator Vehicles and Rollback Vehicles. 
Buyer shall purchase Seller', entire inventory of new Chrysler, Plymouth, Dodge and Jeep motor 
vehicles, as that inventory exists on 1hc Closing Date. Buyer also shall purchase SeUer's entire 
inventory ofDcmonstrator Vehicles and Rollback Vehic1cs. Immediately prior to Closing, 
Buyet and Sener shall jointly review Sener's outstanding purchase orders for New Vehicles 
Otdered B:om Seller by customcm but not dclivcrccl prior to Closing.. At Closing, SeUer shall 
assign to Buyer, and. Buyer shall asswne from Seller, alI of Seller's rights (including customer 
deposits) and obligations (meluding sales commissions) under such purchase orders. At Closing. 
Stiller shall reimburse Buyer for all deposits made to Seller with respect to ordered but 
undelivered New Vehicles. 
Section 5. IIIventory of Used Vehicles. Buyer shall purchase Seller's entire inventory of 
Used Vehicles, as that inventoty exists at Closing, i1lcludit1g Seller's parts tmcks, ~e 
vehicles and colU'tesy vehicles. Those Used Vehioles that are not financed through Seller's 
flooring line of credit with First Security Bank ofIdaho, N.A., however, shall not be part of the 
Fixed Purchase Price, but Buyer instead shall pay for those Used Vehicles punuant to 
Section 14.2. . 
Section 6. Inventory of New Parts aDd ACcessories. Buyer shall purchase Sellers entire 
inventory ofvchicle parts and. accessories man~ by FranchiSot and/or third. party 
suppliers, as that inventory exists on the Closing Date. Buyer shall purohase that entire inventory 
~AS IS" as oltho Closing Date. Prior to Closing, Seller shall maintain Sellers inventory ofparts 
and accessories at a level consistent with Bood business. practices and Sener's nonnaI and regular 
course ofbusincss. 
Section 7. Equipment. Buyer shall purchase SeDer's Equipment Buyor acknowledges that 
Seller is retaining, and is not selling to Buyer those excluded items of SeUet s Equipment, as 
contemplated in Section 2.4. 
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Scctlon 8. Supplies. Buyer shall purchase all ofdle gas. oil, nuts, bolts, and other 
automotive and office supplies which are held for use in Seller's Business. 
Scctlon 9. Contnaetu.l Right. and Obligation I. At Closing, Buyer shall assume all rights 
and obligations of Seller under all cquipmCD.t leases and other contracts. Sellet wmants that aU 
of Seller's obHsations under those contracts are current as of the Date of this 'Agreement. Buyer 
agrees to indemnify Seller agai.nst all obligations undct those contracts, whether they relate to 
periods bofore or aJ.ler Closing. 
Sec:dou 10. Repair Work In Progress. Buyer shall purchase all of Seller's vehicle repair 
work-in-pTOgrcss (in-house and s\.l.bccmtracted). 
Section 11. Intangible Assets. Buyer shall purchase all ofSeller's Intangible Assets. 
SectiOD 12. SeDer's Cash, Bank AeeoUDtI, aDd Notes Receivable. Buyer shall purchase aU 
of Seller's cash, banking accounts and deposits, and notes receivable. Buyer shall take such 
actions as Buyer deems appropriate to collect those notes reCeivable. and Seller sball not be 
liable to Buyer to the extent that 8.t1y of Sclle:r's notes receivable are not collected. by Buyer. 
Buyer shall retmn for Buyer's own account any payment with respect to Seller's notes receivable 
arising O\lt of the operation of Seller's Business prior to Closing. 
Section 13. Fnnchisor Credits. Buyer shall purchase all ofScllcr's credits, deposits or other 
amounts due it by Fnmohisor as of the Date of this Agreement, except for Franchisor holdbacks 
that shall be retained by Seller • 
Section 14. Purchase Price and Payment. 
14.1 FIxed Purchase Price. Buyer shall pay Seller, as the total purchase price 
fbr the Purchased Assets (other than those Used Vehicles described in Sections 5 and 14.2) the 
amount of Eight Hundred Fifty Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($850,000.00), as such amount 
may be reduced by distributions made to Sbareholders prior to the Closing Date pursuant to the 
terms of that certain Management Contract dated September 1,2000 between the parties ("'Fixed 
Purchase PrIce"). Buyer shall pay Seller the Fixed. Purcbase Price in monthly installments 
amortized over a period qftwenty (20) years iTom and after the Closing, in~luding iIrtercst at the 
prime rate of interest charged by Ftrst Security Sank of Idaho. N.A. plus two hundred (200) basis 
points, with the amortization to be adjusted co1lCmrmtIy with each adjustment ofsueh prime rate 
of interest; provided. however, that the interest in no event shall be less than ten percent (10%). 
Notwithstanding such amortization schedule, Buyer shall pay Seller the entire unpaid balance of 
lhe Fix.ed Purchase Prlc:e and all accruec:i interest on September I, 2008. 
14.2 AddiUonal Pnrthase Price. In addition to the Fixed Purchase Price 
provided in Section 14.1, Buyer shall pay Seller. as the pmchase price for each Used Vehicle that 
is [lot financed through Sener's flooring line of credit with F'll'St Security Bank ofTdaho, N.A., 
AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF BUSINESS ASSETS - 4 
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Seller's cost as reflected on its books and records for such Used Vehicle at the time Buyer sells 
each such Used V chicle. 
SeedOD 15. Assllmccl Llabnldes. In addition to the purchase ofthc Pw:cbased Assets. Buyer 
al$O shall, in coajuncticm with such purchase, assamo and take responsJbUity for any and all 
liabilities. debts or obIiptions of Seller (including Seller's trade payabl~ accotm.t payables, 
notes payable to SharcholdCl'B and obligations to employees), e"clusive of any income tax 
liabilities ofShareholderL 
SeetiOD 16. Wammdes ofSener. SeUer and Shareholders make the foUowingwarranties to 
~uyer, with the intent that Buyer my thereon: 
16.1 Corporate O~anlzatlo.. Seller is a corporation organized., validly 
existing, and. in good standing under the laws of the State of Idaho. Seller is qualified to do 
business in the State ofIdaho. and has full power and authority to own. use, and. sell its assets. 
16.2 Corporate Authority. Seller's Board of Directors and Shareholders have 
authorized the execution and delivery of this Agreement to Buyer and the cmying out of its 
provisions. 'Ibis AgrccmCDt will not violate any judicial. governmental or administrative decree, 
order. writ. injunotion. or judgment, and will not conflict with or constitute a default under 
Seller's bylaws, or any contract, agreement, or other instrument to which Setler is a party or by 
which it may be bound. . 
16.3 Employee Issues. No employees of Seller are members of my union. 
Within ten (10) days a:ftcr the Date of this Agreement. Seller shaIl provide to Buyer the 
fonowing: (A) a census of Seller's employees, (B) a written disclosure ofall benetits made 
available to Seller'S employees (includiJlg qualified and non-qualified retirement plans), and (C) 
8cc:csS to all personnel files for Seller's employees. All employee benefit plans maintained by 
Seller for its employees shall be fiJlly tunded prior to Closing. SeUer shall pay all wages, 
commissions, accrued vacation pay and other accrued compensation camcd by Seller's 
employees prior to Closina (together with all aoorued PICA and withholding taxes). Seller shall 
terminate the employment of all of Seller's employees cff'cctivc as of the close ofbusincss on the 
Closing Date. At Buyer's sole discretion, Buyer may (but shall not be obligated to) hire any of 
Seller's employees. 
16.4 Undisclosed Llabllltles and Contractual Commitmeots. :Except as 
otherwise disclosed in this Agrccmcnt, the following statements are true as of the nate of this 
Agreement and shall be true at Closing: (A) Seller does not have any liabilities which might bave 
a material impact 011 8~'$ usc of the Purchased Assets, (8) Sencr is not a party to any 
contracts or commitments'which might have a material impact on Buyer's use ofthc Purchased 
Assets, (C) no law suit or action, administrative proceeding, arbitration proceeding, 
governmental investiption, or other legal or equitable prooeeding of any kind is pending or 
threatened against Seller which might adversely affect the value of the Purchased Assets, and (D) 
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Seller bas all licenses. permits and authorizations required by any federal. state or local 
governmental or regulatory &JCD.C1 in order to operate Seller's Business, and knows of no reason 
why my such license or pennit miiJtt be subject to revocation. If any claim is asserted against 
Bllyer after Closiq with respect to any obliption of Sener which Seller has £'ailed to disclose to 
Buyer in wnw" or which Sentt has disclosed but tailed to pay, 1h= Buyer shall give prompt 
written notice otthat claim to Sener. Seller shall indemnify Buyer with respect to all such 
obUptions. 
16.S COlldltloll of Equipment. Each item or Seller's Equipment shall be sold 
•• AS IS" as of the Closing Date. Seller will continue to perform routine maintenance and l'epat1'8 
with respect to Sellerts Bquipmcnt prior to Closing. 
16.6 Good Title. Seller has, and shall tr&nsferto Buyer at Closing, good and 
ma.dcetable title to all of the Purchased Assets, free and cleat or aU security interests, liens, 
equitable interests, leases, assessmetltS, restrictions, reservations. or other burdens of any kind, 
other than those ~g in favor of First Security Bank ofIdabo, N.A. and assumed by Buyer. 
All earrent and accrued taxes which may become a lien against any of the Purchased Assets shall 
have been paid by Seller prior to ClosinJ (meluding property taxes, sales taxes and excise taxes). 
16.7 FraDchlsor's' Consent. Seller shall talce all actions which are reasonably 
necessary on' Seller's part to obtam the eonser:d: oCtile Fr.mchisor to the issuance 'to Buyer of an 
exclusive franchise fol" the sale of new Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in tho 
same pgraphical area as Sellers current franchise in Bmmett, Idaho. 
Socdon 17. Conduct of Business Pending Closing.. Seller wammts that during the period 
beginning on the Date of this Agreement and ending at Closing: (A) Seller'shan continue to 
operate Seller·s Business in the usual and ordinary course, and in substantial conformity with all 
applicable Jaws, Ot'dinanees, reguJatiorts, rules or orders; (B) Seller shall not allow any liens to be 
placed against 8DY oftbc Purchased Assets unless those Hens are discharged prior to Closing; (C) 
Seller shall not take any action which may cause a material adverse change in. the operations of 
Sellct'a Business; (0) Seller shall not cOllduct any sale which shall use the words or phrases 
'~oinl Out of Business Sale" or other words ar phrases having similar meanings; and (E) Seller 
shall usc its best cff'om to preserve the value olthe Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep 
fta:nchise in Emmett, Idaho. Notwithstanding the wammtics made by Seller in this Section 17. 
Buyer acknowledges and agrees that Buyer shaJJ be responsible for the perfonnance orthosc 
warranties pursuant to the terms olthat certain Management Contract dated September 1, 2000. 
SeedOD 18. RepresentadoDs ad warrallties of Buyer. Buyer hereby makes the following 
representations and warranties to Seller, with the intent that Seller rely thereon: This Agreement 
will not violate the proVision of any judicial, govemnlental or administrative decree, order, writ, 
.injunction. or judgment, or conflict with or constitute a default under, any contract, agreement, or 
other instrument to which Buyer is a party. 
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SectiOIi 19. Additional COllditlolU Preeedcmt to Buyer's ObUpdoD. Thc obligation of 
Buyer to close this transaction is subject to each of the following conditions (eacb ofwhicb is for 
the benefit otBuycr and may be waived by Buyer). and Buyer shall have the right to rescind this 
Agreement if any of the fonowing conditions is 110t satisfied in accordanoe with its terms: 
19.1 Buyer shall have obtained fi:om Franchisor, prlotto the Closing Date, an 
exclusive :&anchise to sell new Chrysler, Dodge. PlymoU1h and Jeep motor vehicles in the same 
geographical area as Soller's CIll1'CI1t franchise in Emmett, Idaho (as evidenced by the issuance to 
.Buyer by Pranchisor of an appropriate Dealership Sales and Service Agrecment, and the approval 
otBuycr as tho publicly-owned Dcalcr..()porator ofthc ftancbise), and Buyer agrees to usc its 
best reasonable efFortS to obtain that 1i'aD.cb.ise. . 
19.2 Buyer shall be reasonably satisfied. with any facility improvement 
raquirements which are imposed. by Franchisor. 
19.3 All of Seller's agreements and warranties set forth in this Agreement shalJ 
be true, colTCCt, complete and not misleading at Closing; provided that Buyer's dccisi9n to close 
this ttansaetion shall not release Sener ftom. liability to Buyer for any Vlammty which is 
subsequently detemrlned to be incorrect, incomplete or misleading. 
Seedon 10. Closing. The parties 'shall make aU reasonable efforts to close the purchase and 
sale under this Agreement at or before 5:00 p.m., Mountain Daylight Time, on or before the 
Closing Date, at the offices of Seller, or at such other location as shall be selected by mutual 
agreement of the parties. 
20.1 If this trarisaction closes as provided in this Agreement. then actual 
poSSdSsion and all risk of loss, damage or destruction with respect to the Purchased Assets. shall 
be deemed to have been delivered to Buyer at 11 :59 p.m., Mountain Daylight Time, on: the 
Closing Date. 
20.2 At Closing. and coincidentally with the perfonnanee of tho obligations to 
be perfonned by Buyer at Closing, Seller shall deliver to Buyer the fonowing: (A) all bills of 
sale, assignments and other instnunents of transfer. in fonn and substance reasonabJy satisfactOlj' 
to Buyer, which shaJJ be necessary to convey the Purcbascd Assets to Buyer, and (B) all other 
documents required under this Agreement. 
20.3 At Closing. and coincidentally with the ped'ormancc of all obligations 
required of Seller at Closing. Buyer shall deliver to ,Seller the foUowins: (A) payment for the 
PUrehased Assets; and <B), all other 'payments ind documents required under this Agreement 
Buyer sball be responsible for aU sales taxes payablo in connection with the transaction. 
20.4 If Closing does not talce place on or before the Closing Date because there 
has been. a failure of any condition precedent set forth in Section 19, then: (A) all rights and 
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obHptions of both parties under thil Asrcoment sba1l temdnatc. and (B) this Agreement and all 
predecessor agreements shall thereafter be void and of no effect. 
20.S Both parties agree to malee a good Eaith efi'ort to execute and deliver all 
documents and complete all actions necessary to consummate this t1'ansaetion. 
Sectioll 21. Sun1val ofRepreseatatJoas. All representations, warranties, indemnification 
obligations and covenants made in this Agreement shall survive the Closing, and shall remain in 
ettcct until the expiration of the Jatest period allowable in any applicable statute of limitations. 
Seetfoa 2:z. Assiplheat by Buyer. Buyer shall have the right to assign all of its rlgbu and j 
oblipdons under this Aarcemcnt to a business entity owned exclusively by Buyu. 
SectiOIl 23. Lease ed/or Purchase of BuslDess Real PropeiV. As a condition to the 
Closing oithe 1ranSaction contemplated under this Agreement, S'c11cr shall assign to Buyer (or a 
related entity) the Lease. including.. without limitation. its terms regardhig the lease of Parcels 1 
and 2 of the Business Real Property, the l:b.turo substitution ofParccl3 for PaJ.W12 during the 
term ofthc Lease, and the purchase of Parcels 1 and 3 of tile Business Real Property. 
Section 14. MiseeUalleoUS. 
24.1 Thc.rc are no oral agreements or tepreSentations between the parties which 
affect this transaction, and this Agreement supersedes all previous negotiations. wammties. 
representations and understandings between the parties. Trueeopies of all documents reterenecd 
in this Agreement are attached to this Agreema1t If any provision of this Agreement sball be 
determined to be void by any court of competent jurisdictioDt then that determination shall not 
afl'ect any other provision oitrus Agreement. and all other provisions sbatt remain in filiI force 
and effe«. Jfany provision of this Agreement is capable of two (.2) constructions, only one (1) 
ofwhicb would render thc provision valid, then the provision shan have the meaning which 
renders it valid. The section beadings in this Agreement arc for convcniCJlCe purposes only. and 
do not in any way define or construe the oontents of this Agreement. . 
24.2 This Agreement shall be governed and performed in accordance with the 
laws of tho State otIdaho. Bach of the parties hereby itTevocabty submits to the jUrisdiction of 
the courts of Gem County, Idaho, and agrees that any legal proceedings with respect to this 
Ageement shaJl be filed and beard in the appropriate court in Gem County, Idaho. 
24.3 This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which 
shall be an original. and all ofwbicb shall constitute a single instrument, when signed by both of 
the parties. This Agreement sball inure to the bene.6t of and shall be binding upon the successors 
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24.4 Waiver by either party of strict performance of any provision oftbis 
Agreement shall not be a waiver 0.( and shall DOt prejudice the party's right to subsequently 
require striot performanee o£ the same provision or any other provisio.n. The conse.at or approval 
of either patty to any act by the other party of a nature roquiriul consent or approval shall not 
render unnecessmy the consent to or approval of any subsequent similar act. 
24.5 All notices provided for herein shall be in writing and shall be deemed to 
be duly given when mailed by United States certified mail, postage prepaid, to the last mown 
address of tho party entitled to receive the Dotice. or when personally delivered to that party. 
24.6 Time is of tho essence of this Agreement. 
24.7 Should any party hereto institute any action or proceedings to enforce or 
interpret any provision bereof: or for damages by reason of any alleged breach of any provision 
of this Agreement. the prevailiug party shalt be entitled to recover from the losing party or 
pattia such amount as the court may adjudge to be reasonable attomey fees for services rendered 
to the prevailing party in sudl don or proeeoding. The term "prevailing party" as used in this 
$t:Cti011 shall htcludc, without limitation, any party who is made a defendant in litigation in wh;ch 
damages and/or other reHefmay be sought agaJnst such party and a final judgment or dismissal 
or dccrcc is entered. in sucb litigation in favor of such party defendant 
IN WITNESS WHERBOF. the parties have executed this Agreement on the dates 
indicated below. 
SELLER.: 
THOMAS MOTORS. INC. 
~~~"'Q onald O. Thomas; President 
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SHAR.BHOLD'BRS: 
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i ~ RONALDO. OMAS Dated: 
?-/~ - c:;cJ DU~, ________________ __ 
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MANAGEMENT CONTRACT 
nus MANAGBMBNT CONTRACT ("Contract" dated this 1st day or 
September 2000, is entered into by and among RONALD O. THOMAS and ELAINB K. 
THOMAS, husband atldwifc ("Shareholdersj. THOMAS MOTORS, INC •• an Idaho 
corporation ("Corpontioa"'), and R.. DREW THOMAS, a single person ("'General Manager"). 
In consideration of and in reliance upon tho mutual covenants contained in this 
Contract, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
Sect10D 1. Employment as General Manager. Corporation hereby eJ:1l1)Joys General 
Manager as the genetal manager of Corporation's business ofseUing and servicing Chrysler, 
Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles and related parts and accessories from premises 
located at 2121 Service Avenue, Emmett, Idaho 83617 (the "Buiness" effective immediately 
and. to continue thereafter through Augast 31, 2001, unless or until terminated earlier by either 
party pursuant to the Section 8 of this Contract 
SceUOD 2. RespoDslbDities. General Manaaer shan have the responSl'bilitics for any and all 
decisions about the conduct of the Business, including, without limitation, (A) the expenditure of 
revenue$ and other working capital, and (8) the employment, compensation and terminatio.n of 
all Corporation Ctnployee8; provided, however, that General Manager shall not have the authority 
to take any action on behelf of Corporation that would cause it to incur liabilities that could not 
be paid through (1) Corporation·s existinS flooring Jine of credit with First Security Bank of 
Idaho, N.A. ("Ballk." (2) Corporation's revenues, or (3) additional working capital loan to be 
provided by Shareho1ders pursuant to Section 5. General Manager's responsibilities specifically 
shall include the financial reports to Shareholders described in Section 4. 
SeetiOD 3. CompensaUoD. General Manager sbaU be compensated the amount orFive 
Thousand and No/lOO Dollars (SS,OOO.OO)each month during the tenn of this Contract. payable 
in accordance with Corporation's regular payroll procedures, and shall receive other employee 
benefits that Corporation provides its salaried employees during the term oftbls Contract 
SectiOD 4. FfDancfal Reports to Sbareholders. During the term of this Contract, General 
Manager shall meet with Shareholders to provide them a financial review ofCotporauon's 
Business. including, without limitation, a review oftbc status of (A) Cotporatio.a's Booting linc 
ofcrcdit with Bank, (B) Corporation's revenues, (C) Corporation's monthly budget, (0) General 
Manager's projections about Cotporation '$ need to draw upon the worlcing capita110an to be 
plO'Vidod bY Sh~ 10 Sectlon S,II!Id (I!) such o1her matters as Shareholders may 
require. S~weckll': cia! reporting meetings can be suspended once Corporation has 
demonstrated1ts ibrrf , through General Manager' s lca.4~ip;.tQ sustain its casb flow' witbout 
the injeetion of any working capital loan for at leut.-siX" (6) weeW In addition to such weeldy 
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financial reporting meetings, General Manager shall provide Shareboldet$ throughout the term of 
the Contract with the same financial reports and at the same times as is required by Daimler .. 
Chrysler Corporation. 
Thousand and No/lOO DolJaii($300,OOO.OO)Jurmg the x b:Loithe term oftbis 
Seelloa 5. Wortlq Caplt§.SIIaoeboldoQ shall J~~ 'Ibree Hlmdrcd 
Contract as needed by Coribilmh1br'the purposes oC (A) • . . rporatiOl'1 into compliance 
with its flooring line of aedit with Bank, and (8) additional working capital. and as Shareholders 
are able. In order for Corporation to draw upon any portion of such Joan for additional workiug 
capital, GeneraJ Manager shan give Shareholders at least fourteen (14) days written notice in 
advance of the dafc such funds are to be made available to Corporation. 
SectioD " Guaranty of Flooring LIDe of Credit. Throughout the term of this Contract, 
Shareholders sball continue to guaranty Corporation's existing flooring line oCcredit-with Ba.nk. 
and Shareholders sba.n continue to have use of such flooring Une of credit for usc in 
Shareholders' separate used car sales business. 
Sect10ll 7. Interim Dlstributio ... To the extent that Corporation-s net profit in any month 
during the tcnn of this Contract exceeds Fifty Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($50,000.00). such 
exees. shall be distributed to Shareholders as a dividend for that month and sueh amount shall 
tcduce the total purchase price that General Manager othet\vise would pay pursuant to Section 14 
of that certain Agreement fot' Purchase and Sale of Business Assets dated September 1, 2000 
between Corporation and General Manager (the" AgreemeDtj. 
Secdoll 8. TermbladoD. The parties may tenninate this Contract by mutual agreement 
Corpruation and Shareholders may terminate this Contract (A) upon its breacb by General 
Manager by his incurring liabilities for Corporation in excess of the limit set forth in Section 2, 
(B) tho detcnninatioD, based upon information supplied in the weekly financial reporting 
meetings described in Section 4, that Corporation· s operations under General Manager have not 
demonstrated and projections :fbr Co1poration's future operations do not demonstrate that 
CO!pOratiolYJ..:MU-be-alSli-f(f"SQStain itself:&Om cash available from operations by at least the eud 
ofJh~siXtii month of the term orthfs Co.n1:raet, or (e) Corporation shall not be in compliance 
·.:Stith iii;;~(Jf' itS" .ttOGi'ihl"J.ii; of credit with Bank. General Manager may terminate this 
COl1t:ract at any time during its telm upon. fourteen (14) days' written notice to Shareholders and 
Corporation. Any termination oftbis Contract automatically shall terminate the Agreement and 
shall terminate General Manager's right aiitt obligation to purchase the Putehased Real Property 
as defined in that eerta:in Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement dated September 1. 2000 
among the parties. 
IN WITNBSS WHBRBOF, the parties hereunto executed ·this Management 
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SHAREHOLDERS: RONALD O. THOMAS and BLAlNB K. THOMAS 
~~~ onald O. Thomas 
~4~K~ 
Elaine K. Thomas 
CORPORATION: THOMAS MOTORS, INC. 





John 1. Janis (ISB No. 3599) 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83q17 -0188 
Telephone No. (20'8) 365-4136 
Fax No. (208) 365~4196 
Attorneys for Defq~dants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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· . 
COMES NOW the defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Hepworth, 
Lezamiz & Janis and hereby submits Defendants' Response to Plaintiff s First Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production Propounded to Defendants as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Documents pertaining to this action. Please separately 
identify each document which pertains to any issue in this action. 
ANSWER: The defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds ofbeing overly 
broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks a pure legal conclusion from the defendants. It would be 
virtually impossible for anyone to "identify," as that term is defined in these discovery requests, each 
and every document which could arguably "pertain to any issue" in this lawsuit. Notwithstanding 
, 
and without waivirl:g said objections, the documents which have been or will be produced by each 
.' 
of the parties in response to more specific or reasonable discovery requests in this action, are all 
likely to "pertain" fo one or more of the issues in this action. 
INTERROGATORY NO.2: Communications between you and each party to this 
action. Please separately identify each instance of a communication, discussion, or contract between 
you and your repre~~ntatives and each party to this action which is relevant to any issue in this action 
or which you inten~ to offer in evidence at the trial of this action for any purpose. 
ANSWER: The defendants object to this interrogatory again on the grounds of being 
, 
overly broad, unduly burdensome, amounting to harassment of the defendants, and again, seeks a 
\ 
legal conclusion to be offered to the requesting party. This case involves a son/plaintiff filing a 
lawsuit against his'parents as the defendants. Here again, it would be impossible for anyone to list 
~ i 
or separately "identify" every single communication of any kind that has taken place between each 
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ofthe parties and! or their representatives, who are all family members, which are arguably "relevant" 
to any issue in this 'action. 
INTERROGATORY NO.3: Witnesses with knowledge ofthe issues. etc. Please 
separately identify'each person who, according to your information or knowledge, or the information 
or knowledge of your representatives, has knowledge of any of the issues or any ofthe occurrences 
which are relevant to this action. 
ANSWER: The following individuals are at least among those who arguably have 
some knowledge of the issues or occurrences involved in this action: 
, 
Ro~ and Elaine Thomas, c/o Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, P.O. 2582, Boise, Idaho, 
893701 ; 
R. Drew Thomas, c/o White Peterson, P.A., 5700 East Franklin Road, Ste. 200, 
Nampa, Idaho, 83687-7901; 
Shirley Youngstrom, c/o Lot of Cars, P.O. Box 505, Emmett, Idaho, 83617, (208)365-
5050 ; 
J. Robin Wilde, 207 W. 6th St., Emmett, Idaho, 83617, (208)365-1427; 
Sandy Mills, c/o Lot of Cars, P.O. Box 505, Emmett, Idaho, 83617, (208) 365-5050; 
James Warr, CPA, Wilson, Harrison Company, 1602 W. Franklin Street, Ste. B, 
" 
Boise, Idaho 83702, (208) 365-5050; 
Jan Flowers, c/o Bill Buckner Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, Inc., P.O. Box 685, Emmett, 
Idaho, 83617, (208) 365-4438; 
PemlY Hulbert, c/o Bill Buckner Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, Inc., P.O. Box 685, Emmett, 
,( 
Idaho, 83617, (208) 365-4438; 
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Bill'Buckner, c/o Bill Buckner Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, Inc., P.O. Box 685, Emmett, 
Idaho, 83617, (208) 365-4438; 
Don Ovitt, c/o Bill Buckner Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, Inc., P.O. Box 685, Emmett, 
Idaho, 83617, (208) 365-4438; 
Dave Hull, c/o Bill Buckner Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, Inc., P.O. Box 685, Emmett, 
Idaho, 83617, (208) 365-4438; 
Mark Bottles, c/o Mark Bottles Real Estate Services, 5418 N. Eagle Road, Eagle, 
Idaho, (208) 377-5700. 
The defendants reserve the right to seasonably supplement their response to this 
'" , 
interrogatory with any additional individuals that may have knowledge of the facts or issues 
presented in this matter as such names are obtained or revealed in discovery in this case. 
IN~ERROGATORY NO.4: Experts retained by (sic) not expected to testify. Please 
separately identify each person retained or specially employed by you as an expert in anticipation of 
this litigation or in preparation for the trial of this action whom you don(sic) not expect to call as a 
, 
witness at the trial of this action. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks 
information outside the scope of permissible discovery under Rule 26 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
INTERROGATORY NO.5: Expert witnesses for trial. Please separately identify 
; 
each person whom you may call as an expert witness at the trial ofthis action, and state the subject 
matter on which such expert witness is expected to testify, the substance of the facts to which such 
expert witness is expected to testify, and the substance ofthe opinions to which such expert witness 
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is expected to testify. 
ANSWER: Defendants have not yet identified which expert witnesses are expected 
to testify at the trial ofthis action, but will seasonably supplement their response to this interrogatory 
in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and/or any applicable pre-trial orders of the 
Court in this actiOf1~ 
INTERROGATORY NO.6: Persons supplying answers hereto. Please separately 
identify each person who supplied answers to these interrogatories and designated the answers or 
answer or part thereof supplied by such person. For any answer or part thereof not within your actual 
knowledge, state the sources of your information. (This interrogatory is intended to discover 
, 
principal sources of information and does not seek to ascertain the identity of mere draftsmen or 
'" persons responsibie for the mechanical preparation of answers.) 
ANSWER: The defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks 
information which may invade the attorney client and/or work-product privileges. Notwithstanding, 
and without waiving said objections, the individuals who assisted in the preparation ofthese answers 
include the defendants Ron Thomas and Elaine Thomas, and their counsel. 
, 
IN~ERROGATORY NO.7: Has (sic) you ever been party to any lawsuit or 
litigation? If your answer is anything other than an unqualified ''No,'' then for each such case in 
which you were irivolved within the preceding fifteen (15) years, please set forth the following 
information specifically and in detail: 
A. The title and nature ofthe action and a brief description of your role or part 
in it. 
, 
B. The name and address of the court and the case number. 
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C. The resulting verdict or judgment. 
D. The name, address, and telephone number of all attorneys involved in the 
litigation. 
E. The name, address, and telephone number of each person or entity, other than 
yourself, who was a party to the litigation. 
ANSWER: The defendants obj ect to this interrogatory on the grounds ofbeing overly 
broad, unduly burdensome, amounting to harassment ofthe defendants, and to a significant extent 
seeks information that is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
in this action. Notwithstanding and without waiving said objections, the only lawsuits the 
defendants can recall being involved with as a party, regard a number of small claims type matters 
against purchasers 0 f vehicles not making payments for t he vehicles. T he defendants don ot 
remember the details of any of these small claims matters. 
INTERROGATORY NO.8: Please describe in complete detail all facts which form 
the basis of your denial ofthe allegation that: "Defendants, however, have failed to perform andlor 
continuously frustrated the purpose of the agreement by, inter alia, diverting funds from Thomas 
Motors and/or creditor's of Thomas Motors Inc. to his and Elaine Thomas' personal use, diverting 
funds from Thomas Motors and/or creditor's of Thomas Motors, Inc. to unrelated entities, and 
unilaterally selling Thomas Motors, Inc. To a third party and, consequently, breaching the agreement 
with Plaintiff." By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with knowledge, and any 
ncnts which support your denial. 
ANSWER: The defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds of being vague, 
" 
confusing, unintelligible, and has the potential of being materially misleading. The interrogatory 
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basically seeks to discover "facts" that support the "denial of facts" that have been alleged by the 
plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff of course has the burden of proving those factual accusations 
in his Complaint. The bottom line is the plaintiff has made the referenced factual accusation in his 
Complaint, which·the defendants believe is simply untrue, or did not happen. 
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please describe in complete detail all facts which form 
the basis of your denial of the allegation that: "Defendant Ronald Thomas made this offer in an 
, 
attempt to induce Plaintiff into leaving his job and begin working for the Defendants. This offer was 
made in an effort to procure the Plaintiff s extensive knowledge and background related to the day-
I 
to-day operation and management of a large scale new car dealership." By this interrogatory, 
Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with knowledge, and any documents which support your denial. 
,. 
ANSWER: The defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds of being 
vague, confusing, . unintelligible, and has the potential of being materially misleading. The 
interrogatory basically seeks to discover "facts" that support the "denial of facts" that have been 
alleged by the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff of course has the burden of proving those factual 
accusations in his' Complaint. The bottom line is the plaintiff has made the referenced factual 
accusation in his Complaint, which the defendants believe is simply untrue, or did not happen. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please describe in complete detail all facts which 
the basis of your denial of the allegation that: "After being referred to Special Assets, Plaintiff 
personally worked with Wells Fargo an extraordinary amount ofhours at great personal sacrifice in 
order to maintain a flooring line of credit at Thomas Motors and assure Thomas Motors remained 
an open and viable entity." By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with knowledge, 
and any documents which support your denial. 
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ANSWER: The defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds of being 
vague, confusing, unintelligible, and has the potential of being materially misleading. The 
interrogatory basically seeks to discover "facts" that support the "denial of facts" that have been 
alleged by the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff of course has the burden of proving those factual 
accusations in his Complaint. The bottom line is the plaintiff has made the referenced factual 
accusation in his Complaint, which the defendants believe is simply untrue, or did not happen. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please describe in complete detail all facts which 
form the basis of your denial of the allegation that: "In 2002, after bringing the loan with Wells 
Fargo up-to-date, Thomas Motors arranged with Key Bank for a new flooring line for used cars, a 
new flooring line for new cars and a new note on the real property upon which Thomas Motors was 
situated." By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with knowledge, and any 
documents which s'upport your denial. 
ANSWER: The defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds of being 
vague, confusing,' unintelligible, and has the potential of being materially misleading. The 
interrogatory basically seeks to discover "facts" that support the denial of facts that have been alleged 
by the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff of course has the burden of proving those factual 
accusations in his Complaint. The bottom line is the plaintiff has made the referenced factual 
accusation in his Complaint, which the defendants believe is simply untrue, or did not happen. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please describe in complete detail all facts which 
form the basis of your affirmative defense that: "The Plaintiffs (sic) did enter into written 
contractual agreements with defendants, but the Plaintiff breached material provisions of said 
contracts, and thereby forfeited all contractual rights attendant thereto." By this interrogatory, 
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Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with knowledge, and any documents which tends to support this 
affirmative defense. 
ANSWER: The plaintiff is already aware that the parties in this case did in fact enter 
into written contractual agreements with each other, and copies of said contracts have been 
exchanged in informal discovery already. The plaintiff is also aware, or at least should be aware 
from reading and signing those contracts, that those contracts impose certain specific and expressed 
~ 
requirements on the plaintiff to perform. The plaintiff simply failed to perform the requirements 
imposed upon him' in those written contractual agreements with his parents, the defendants. For 
example, the written agreement to purchase the business assets of Thomas Motors, which concerns 
the primary contention of the plaintiff in this lawsuit he has brought against his own mother and 
father, require the plaintiffto make certain payments in order to purchase the business. The plaintiff 
made no such payments nor any effort to comply with the payment obligations imposed upon him 
under those contraCts. The individuals who would have knowledge of that would of course include 
the plaintiff and the defendant themselves, and their respective other family members, the 
accountants for the respective parties, other employees of Thomas Motors, and the banking 
representatives for;each or any ofthe respective parties in this action. The documents which would 
tend to support this affirmative defense would include the contracts themselves, and to the extent 
the plaintiff claims· he actually made such payments, any of his financial records demonstrating a 
lack of any such payments. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please describe in complete detail all facts which 
form the basis of your affirmative defense that: "The Plaintiffs claims are barred due to an 
impossibility of performance." By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with 
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knowledge, and any documents which tend to support this affirmative defense. 
ANSWER: The plaintiff agreed to purchase the business of Thomas Motors from the 
ddtmdants which among the other requirements ofthe contract would have required him to receive 
approval from the auto manufacturers to approve the plaintiffto run such a franchise dealership. The 
defendants believe it is reasonably likely the plaintiff would not have been able to so qualify, or have 
been approved by the automobile manufacturers to be such a franchise, had the plaintiff made any 
efforts to obtain such approval. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please describe in complete detail all facts which 
, 
form the basis of your affirmative defense that: "The Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of 
release and/or accord and satisfaction." By this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with 
knowledge and any documents which tend to support this affirmative defense. 
ANSWER: The plaintiff repeatedly advised the defendants orally that he was not 
going to be able to purchase the business, and informed his parents to that effect. The plaintiff also 
gave his defendant father verbal approval of him going ahead with selling the business, and the 
business was sold thereafter. 
, 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of a 
"Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement," "Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business 
Assets" and "Management Contract," which purportedly contains the signatures of Plaintiff and 
Defendants Ronald' and Elaine Thomas. Please describe and explain in full and complete detail each 
and every effort made by you to comply with the requirements of this alleged Agreement. 
ANSWER: The defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds of being overly 
hroad, unduly burdensome, vague, confusing, and has the potential for being materially misleading. 
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The bottom line for each of the respective contracts referenced in this interrogatory is the plaintiff 
failed to live up to his contractual obligations, made it clear he never could live up to the contractual 
obligations of these contracts, thereby rendering the contracts null and void for all purposes. The 
defendants did not'in any way prohibit or prevent the plaintiff from living up to the contractually 
mandated requirements in order to purchase the business; the plaintiff simply failed to do so. 
REQUEST FOR PRQDUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
RE'QUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please produce any and all documents 
related to the sale and/or auction of assets/inventory relating to Thomas Motors, Inc., Thomas 
Motors, Lot of Cars 2, Emmett Auto Parts (NAP A), Parts Plus, Emmett Auto Care, Thomas Auto 
Parts and any entity owned, operated, and/or controlled by either of the individual defendants in this 
action. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.1: The defendants object to this Request on the 
grounds of being overly broad, unduly burdensome, amounting to harassment ofthe defendants, and 
seeks information that is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
in this action. Notwithstanding, and without waiving any such objections, attached as Exhibit "A" 
hereto are copies of contract documents relating to the defendants' sale of Thomas Motors and 
pertinent real estate. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please produce copies off (sic) the tax 
returns for calendar years 1995 through 2005 inclusive. This request encompasses both the personal 
tax returns for the individual defendants as well as the corporate tax returns for any entity owned, 
operated, andlor controlled by either of the individual defendants during the referenced period. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.2: The defendants object to this request on the 
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grounds that it is overbroad, unduly burdensome, constitutes an unwarranted invasion of privacy of 
the defendants, amounts to harassment of the defendants, and seeks information that is not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this action. Notwithstanding 
and without waiving said objections, attached as Exhibit "B" hereto are copies of the tax returns filed 
for Thomas Motors for the calendar years 1997 - 2005, inclusive. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please produce andlormakeavailable fo r 
inspection/investigation the original document( s) which you claim and allege support your position 
that a valid written contract was executed between yourselves and Plaintiff. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.3: The defendants through counsel have already 
indicated to counsel for the plaintiff that the original contracts are in the possession of Mr. Ronald 
Bjorkman, co-counsel for the defendants in this action, at his office in Emmett, Idaho. Arrangements 
can easily be made to review such originals upon request, and counsel for the defendants will 
accommodate any reasonable scheduling requests to look at the originals of these agreements. The 
defendants are otherwise unsure what is meant by making the original agreements available for 
"inspection/investigation" and would request further clarification on precisely what is 
meant/intended by'these before they will agree to it. 
,; 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Please produce copies of any and all 
exhibits you intend to use at the trial of this action. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.4: Defendants have not decided which exhibits 
will be used at the trial of this action at this point, but will seasonably supplement their response to 
this request in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure andlor any applicable pre-trial 
orders of the Court in this action. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: Please produce and attach copies of the 
education and professional qualifications of all expert witnesses you will call at trial and also attach 
copies of each and every report generated by each expert witness referred to herein. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.5: The defendants have not decided which expert 
witness will be called at the trial of this action at this point, but will seasonably supplement a 
response to this request in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or any applicable 
i 
pre-trial orders of the Court in this action. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 1, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.6: Objection. Please see Answer to Interrogatory 
No.1 above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 2, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.7: The defendants object to this Request on the 
grounds of being vague, confusing, and unintelligible. The referenced Interrogatory No.2 asks about 
, 
communications; it does not make reference to any documents. Notwithstanding and without 
waiving said objection, please refer to the Answer to Interrogatory No.2 above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8: Please produce copies of any and all 
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documents identifi~d or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 3, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.8: Defendants object to this request on the 
grounds of being vague, confusing and unintelligible. Interrogatory No.3 asks only for the identity 
of people with knowledge of the facts of the case; it does not appear to have anything to do with 
identifying any documents of any kind. This Request thus does not appear to make sense. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 4, including, 
'. 
but not limited to, ~ll documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.9: The defendants object to this request on the 
grounds of being vague, confusing and unintelligible. Here again, Interrogatory No. 4 asks the 
defendants to identify experts not expected to testify at trial, and has nothing to do with identifying 
or requesting documents. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 5, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.1 0: Defendants object to this request again on the 
grounds of vague, confusing, and unintelligible. Here again, Interrogatory No.5 asks the defendants 
to identify individuals who might qualify as expert witnesses that will testify at trial; it has nothing 
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to do with documehts. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 6, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 11: The defendants object to this request again 
on the grounds of being vague, confusing, and unintelligible. Again, the interrogatory referenced 
asks only to identify the individuals responsible for supplying answers to the interrogatories and has 
nothing to do with documents. Again, this Request thus does not appear to make sense. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 7, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 12: Defendants object to this request again on the 
grounds of being vague, confusing, and unintelligible and potentially seeks discovery that is 
irrelevant to any issue in this case. The interrogatory in question, Number 7, asks ifthe defendants 
have been party to a prior lawsuit and if so to provide some "information" about such a lawsuit. The 
interrogatory does not even request the defense to identify any documents in their answer, so this 
request does not make any sense. In any event, the defendants did not rely on any documents for 
Answer to Interrogatory No.7. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 8, including, 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION PROPOUNDED TO DEFENDANTS - 15 
000115 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 13: The defendants object to this request again 
on the grounds of~eing vague, confusing, and unintelligible. For further response to this Request, 
please refer to Answer to Interrogatory No.8 above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 9, including, 
but not limited, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 14: The defendants object to this request again 
on the grounds of being vague, confusing, and unintelligible. For further response to this Request, 
please refer to Answer to Interrogatory No.9 above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 10, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 15: The defendants object to this request again 
on lhe grounds of being vague, confusing, and unintelligible. For further response to this Request, 
please refer to Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 11, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
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which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 16: The defendants object to this request again 
on the grounds of being vague, confusing, and unintelligible. For further response to this Request, 
please refer to Answer to Interrogatory No. 11 above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 12, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 17: The defendants again object to this request 
on the grounds ofbeing vague, confusing, and unintelligible. Once again, the interrogatory asks the 
defense to describe facts which form the basis of an affirmative defense. While the affirmative 
defense raised by Illterrogatory Number 12 specifically relates to written contract agreements with 
the defendants, the defense has long ago been provided with copies of such contracts already. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 13, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identifi~d in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 18: The defendants object to this Request on the 
grounds of it being vague and confusing. Notwithstanding said objections, the defendants did not 
rely upon documents to answer Interrogatory No. 13, nor are any documents referenced in said 
answer. The defendants reserve the right to seasonably supplement their response to this Request 
if any documents are obtained or gathered which are pertinent to this defense. 
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documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 14, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 19: The written agreements provided as 
attachments to the plaintiff s discovery requests herein arguably pertain to the defenses of accord and 
satisfaction and/or release. Otherwise, the plaintiffs agreement with the fact that he was not going 
to be able to purchase the business, after it was clear he was not going to do so and he failed to meet 
any of the contractual commitments under the written agreements, were oral discussions with his 
parents. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents identified or relied upon by you in your Answer to Interrogatory Number 15, including, 
but not limited to, all documents which contain a part or all of each such answer, and all documents 
which you identified in said answer. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 20: The defendants object to this request on the 
grounds that it is vague, confusing, and unintelligible. The interrogatory referenced does not call for 
the identification of any documents but instead asks the defendants to explain efforts made to comply 
with the written Aw-eements which are attached to the discovery requests. As such, the instant 
request to produce documents identified in answering that interrogatory makes little or no sense. 
Notwithstanding said objections, please refer to Answer to Interrogatory No. 15 above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21: Please produce any and all documents 
which document and/or demonstrate the transfer andlor sale of any item of inventory or asset 
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between Thomas Motors, Inc., Thomas Motors, Lot of Cars 2, Emmett Auto Parts (NAPA), Parts 
Plus, Emmett Auto Care, Thomas Auto Parts and any entity owned, operated, and/or controlled by 
either of the individual defendants in this action. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 21: The defendants object to this Request on the 
grounds of being overly broad, unduly burdensome, amounting to harassment ofthe defendants, and 
seeks information that is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
in this action. The defendants further object on the grounds that this Request appears to be 
duplicative of Request for Production No.1 above. Notwithstanding said objections, please refer 
to the Response to Request for Production No.1 above, and the attached Exhibit "A" hereto. 
DATED this / {,~ay of August, 2006. 
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• 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
County of C(.rtt. ) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as 
follows: 
. 
That he is one of the defendants in the above-entitled action; that he has read the 
above and foregoing Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests 
for Production Propounded to Defendants and knows the contents thereof; that the facts therein 
stated are true as he verily believes. 
RONALD O. THOMAS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this I f ~ay of August, 2006 . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofIdaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this I/,'" day of /tv'jVJ-t', 2006, he caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by tlie method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
William A. Morrow 
James M. Vavrek 
WHITE, PETERSON, PA 
5700 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
rX1 U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[Xl U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
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SARAH H. AllNETT 
KEvIN E. DINIUS 
JULIE KulIN FISCHEIt 
CHiusTOPHER D. GABBERT 
WM. F. GlORAY, m 
T. GUY HALLAM •• 
In.L S. HOLINKA 
JOHN R. KORMANIK • 
WILLIAM A. MORROW 
WHITE PETERSON 
ArrORNEYS AT LAW 
WHITE PETERsON, P.A. 
CANYON PARK AT THE IDAHO CENTER 
5700 E. FRANKLIN RD., SUITE 200 
NAMPA, IDAHO 83687-7901 
TEL (208) 466-9272 
FAX(208}466-440S 
EMAIL: jvavrek@whitepeterson.cOltl 
August 30, 2006 
JI1A FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION (208) 342-2927 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS, CHID. 
537 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Re: Thomas v. Thomas 
Case No. CV 2006-492 
Dear John: 
WlLuAMF. NICHOLS" I 
CHiusToPHBll S. NYE 
Pim.Jp A. P!ITERsON 
TODD A. ROSSMAN 
JAMES M VA VR.IlK 
TElUuJNcB R. WHm! ••• 
DIlNNIs P. WILKINSON 
• Also admitted in CA 
•• Also admitted in OR 
••• Also admitted in W A 
This letter is in response to the Defendants' responses to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. Mr. Thomas is concerned by the 
Defendants' inadequate responses to the interrogatories and Defendants' limited production of 
documents. It appears the Defendants refused to provide the information requested by the 
interrogatories and produce the requested documents, or they simply failed to undertake the task 
of producing the information and documents. The purpose of this letter is to identify the 
Defendants' responses that appear to be defective and not in compliance with Defendants' 
discovery obligations pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Request for Production No.1: This request required the Defendants to produce any and 
all documents related to the sale and/or auction of the assets and inventory of various 
commercial entities under the Defendants' control. In response, Defendants only provide 
information related to the sale of Thomas Motors. While Plaintiff appreciates this information, 
the Defendants' response fails to adequately respond to the request for documents pertaining to 
the other businesses and the sale of inventory off the lot of Thomas Motors. Given the 
Defendants' posture in this case up to his point, this information is wholly discoverable and the 
objections stated are not well founded. Please provide any and all further responsive documents 
on or before September 8, 2006. 
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Request for Production No. 21: This request required the Defendants to produce any and 
all documents related to the transfer of assets and/or inventory between the various commercial 
entities under the Defendants' control. In response, Defendants provided only limited 
information duplicative of the response to Request for Production No.1. While Plaintiff 
appreciates this information, the Defendants' response fails to adequately respond to the request 
for documents pertaining to the other businesses and the sale of inventory off the lot of Thomas 
Motors. Given the Defendants' posture in this case up to his point, this information is wholly 
discoverable and the objections stated are not well founded. Please provide any and all further 
responsive documents on or before September 8, 2006. 
Request for Production No.3: This request required the Defendants to make available for 
inspection by Plaintiff's document examiner the original documents Defendants' allege creates a 
contract in this matter. While the Defendants' response indicates the responsive documents are in 
the possession of co-counsel, Ronald Bjor~ it does not indicate a time and place in which 
Plaintiff can have access to said documents in order to forward them on to his document 
examiner. I would request that you contact myself or William Morrow to identify a time and 
place where Plaintiff may gain access to these documents. If you wish some kind of stipulation 
which would allow a signed photocopy to be stipulated as an original in the unlikely event that 
the original is lost, then we would certainly do so. 
Interrogatory No. 15: This interrogatory required the Defendants to identify the efforts 
made to comply with the alleged requirements of the "Commercial Lease and Purchase 
Agreement," "Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets," and "Management 
Contract." The response of the Defendants, however, is entirely unresponsive and fails to 
identify or offer any explanation regarding the Defendants conduct toward this purported 
agreement. Given the Defendants' posture in this case up to his point, this information is wholly 
discoverable and the objections stated are not well founded. Please provide any and all further 
responsive information on or before September 8, 2006. 
Interrogatories Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11: These interrogatories requested the specific facts 
relied on by the Defendants in denying certain portions of Plaintiff's Complaint. However, in 
responding, the Defendants merely stated that they felt the assertions were not true but failed to 
provide any factual support for those claims. If it is the position of the Defendants that they do 
not have any factual support for their denials that is one position, however, should the 
Defendants possess any facts that would support their denials Plaintiff is entitled to discover 
those facts. Accordingly, please provide any and all further responsive information on or before 
September 8, 2006. 
In the event you are unwilling to provide the information and documents requested in the 
Plaintiff's written discovery and further identified and requested in this letter, the Plaintiff will 
have no alternative but to seek the intervention of the Court and seek a Motion to Compel. 
John J. Janis 
August 30, 2006 
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I thank you in advance for your kind and prompt attention to this matter. Do not hesitate 
to contact me should you have any questions or concerns. 
Very truly yours, 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
~~---
James M. Vavrek 
IMV/sw 
c: Drew Thomas 
sw!W:\Work\1\Thomas. R Drew 2197l\Thomas Motors, Inc.l)OO\CorrespondenceYanis Ilr 082806.doc 
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__ __ ...... -....JA.:) 
(208) 343-7510 
Fax: (208) 342-2927 
537 West Bannock Street 
P. O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
J. Charles Hepworth .. 
John J. Janis 
John W. Kluksdal 
.. Member CA Bar 
James M. Vavrek 
WHITE PETERSON 
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
LEZAMIZ & JANIS, 
LAW OFFICES 
- ESTABLISHED 1952 -
August 31, 2006 
Re: Thomas v. Thomas 
HL&J File No.: 06-2-023 
Dear James: 
TWIN FALLS OFFIC 
(208) 734-751 
Fax: (208) 734-411 
133 Shoshone Street NortJ 
P. O. Box 38~ 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-038S 
John C. Hepworth 
John T. Lezamiz 
Robyn M. Brody 
Benjamin J. Cluff 
Joel A. Beck 
Wm. L. Nungester, OfCounse! 
This will respond to your letter of August 30, 2006, and the various points raised 
therein. I will attempt to address each of the discovery requests at issue, in the same manner your 
letter does. 
Request for Production No.1: We do not see the relevance of documents related to 
the sale and/or aJetion of the assets or inventory of the other commercial entities under the 
defendant's control. Your client's claim boils down to asserting his mother and father promised to 
give him one oftheir businesses, and his mom and dad both deny that was the case. For that reason, 
we thought the sale documents relating to that particular business were discoverable and produced 
them accordingly. However, we do not see how any sale of any of the other businesses could have 
any relevance to the issues presented in this case. 
We';;rre, of course, more than willing to provide any information which is reasonably 
calculated to lead tothe discovery of admissible evidence in this action, and I appreciate the fact that 
you are trying to work any discovery issues out by letter. However, your letter does not do much in 
the way of explaining how any documents related to the sale of other businesses, that were not the 
subj ect of any alleged promise in this case, are relevant or discoverable. Instead, the only reference 
made in your letter that could arguably be said to deal with the relevance of this information states: 
"Given the Defen9-ants' posture in this case up to his [sic] point, this information is wholly 
discoverable and the objections stated are not well founded." This seems to be more ofa conclusion 
than an explanation, and does not disuade us from believing our original position on this subject is 
well founded. 
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Request for Production No. 21: This references any documents related to any 
purported transfer of assets or inventory between the various commercial entities. Our response to 
this is pretty much the same as the response to Request for Production No.1 above, as we do not see 
the relevance or discoverability of any such documents, ifthey exist. Again, the case you filed boils 
down to your client claiming his parents orally promised to give him a particular business, and seeks 
to recover large money damages from his own parents because they sold that business to someone 
else. We do not believe any of the documents requested here could have anything to do with the 
issues raised by that basic claim. 
Request for Production No.3: This regards your request for the defendants to make 
the original contracts available for inspection and examination. As we said in our response, the 
originals are in the possession of co-counsel Mr. Bjorkman, and you are free to make arrangements 
to look at those documents at his office. You apparently suggest that it is our responsibility to 
contact you or Mr .. Morrow to identify a time and place where "Plaintiff may gain access to these 
documents." I do not believe that to be the case. While it is true I did not specify a time and place 
for you to come over to Mr. Bjorkman's office to look at the documents, I thought the answer was 
clear that we wouid make those arrangements at virtually any time that was reasonable. All you 
would have to do is call me or Mr. Bjorkman, and I am sure that we can accommodate everyone's 
.schedule for this, and do so quite quickly. The only thing I would like to assure is that Mr. Bjorkman 
is actually in the office when the "inspection" takes place. 
However, our response also indicated that to the extent that your requested inspection 
and/or examination involves something other than looking at the documents, we requested some 
clarification on what is being suggested by that. Your letter suggests that you are actually seeking 
to take the original documents out of the possession of the defendants or their counsel altogether, 
and send them to some unidentified "document examiner," to perform some kind of unidentified 
examination~ To begin with, your letter does not identify who this "document examiner" is, nor does 
it explain what this document examiner actually intends to do with these original documents. We 
believe at the very least we are entitled to get the specifics of what would actually be done with these 
documents, who is.going to be handling them, and what exactly they are planning on doing with 
them, before we have to take an affirmative position on that, one way or the other. 
You know as well as I do that your client's position regarding these original contracts, 
makes these original documents have significant evidentiary value in this case. Ifthere is any risk 
that any effort on your part, or that of your expert's, would be to lose or destroy the original nature 
of this significant evidence, we do not believe it is just a matter of stipulating that a signed 
photocopy will be the equivalent of an original. On the contrary, such an eventuality would involve 
a spoilation of evidence, which might very well involve or trigger other evidentiary principles than 
the "Best Evidence" Rules. 
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In short, if you would actually like to just "inspect" these original documents at Mr. 
Bjorkman's office (i.e. come and look at them) I would ask that you contact Mr. Bjorkman's office 
to arrange a time that he could be there for that purpose. Again, I am sure those arrangements can 
be made very easily with a simple phone call. Based upon your letter, however, it does not at this 
point appear to me that you are actually requesting that opportunity. Instead, you are apparently 
requesting that we actually turn over these documents to your possession, and for you to then send 
them somewhere else. On that subject, the bottom line is we are not willing under the present 
"cIrcumstances'to do that, as outlined above. I believeoClf position on this subject is ;::ntirely 
consistent with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (e.g. Rule 34), but if you are aware of legal 
authority to the contrary, please let me know. 
Interrogatory No. 15: This interrogatory is directed at Defendants' efforts to comply 
with the requirements of the contracts. As we stated in our Answer, the Defendants were required 
under the original contracts to turn over the business to your client, if he satisfied his contractual 
obligations. He did not do that. He did not make the requisite payments nor make any effort to 
comply with his obligations under the contract. As such, there was not much for the Defendants to 
do. As our responses indicate, your client made it clear that he was not going to buy the business 
although he had contractually agreed to do so, which thereby rendered any obligations on the part 
of the Defendants to do anything as void and unnecessary. I frankly do not see how this response 
could be considered unresponsive. 
Interrogatories Nos. 8,9, 10 and 11: There seems to be a communication disconnect 
here, as we believe all these interrogatories basically involve a double negative. We do honestly 
believe that they are very confusing interrogatories which boils down to asking someone to disprove 
a negative. Each of these interrogatories quotes a specific factual accusation contained in your 
complaint. The Defendants deny that those accusations are accurate or true. Your interrogatory then 
takes the additional step of asking the Defendants to provide facts to prove why their denials are 
accurate. That simply does not make much sense to us. Otherwise stated, our denials boil down to 
saying the factual accusations made by the Plaintiff that are at issue simply did not happen, or are 
not true, and that w~ do not believe the Plaintiff can prove those specific factual allegations, because 
they did not happen in the precise manner alleged by the Plaintiff. Again, I would remind you that 
Plaintiffbears the burden of proving any particular facts that he alleges to have happened a partiCUlar 
way; it is not the Defendants' who have the burden of proving such facts did not happen as alleged. 
To be fair on this, I have to say that we struggled with these interrogatories, and we 
were frankly stumped by them. I have simply never had the experience of having a party making 
specific factual allegations against another patty, which the responding party denies, and then the 
alleging party asking the responding party to identify facts or documents upon which they base their 
deniaL It is of course much more common for each party to ask for facts that support the making 
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of, or denial of, a claim or an affinnative defense (which you had done elsewhere and we answered 
accordingly). This, however, asks for facts supporting a denial of facts which we believe not to have 
occurred. Nevertheless, I will agree to re-look at your interrogatories and our responses, and see if 
there is any more meaningful infonnation that I can give you, that has not already been given. 
I should also say that I appreciate your efforts at trying to resolve any disputes we 
have in discovery infonnally, notwithstanding any disagreement we may have on particular issues. 
, ' ", We believe in fact, that most discovery disputes should be resolved by the litigants under most 
circumstances, although there are of course circumstances where there is no choice but to seek Court 
intervention. We will endeavor to be as reasonable and cooperative as we can in any of the 
discovery efforts in this case. 
Very truly yours, 




SARAH H. ARNBTr 
KIMN E. DINrus 
JUlJE KLIliN FIsCHER 
CHiusToPHBllD. GABBERT 
WM. F. GIORAY, ill 
T. GUY HALLAM •• 
JILL S. HOLINKA 
JOfIN R. KORMANlK • 
WlLUAM A MORROW 
WmTE PETERSON 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
CANYON PARK AT THE IDAHO CENTER 
5700 E. FRANKLIN RD., SUITE 200 
NAMPA, IDAHO 83687-7901 
TEL (208) 466-9272 
FAX(208)466-440S 
EMAIL: jvavrek@whitepeterson.com 
September 12, 2006 
VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION (208) 342-2927 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS, CHID. 
537 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Re: Thomas v. Thomas 
Case No. CV 2006-492 
Dear Mr. Janis: 
WILLIAM F. NICHOLS •• 
CHR!STOPHEllS. NYE 
P!mJp A I'1lTERsoN 
TODD A ROSSMAN 
JAMESM. VAVlU!K 
TERRENcE R. Wmn! ••• 
DENNIsP. WILIONSON 
• Also admitted in CA 
•• Also admitted in OR 
••• Also admitted in W A 
Thank you for your prompt response to my letter of August 26, 2006. I would, at this 
point, like to take the opportunity to address some of the concerns you have raised. 
As you are well aware, it is my client's contention that the contracts which you claim to 
be applicable to this litigation are fraudulent documents. To that end, it is our desire to access the 
original documents and have them examined by a document examiner. It is our intention to use 
all available scientific methods to determine the authenticity of the signatures contained on those 
documents. The specifics of this testing, however, cannot be ascertained until such time the 
examiner has access to the documents. You can be assured the examiner will not destroy the 
documents as part of the testing process and the originals will be returned to your or Ron 
Bjorkman's custody and control following the completion of the tests. Clearly, this request is 
valid pursuant to LRC.P 34(a) and I am confident the court will grant us access to these 
documents should we need to seek its intervention. I hope, however, the court's intervention can 
be avoided. As noted in my previous correspondence, my client is willing to stipulate to allow a 
signed photocopy to be used as an original in the unlikely event that the original is lost - such a 
stipulation should suffice to overcome any application of the Best Evidence Rule. 
Time is of the essence in this matter and, accordingly, I would request a date by which 
we may take possession of this document to be identified prior to September 15, 2006. In the 
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event you are unwilling to grant us access to the original document as requested in the Plaintiffs 
written discovery and further identified and requested in this letter and my letter of August 26, 
2006, the Plaintiff will have no alternative but to seek the intervention of the Court and seek a 
Motion to Compel. 
Finally, I would also request that you identify a date during the first week of October 
where Elaine Thomas would be available to be deposed. 
I thank you in advance for your kind and prompt attention to this matter. Do not hesitate 
to contact me should you have any questions or concerns. 
Very truly yours, 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A . 
. ~tP~ 
James M. Vavrek 
JMV/sw 
c: Drew Thomas 
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Jallles M. Vavrek 
Wl11TE PETERSON 
5700 E. Franklin Road, Sic. 200 
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- ES'J'A RUSHED 1952 -
Scptcl'nbcr 1 J, 2006 
Rc: ThomHs v. Thomas 
HL&J File No.: 06·2-023 
Dear Mr. Vavrek: 
TWIN PAT ... L.':i Ol:FIC I 
(2(lB) 734-751 
P;\x:(20l{)n4-4:1l: I 
133 ,<;!lO~honl: S[rl'~r Nonl 
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Johll C. t kpworrh 
TullH T. I.<::t.:lmit: 
RI.lnYII M. Brody 
g':l1iamin J. Clot}" 
T,)<.:I A. ih:(k 
Wm. 1.. NtIl1I:'.c!;u:r, OfCotln~d 
This will r e~pond toy ourl etter 0 f S cplembcr 1 2, 2006. W estill h ave several 
C(lncel11s about YOtlr request, ::\nd have several points to make in response to your letter. 
) 
1. Your leiter first indicates that T ,Ill} "well aware" that your client is contentlhlg the 
cOI1!racls which we claim to be applicable to this litigation arc "fraudulent documents." l am not 
sure that is a [Hit' cll:.1racleriziltion. 11 is my understanding your clit:llt h,lS aclmowlcdg¢d actually 
signing tho$e writicil contracts lo purchase the business. As such, I do not see how they could 
possibly amount t 1.'1 <, fhltldulcnt documents." N overthclcss, I a m a ware your client h ns raised 
Qllc5titms ahollt wlw signed these documents on behalf of the defendants and when, which 
nppa1'cllLlyhas something to do with the ·'testing"you want to accomplish, which is fllrthcraddrcsscd 
bdow. 
..: 
1. 'l'tHII']cttcr still docs not addl'e~s the basic requests we have made ofyotl in regards 
Lo this "testing" yoti appnrcntly wLlnt to accomplish. That is, you have not ic.lenti fied the person who 
would tlo the testing nor their credentials which would idcnlify or explain what expertise they 
purporL to havo. II) filet, we have no idea who this purported expert of yours is, where {hey live, or 
nnything "hout thc:\~'l. 
r, 
Eql~,\lly important, ifnot more so, you have stil1not identified what kind of possible 
"testing" this eXp~\l might perform on these original contracts. Your letter indicates that the 
H!;pcci tics" of the tcsting cannOl be ascertained ul1lillhe examinur has access to the oocuments. l do 
110t tll1d<:rst<lIHI this' fit at!. Yon must have something in mind as to what you want lesteLl by a 
'\loctlm~nt examine!'," We beliove we arc enlitled to this type oCinforrnation bcfore we are required 
(0 give ttl' poss0ssi,on of the original c()J1trncts, which ngain have VU1Y significant evidentiary value 
i 11 this C()sc. 
, 
" 





3. Your lcticrindicates that your request is "clearly valid" pursuant to l.R.C.P. 34(a). 
1 Ul1\ nOl sure tll~tL '!s fair either. That rllie allows a party to serve a request on another party "to 
il15p~ct find copy" unydcsignatcd documents. We have, of course, uJrcady pro vided you with copics 
ofthcst: docllnwnts. We hnvc also indicated an open wi11ingness to allow you to "inspect" these 
documents .at Mr. Bjorkman's office at virtually ~ll1Y limo. 'n,erc is nothing in this rule to my 
knowh.'dge thnt requires a party who has pos~t:ssiol1 of original documents, to actLlally give up 
posscs:;ioll of tlwsc original documents, and turn them over to the other party for the pntpose of 
conducting unexp!;linc.d andlor tlnidenti fled "Lesting" by ul1identified intlividuals in unidentified 
l"hlC~S. 
4. The hottom line is t.hnt we request that yon provide tiS with the information we 
previously rcqucstod nbolli this expert and the proposed testing. Specifically, we would like to know 
who this expert is, ;lnct where they art) located, and their credentials that qualify them as a "document 
t:x<\\)Jincr," In addition, we would very much requcsl that we be given as much information as you 
l'c:.\sonably cun as to the type oftcsting this expert would plan on performing, and for what purpose. 
Th<~;1k you again [or your time and consideration. 
v cry truly yours, 
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H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136 
Fax No. (208) 365-4196 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
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vs. 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, 
INC., a.n Idaho Corporation, 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I 
OR\G\NAL 
0001:17 
COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, and pursuant to Rule 56 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby respectfully move this Honorable Court for an order 
granting summary judgment on all counts of the Plaintiff's Complaint in this case. This Motion is 
made on the grounds and for the reasons that there are no genuine issues of material fact in 
establishing that the five causes of action raised by the Plaintiff are devoid of legal and/or factual 
merit. 
This Motion is otherwise based upon the records and pleadings on file with the Court 
in this action, together with the following documents filed contemporaneously and in support of this 
Motion: (1) Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Affidavit 
of Ronald O. Thomas in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and (3) Notice of 
Filing Deposition Excerpts in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 17ft,. day of July, 2007. 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
IS 
ys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this Jj!!:. day of July, 2007, he caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
William A. Morrow 
Dennis R. Wilkinson 
WHITE, PETERSON, P A 
5700 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
[)(1 U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[ XJ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
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John 1. Janis (ISB No. 3599) 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136 
Fax No. (208) 365-4196 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintitf, 
vs. 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV 2006-492 
) 
) DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
) SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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INTRODUCTION 
This case begins with the distasteful notion of a son suing his elderly parents for 
substantial financial damages, all on the premise of the defendant father allegedly promising to sell 
his son his car dealership business upon the father's retirement, which he instead sold to third 
persons. 'vV'hile this case begins with that premise, it should end with summary judgment being 
granted because the alleged agreement underlying the plaintiffs claims in this case is very clearly 
unenforceable as a matter of law. 
OPERATIVE FACTS 
The following represents the facts that are pertinent to this motion which are either 
entirely undisputed or are as alleged by the plaintiff: 
1. The defendant Ron Thomas worked in the business of selling motor vehicles for 
the better part of 30 years in Emmett, Idaho. He worked as a salesman for Johannsen Motors in 
Emmett for approximately 26 years until about 1995. At that point he purchased land and opened 
up his own used car sales business called "Lot of Cars." Within two years of opening that business, 
the owner of Johannsen Motors, for whom Ron had previously worked for numerous years, 
approached Ron about buying him out of Johannsen Motors. Ron eventually agreed to purchase the 
business. See Ron Thomas depo, pp. 45-47. 
2. The defendant Ron Thomas and his wife/co-defendant, Elaine, purchased 
Johannesen Motors in 1997. As part of that purchase, Ron and Elaine sought, and eventually 
obtained, approval from Dodge/Chrysler to become an approved franchisee to run a new car 
dealership for Dodge and Chrysler. Following that approval, they renamed the new car dealership 
"Thomas Motors." See Ron Thomas depo, p 42, ll. 19-25; p. 43,1.1. 
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3. According to the plaintiff, when his dad was considering buying Johannesen 
Motors his dad approached the plaintiff about the prospect of going to work for the new business 
venture as a sales manager. At the time, the plaintiff was working for Lanny Berg Chevrolet New 
and Used Car Dealership in Caldwell, Idaho. The plaintiff had been working for Lanny Berg for 
approximately 8 years. See R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 14, II. 2-10. The overwhelming majority of 
the time the plaintiff worked for Lanny Berg was as a salesman. See R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 15, 
ll. 1-20. For the last six months of his employment there, however, the plaintiffhas testified he had 
worked as a "new car sales manager" working under the general sales manager there (Lanny Berg, 
Jr.) and the owner (Lanny Berg, Sr.). See R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 19, 11.14-25. 
4. The plaintiff claims that he and his father had a number of discussions in 1996 and 
1997 about the prospect of the plaintiff going to work for his dad at the new car dealership he was 
going to buy (i.e. Johannesen Motors), before the plaintiff actually agreed to do so. The substance 
of these discussi ons, again according to the plaintiff, was his dad telling him that if the plaintiff came 
to work for the dad's new car dealership that he was going to purchase, that upon the dad's 
retirement at or about 63 years old, the "dealership would be yours." See, e.g., R. Drew Thomas 
depo, p. 41, ll. 10-15. The plaintiff eventually agreed to leave Lanny Berg and work for his dad at 
the new car dealership and claims he started working there in the Fall of 1997. See R. Drew Thomas 
depo, p. 24, ll. 1-2. The plaintiff testifies that his agreement to leave Lanny Berg and go to work for 
his dad's new business was communicated to his dad "a month or two" before he actually started 
working there. See R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 61, ll. 6-8. In other words, the oral agreement 
allegedly reached with his dad occurred somewhere in the July or August of 1997 time frame. Id; 
see also R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 61, ll. 22-25; p. 66, ll. 1-3. It is undisputed that all of these 
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discussions and/or the alleged agreement in question were oral in nature; nothing was in writing at 
this point. See, e.g., R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 61, l. 2-8 At that time, the defendant Ron Thomas 
was 55 years old, meaning he was approximately 8 years from becoming 63 years old, specifically 
in April of2005. See Affidavit of Ron Thomas, ~ 2 at p. 2. It is this alleged oral "agreement" that 
is at the heart of the plaintiffs claims in this lawsuit. Some of the more specific factual details 
concerning this alleged oral agreement are addressed further below. 
5. At his deposition, the plaintiff was pressed a number of times about the specifics 
of the purported oral agreement reached between he and his father. In fact, there are pages and pages 
of the plaintiff s deposition testimony representing efforts at getting the plaintiff to be specific and 
detailed about the discussions he supposedly had with his dad and, more importantly, what he claims 
were the precise terms of the oral agreement he is claiming to have reached with his father that 
serves as the basis of this lawsuit. See e.g., R. Drew Thomas depo, pp. 35-42. The following 
exchange is aptly illustrative of this, and of the substance of the plaintiffs testimony in this regard: 
Q. Now, you have filed a lawsuit here against your mom and dad 
alleging, in essence, that he had made a promise to you to give you 
the dealership, right? 
A. He had made a promise to me that upon his retirement, that the 
dealership would be mine. 
Q. And are those kind of the words that you remember him saying? 
A. Amongst others. 
Q. Well, let's review them all then. Because what I'm hearing you say-
A. I'll do my best. 
Q. Thank you. What I'm hearing you say is your dad, you can 
specifically recall words to the effect of, 'Drew, if you come over, 
when I retire, the business will be yours,' right? 
A. The dealership will be yours. 
Q. The dealership will be yours. Is that pretty close to at least 
paraphrasing the words he used? 
A. That would be fairly accurate. 
Q. Okay. Try to be as precise as you can. 
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A. With - - tied to I'm not going to do this if you're not coming over. 
I'm not going to buy it if you don't come over. 
Q. Okay. I'm going to try to elicit from you all this - - anything you can 
recall in the way of specific words used by your dad that relate to this 
alleged agreement at issue in this case. Do you see where I'm going 
with that? 
A. I'm trying. 
Q. Okay. You're claiming here that your dad made an agreement with 
you before you joined Thomas Motors that the dealership would be 
yours on his retirement, right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. That's the substance of your allegation in this case; is that fair to say? 
A. That's fair. 
* * * 
Q. So have you, then, told me essentially all you can remember in the 
way of specific words used by your dad that amounted to this 
agreement that's at issue in this lawsuit? 
A. I'd have to say yes. 
R. Drew Thomasdepo.p. 40.11. 24-25;p. 41, 1l.1-25;p. 42, 1l.1-12;p. 43, 1l.1-5. 
The bottom line is based upon the plaintiffs testimony in this case, the terms of the 
alleged oral agreement the plaintiff is claiming he reached with his dad in 1997 was quite vague in 
nature and boils down to the dad purportedly saying nothing more than "the dealership will be yours" 
in about 8 years if the plaintiff went to work for him. The plaintiff himself acknowledged this in 
efforts to get him to restate or summarize the terms of the alleged deal or agreement he claims he had 
reached with his father: 
Q. Okay. And, of course, you remember I got into this before too, trying 
to get the specifics of the words used that you can recall that 
constituted the deal. And I think we've already covered that, right? 
A. As good as I believe we can, I suppose. 
Q. Okay. And as I understand the substance of what you said, you 
understood essentially the terms of the deal were that your dad said, 
'If you come to join Thomas Motors as the general manager, the 
dealership will be yours when I retire at or about 63 years old'; is that 
a fair statement? 
A. I'd say that's fair. 
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R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 63, ll. J 7-25, p. 64, II. J -3 (emphasis added). Thus, the so-called "oral 
agreement" that serves as the primary basis of the plaintiffs claims in this lawsuit is anything but 
specific. On the contrary, it was at best extremely vague in nature without any alleged commitment 
by either party on a number of essential terms that would obviously be materially important to any 
such agreement. 
For example, the plaintiff repeatedly testified that at no point did his father ever 
express any kind of intention in any of their prior discussions that he would literally give the business 
to the plaintiff for free. In the words of the plaintiff himself: 
Now, you've got to remember, too, I never thought that I was going 
to get this place for free. That never crossed by mind that I'd ever get 
it for free. 
R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 86, ll. J 5-J 7. Elsewhere in the plaintiff s deposition he succinctly 
testified: "I never thought I would get it for free. I knew I would have to pay something for it." R. 
Drew Thomas de po, p. J 02, ll. 5-7 (emphasis added). 
Thus, according to the plaintiff, when his father allegedly told him that ifhe came to 
work for him in the summer of 1997 that at his retirement some 8 years later "the dealership would 
be yours", the plaintiff understood at all times from the discussions with his father that he was going 
to have to pay for it. They did not, however, discuss or reach agreement on what the price would be, 
the payment terms, etc. The plaintiff himself point blank acknowledged this in his testimony: 
Q. You at least understood that you wouldn't be getting the business for 
nothing, but there was no specific discussion about what you would 
have to pay? 
A. Correct. 
R. Drew Thomas depo, p. J 04, l. J 0../ (emphasis added). 
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6. The Written Agreements. Approximately 3 years after the plaintiffbegan working 
for his dad's new car dealership in the summer of 1997, it is undisputed that written agreements for 
the purpose of the plaintiff buying the business then known as Thomas Motors were prepared by an 
attorney, and signed by the plaintiff. The attorney was hired and paid by the defendants to prepare 
these written agreements. See Affidavit of Ron Thomas, ~ 6 at p. 3. Copies of these three written 
agreements, containing the signatures of all pertinent parties, are being provided to the Court with 
this Motion. See Affidavit of Ron Thomas, Exhibits "A ", "B" and "e". Here again, there are a 
number off actual disputes that relate to these written agreements, but none that matter to the present 
Motion before the Court. It is entirely undisputed these Agreements were prepared by an attorney 
(Mr. Carl Harder who is since deceased) who met with the plaintiff several times to review drafts 
and proposed changes. See R. Drew Thomas de po, p. 67, ll. 17-25; p. 68, II. 7-25; p. 69, II. 1-22. 
It is also undisputed that the plaintiff signed these agreements, willingly and voluntarily. See R. 
Drew Thomas depo, p. 97, II. 19-25; p. 98, fl. 1-5. In particular, the plaintiff acknowledges that he 
signed the agreement to purchase the assets of Thomas Motors, as well as the Commercial Lease 
Agreement, on September 19, 2000. See R. Drew Thomas de po, p. 71, II. 1-10. 
The plaintiff concedes that the written agreements he signed on September 19, 2000, 
were quite different than the alleged oral agreement he had previously believed and/or now claims 
he had with his father datmg back to July of 1997. R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 105, fl. 13-17. In fact, 
it is more than obvious the written agreements for the plaintiff to purchase the Thomas Motors 
business in September of 2000, were different in several material respects from the oral agreement 
he alleges he previously had with his father. Some of the differences include the following: 
A. [he written agreement to purchase the assets of Thomas Motors now had a 
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set price amount, specifically $850,000. (See Affidavit of Ron Thomas, 
Exhibit "A" at p. 4, Section 14.1. This is of course in stark contrast to the 
oral agreement the plaintiff claims he had with his dad up until this time, 
which had no set price for the purchase of the dealership business, but was 
instead left open to future negotiation, as the plaintiff himself acknowledges. 
See R. Drew Thomas depo. p. 184, 11.21-25; p. 185, ll. 1-2. 
B. The plaintiff also acknowledges these agreements reflected the plaintiff was 
no longer going to buy the business when the dad retired at or about 63 years 
old (in 2005), but would instead take over the business just one year later, 
specifically September 1,2001. See R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 101, II. 17-23; 
see also, Affidavit of Ron Thomas, Exhibit "A H. 
e. Part of the written agreements also encompass the plaintiff purchasing land 
upon which the new car dealership known as Thomas Motors was located, 
and it too had a very specific purchase price. See Affidavit of Ron Thomas. 
Exhibit HB" at p. 24. That is, the dealership business would pay rent for a 
number of years on a monthly basis, and the plaintiff would then have an 
obligation to pay a fixed amount for the land of $900,000. See Affidavit of 
Ron Thomas, Exhibit "B" at p. 2, Sections 2.1 and 3.2; p. 19, Section 22.1 
at p. 24. 
In short, these written agreements that were signed by the plaintiff in September of 
2000 represented a very different agreement in several material respects from that which the plaintiff 
is claiming he had in the way of a prior oral agreement with his father dating back to the summer of 
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1997, as the plaintiff himself acknowledges. R. Drew Thomasdepo,p. 105, 11.13-17. 
The specificity of all the terms of the 'NTitten agreements also illustrate and/or place 
appropriate emphasis upon the very non-specific and vague nature of the alleged oral agreement the 
plaintiff claims to have had with his father. As addressed earlier, the alleged oral agreement boiled 
down to nothing more than the defendant Ron Thomas purportedly assuring his son in 1997 the 
"business would be yours" some 8 years later. The written agreements signed by the plaintiff3 years 
later among other things demonstrate how many material and essential terms were missing from the 
alleged oral agreement, including: (1) the price; (2) the payment schedule for the price; (3) the 
specific date upon which the agreement went into actual effect; (4) the fact that the agreement may 
include some of the land owned by the defendants, and the specific lease, sale and financial terms 
associated with that; and (5) the conditions the plaintiff would have to satisfY before the agreement 
could possibly have any effect (e.g. successfully apply to become an approved franchisee from 
Dodge/Chrysler, which is an extremely involved process that had absolutely no guarantees of 
success). 
7. Following the plaintiff signing the written agreements in September of 2000, the 
plaintiff claims that his mother and father never actually signed these agreements, but instead 
indicated they were not going to hold him to these written agreements. See, R. Drew Thomas depo, 
at p. 118. ll. 1-24. As such, the plaintiff claims that these written agreements that he signed are 
actually not of any binding effect or force upon him. R. Drew Thomas, p. 118, I. 25; p. 119, II. 1-5. 
The plaintiff openly acknowledges he made no effort to comply with any of the requirements 
imposed upon him by any of these written agreements, such as making any payments towards the 
purchase price, making any efforts to apply to Dodge/Chrysler to become an authorized franchisee, 
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Q. Just answer my question. I know you want to make your pitch here, 
but I'm trying to get an answer from your perspective. 
You made no effort to comply with any of the requirements that 
would otherwise have been imposed on you in Exhibits 3 and 5 after 
you had that conversation with your dad; is that correct? 
A. That would be accurate. 
R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 119, II. 17-24 (emphasis added). See also, R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 119, 
l. 4 ("1 didn '( do anything towards them "). 
It should be noted here that the defendants, Ron and Elaine Thomas, strenuously 
dispute the factual assertions made by the plaintiff surrounding the signing of these written 
agreements. For example, the plaintiff is making the rather outlandish accusation that his mom and 
dad actually did not sign these agreements until years after the fact, notwithstanding their testimony 
that they both signed and dated these agreements in September of 2000, just like the plaintiff did. 
In any event, these factual disagreements and/or disputes are of no consequence to the issues 
presented by this Motion for Summary Judgment. For the present purposes, the defendants submit 
at least some of the important facts surrounding these written agreements in September of 2000 
which are indisputably established, are: 
A. The plaintiff actually signed these agreements which contain very specific 
terms relating to important subject matters such as the price, the payment 
schedule, the specific requirements imposed upon the plaintiff in order to 
purchase the business, etc., and that this was the first time any of these 
specific terms were ever discussed and/or put in writing. There were no such 
specific terms ever discussed, or which the plaintiff even claims to have been 
discussed at any point, at or before the time of the alleged oral agreement that 
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serves as the basis for the claims in this lawsuit; and 
B. It is also of importance to note that the plaintiff openly acknowledges he 
made no effort to comply with literally any of the requirements imposed upon 
him by any of these written agreements to purchase the business assets of 
Thomas Motors or the land upon which it was located, such as making any 
of the payments required, applying to become an authorized franchisee, etc. 
The fact this is entirely undisputed explains, of course, why the focus of the 
plaintiff s claims in this lawsuit are on the oral agreement allegedly reached 
with his father back in the summer of 1997. He simply can not possibly 
prove any kind of claim arising out of these written agreements since he 
openly acknowledges he did not comply with literally any of the terms of 
these written buy/sell agreements, nor did he ever try to do so. 
8. It is also undisputed that from its inception Thomas Motors did not do well 
financially. For most of the years that Thomas Motors was in existence, it lost money, at an alarming 
rate. (See Affidavit of Ronald Thomas, ~ 11, at pp. 4-5, and Exhibit "D "). For his part, the plaintiff 
acknowledges that at the time the business was sold to third persons in early 2006, he understood 
the business had approximately $1,000,000 in outstanding debt. See R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 179, 
ll. 1-21. He also acknowledges his awareness that at one point the dealership was $300,000 "out of 
trust" with the bank that provided the loan for the line of credit for the business operation. See R. 
Drew Thomas depo, p. 90, ll. 6-25; p. 91, ll. 1-21. In fact, he attended the meeting in the Fall of 
2000 with the banker and his father to discuss this very serious financial problem. Id By the same 
token, the defendant Mr. Thomas has testified Thomas Motors "has been a loser ever since I bought 
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it." Ron Thomas depo, p. 44, fl. 8-10. He also testified that he was continually falling behind in his 
line of credit with the bank and he was pouring into the Thomas Motors business from other sources, 
and that Thomas Motors ultimately represented a huge drain on his financial resources. (See Ronald 
0. Thomas depo at pp. 197-198; See also, Affidavit of Ron Thomas, ~ 13 at p. 6. 
Towards the end ofthe calendar year 2005, the defendant Mr. Thomas felt like he had 
no choice but to sell the business, as it was turning out to be a financial disaster. (See Ronald 0. 
Thomas depo at p. 196. ll. 24-25; pp. 197-198; Affidavit of Ron Thomas, ~ 13, at pp. 6-7). The 
company's tax returns confirm the seriousness of this, as most ofthe prior years show a loss, and the 
loss in calendar year 2005 alone was in excess of $250,000. (See, Affidavit of Ron Thomas, Exhibit 
"D ".). In fact, the financial picture relating to Thomas Motors was so bad by the end of2005, and 
Mr. Thomas was unable to attract any buyers for the business, he arranged to put the business up for 
auction. (See Affidavit of Ron Thomas. ~ 13 at pp. 6-7). If it had gone to auction, of course, that 
would have amounted to a fire sale of the business assets of Thomas Motors which would be 
expected to generate very little in return for his investment. Id The business known as Thomas 
Motors was actually advertised for auction. See Ronald 0. Thomas depo, p. 201, ll. 8-22; Affidavit 
of Ron Thomas, ~ 13 at p. 7." However, just prior to the scheduled auction the broker retained by 
the defendant Mr. Thomas for the purpose of selling or auctioning off the business approached Mr. 
Thomas about a prospective buyer. The business was in relatively short order sold to a group of 
investors headed by Mr. Bill Buckner. Ronald 0. Thomas depo, p. 196, ll. 19-23; Affidavit of Ron 
Thomas, ~ 13 at p. 7. It should be noted that as part of the selling of the business to the group 
headed by Mr. Buckner, Mr. Thomas also agreed to sell various pieces ofland he owned surrounding 
the land upon which Thomas Motors was located. See Affidavit of Ron Thomas. ~ 14 at p. 7. In 
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other words, the group headed by Mr. Buckner not only bought the Thomas Motors dealership and 
the land upon which it was located, but also various other parcels of surrounding land that were 
owned by the defendant Mr. Thomas which were very valuable in and of themselves. In any event, 
the transaction involving the sale of these parcels of property and the Thomas Motors dealership was 
finalized in March of 2006. ld. 
To put things in perspective, the business was sold to third parties a little less than 
a year after the plaintiff claims he expected the business to be sold to him. According to the plaintiff, 
the oral agreement called for his dad selling him the business when his dad turned 63 years old. The 
defendant Mr. Thomas turned 63 on April 12, 2005. See Affidavit of Ron Thomas. ~ 2 at p. 2. It is 
of course entirely undisputed the plaintiff never paid his mom or dad anything towards purchasing 
the business (or anything else for that matter) at any point. The plaintiff also never made any 
application or effort to become an authorized franchisee for Dodge/Chrysler, which he would have 
to be to own and operate a dealership selling their new vehicles. In point offact, it is undisputed the 
plaintiff did absolutely nothing towards purchasing the business from his parents at any point before 
April of2005 or after April of 2005. 
ST ANDARDS GOVERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The standards governing summary judgment motions are of course well established. 
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter oflaw." lR.CP. 56(c); 
Bonz v. Sedweeks, 119 Idaho 539,808 P.2d 876 (1991); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co .. 119 
Idaho 514,808 P.2d 851 (1991); AlcCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991). All 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I3 
OU015~ 
disputed facts are liberally construed in favor ofthe non-moving party. Id. Similarly, all reasonable 
inferences which can be made from the record shall be made in favor of the party resisting the 
motion. Id. 
Nevertheless, when a party moves for summary judgment, the opposing party's case 
must not rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue of fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769,820 P.2d 360 (1991); G&M Farms v. 
Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,808 P.2d 851 (1991); Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 
92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). 
It is equally well-established that a party against whom a motion for summary 
judgment is sought may not 'merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come 
forward and produce evidence by way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the 
moving party and establish a genuine issue of material fact.' McCoy v. Lyons, supra, 120 Idaho at 
770,' Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990),' Clarke v. Prenger, 114 
Idaho 766, 760 P.2d 1182 (1988); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). This 
requirement has in fact been made a part of the Court rules. I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides: 
l.R. .P. 56(e). 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specitic facts showmg that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against the party. 
LA W AND ARGUMENT 
The plaintitr s Verified Complaint in this case contains five separate counts or causes 
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of action, each of which are entirely devoid of legal merit. Each will be addressed separately and 
in turn. 
A. Count One - Breach of [Oral} Contract. 
1. The alleged contract is unenforceable because the essential terms are not 
sufficiently definite. This appears to be the primary cause of action made against the defendants in 
this action, which centers on the alleged oral agreement that the defendant Ron Thomas purportedly 
made with his son in the summer of 1997. As reflected above, the plaintiff claims that when his 
father was intending to purchase the new car dealership, then known as Johannsen Motors, he made 
an oral agreement with his son that if he came to work for the new dealership upon his retirement 
at 63 years old, the business "would be yours." The "agreement" being alleged by the plaintiff, to 
the extent it can even be called that, is no more specific in substance than that. 
The plaintiff openly acknowledges in his testimony that the discussions he had with 
his father leading up to the supposed oral agreement and/or the agreement itself was very vague in 
nature, and left many of the essential terms of any purported agreement to future negotiation. One 
of the more notable examples of these essential terms, that serves to illustrate the point as well as 
anything else, is the price. That is, the plaintiff very clearly understood that his father was not 
agreeing to give him this new car dealership for free at any point. Instead, the plaintiff very clearly 
understood that he was going to have to pay some price for the dealership upon his father's 
retirement some 10 years later, but the actual amount he would have to pay was not discussed, and 
certainly never agreed upon at any point prior to the time he left his former employment, and went 
to work for his father. 
As also addressed above, some three years after this oral agreement was allegedly 
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reached, the parties to this case actually did reach a written agreement regarding the purchase and 
sale of Thomas Motors, specifically in September of2000. However, the plaintiff makes every effort 
in this case to completely distance himselffrom having anything to do with these written agreements. 
He claims that about a month after he signed these written agreements which covered all the material 
terms with detailed specificity such as price, payment schedule, etc., his father allegedly told him that 
he was in essence not going to hold him to these written agreements, thereby rendering them of no 
force and effect. It is, of course, more than obvious why the plaintiff wants to distance himself from 
having anything to do with these written agreements, since it is entirely undisputed that he made no 
effort whatsoever to comply with any of the terms of these written agreements. 
In any event, according to the plaintiff, after the written agreements were signed and 
purportedly nullified by oral discussions with his father, he went back to understanding the same 
thing he had understood as a result of the alleged oral agreement he claims to have had with his dad 
back in the summer of 1997. That is, an oral agreement that upon his dad's retirement, "the business 
would be his," but the plaintiffs own testimony establishes he still had no agreement whatsoever 
regarding any of the specific terms upon which he would purchase the business at that point: 
Q. And that's my question. So at that point, this discussion following 
your signing of Exhibits 3 [agreement for the sale of assets of Thomas 
Motors] and 5 [commercial lease and sale agreement regarding the 
land] when he said he's going to give it to you, your understanding is 
that you're going to have to pay for it in some way, but you don't 
have an understanding ofthe specific terms of how much you would 
have to pay for it, right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. That would be worked out down the road? 
A. Correct. 
R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 112, II. 14-23 (emphasis added). Thus, any discussions or understandings 
the plaintiff claims to have had following the signing of the written agreements in September of 
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2000, have the same lack of specificity problems as the original alleged oral agreement in this case, 
supposedly reached in the summer of 1997. That is, any such oral agreement lacked virtually all of 
the material and essential terms that would have to be in place in order to have a valid agreement to 
purchase a car dealership business and the land upon which it is located. 
It is a fundamental principle of contract law that any contractual agreement must be 
complete and definite in all its material terms, in order to be legally enforceable. See, e.g., Wood v. 
Simonson, 108 Idaho, 699.701,701 P.2d 319 (Ct. App. 1985); Giacobbi Square v. PEKCorp., 105 
Idaho 3-16.670 P.2d 51 (1983); Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (1995); Kohring 
v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 44 P. 3d 1149 (2002). Conversely stated, if any portion of the proposed 
terms to an alleged agreement is unsettled, a legally enforceable contract does not exist. As 
succinctly stated by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
In order to constitute a contract, there must be a distinct 
understanding common to both parties. The minds ofthe parties must 
meet as to all of its terms, and, if anv portion of the proposed terms 
is unsettled and unprovided for, there is no contract. 
C. H Leavell and Company v. Grafe and Associates. Inc., 90 Idaho 502. 511. 414 P.2d 873 
(1966)(emphasis added); see also e.g. Matheson v. Harris, 96 Idaho 759, 536 P.2d 754 (1975)("A 
contract does not exist if any portion of the proposed terms is unsettled" Id at 760). 
Likewise, an "agreement to agree" or an agreement that leaves material terms for 
future negotiations is not a legally enforceable agreement. As again succinctly stated by the Idaho 
Court: 
Generally, an agreement to agree is unenforceable as it terms are so 
indefinite that it fails to show a mutual intent to create an enforceable 
obligation. No enforceable contract comes into being when parties 
leave a material term for future negotiations, creating a mere 
agreement to agree. 
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Nfarounv. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604,614, 114 P.3d974 (2005); See also e.g. Dursteler 
v. Dursteler. 108 Idaho 230, 697 P.2d 1244 (1 985)("If terms necessary to a contract are left for 
future negotiation, the contract cannot be enforced" Id. at 234). 
All of the foregoing fundamental principles of contract law, absolutely requiring a 
contract to be definite in alJ its material terms in order to be enforceable, are of particular force and 
effect when talking about the most basic term of most agreements - the price. Here again, it is a 
axiomatic principle of contract law that a contract must provide for a definite price in order to be 
legally enforceable, or at least provide for a specific means of determining that price with some kind 
of reasonable certainty. See, e.g. Garmo v. Clanton, 97 Idaho 696, 551 P.2d 1332 (1976) ("To be 
enforceable by a court, a contract must provide for a definite price or for a means of determining 
the price." Id at 699). 
In this case, there is no question that even if the plaintiff s allegations are to be taken 
as true, the alleged oral agreement the plaintiff claims was reached with his father back in the 
summer of 1997, did not create any kind of legally enforceable obligation. Even by his own 
testimony, the plaintiff concedes the agreement was extremely vague in nature, and left out many 
essential terms that were to be left for future negotiation and agreement. 
Q. Well, in fact, as I'm understanding, other than the specifics that are 
addressed in the written contracts, Exhibits 3 [agreement for sale of 
assets of Thomas Motors] and 5 [commercial lease and sale 
agreement for land], all the terms of any agreement you had with your 
dad were rather vague? 
A. Other than everything would be taken care of, it's all going to be 
handled. 
* * * 
Q. And so how much - - so things like how much you would have 
actually had to pay for the business, what would have happened to the 
debt, all of that was to be worked on in some manner down the road, 
non specific, otherwise you didn't have a specific term of agreement: 
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A. Correct. 
* * * 
Q. But again, back to my point, as far as your understanding of what 
kind of agreement you had reached with your dad, the idea in tenns 
of what you would of had to pay for and what would happen with the 
specific finances when you took over were left open to future 
discussion or negotiation? 
A. That sounds accurate. 
R. Drew Thomas depo, p. 182, ll. 18-23; p. 183, ll. 16-21; p. 184, ll. 21-25; p. 185, ll. 1-2 (emphasis 
added). 
In summary, the plaintiffs own testimony finnly establishes that any alleged oral 
"agreements" he had with his father were really nothing more than "agreements to agree" which are 
not actual enforceable agreements at all. These so-called oral agreements simply did not contain 
most of the material and essential terms, if not all of them, according to the plaintiffs own sworn 
testimony. As such, finnly established Idaho law clearly dictates that there can be no legally 
enforceable obligation arising out of the alleged oral agreement being claimed by the plaintiff here. 
2. The alleged oral agreement is barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
Idaho Code § 9-505 provides that if certain agreements are not committed to a 
writing. the agreement is invalid. Among the "certain agreements" which must be in writing in order 
to be enforceable is the following: 
An agreement that by its tenns is not to be perfonned within a year 
from the making thereof. 
1. C. § 9-505(1). 
The agreement in this case was made in 1997, but the transfer/sale of the company 
was not to take place until Ron Thomas turned 63, which was in 2005. See R. Drew Thomas depo, 
p . .:II, II. 10-15:p. 23, ll. 16-19; P. 61.11.6-8: Affidavit of Ron Thomas, ~ 2atp. 2. Theagreement 
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being claimed by the plaintiff here could not possibly be performed within one year; in fact it was, 
according to the plaintiff, scheduled to take place 8 years after the fact. Such oral agreement is thus 
also barred by the Idaho Statute of Frauds. 
Another subsection ofIdaho Code § 9-505 applies to any "agreement for the sale of 
real property." Ie §9-505(4). As reflected above, the plaintiff alleges that the only specific words 
ever used by his father that constituted the specific terms of such oral agreement were that "the 
business will be yours." As such. the plaintiff does not even appear to be claiming that the alleged 
oral agreement included any particular real property or land upon which the "business" will be 
located. However, to the extent the plaintiff would now make claim to any real property being part 
of the original oral agreement he alleges to have reached with his father, that part of such oral 
agreement would likewise be barred by the Idaho Statute of Frauds. 
B. Count Two - Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealina:. 
Count Two of the plaintiff's Verified Complaint in this action also relies entirely on 
the same alleged oral agreement that serves as the basis for Count One as discussed above. In fact, 
the plaintiff specifically alleges in Count Two that the defendants' "breach of the aforementioned 
agreement with Plaintiff' also amounted to a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deaHng 
"implied in the party's contract". See PlaintifFs Verified Complaint at p. 6, ~ 30. (Emphasis added). 
In other words, this Count of the plaintiffs complaint relies for its existence on there being an 
enforceable oral agreement, as alleged in Count One of the Complaint. 
In fact, Idaho law is quite clear that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
applies only to legally-enforceable, already existing agreements. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
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dealing as applying to "all contracts." Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 
337 (1984). In other words, there has to be an enforceable existing contract in place already in order 
to trigger any of the obligations required by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Similarly, the Idaho Court of Appeals has explained the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing as follows: 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to all 
contracts. It is a covenant that is implied by law, and it obligates the 
parties to cooperate with each other so that each may obtain the full 
benefit of performance. The implied covenant requires only that the 
parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their 
agreement. 
Record Steel & Const. v. Martel Canst., 129 Idaho 288,292,923 P. 2d 995 (1996)(emphasisadded). 
As such, ifthere is no existing legally-enforceable agreement to begin with, a plaintiff 
cannot stake claim to a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing either. This 
covenant attaches only to an existing contract that is of some legal force or effect. As addressed 
above, it is clear in this case that the alleged oral agreement by the plaintiff cannot possibly create 
a legally enforceable contract that gives rise to any cognizable cause of action under Idaho law. 
Accordingly, there is no possible cause of action for breach of any implied covenants to any such 
alleged oral agreement either. 
C. Count Three - Quasi Contract. 
The next count of the plaintiff s complaint is based upon a theory of "Quasi Contract" 
in which the plaintiff is claiming the defendants were "unjustly enriched" in some unspecified 
manner. This claim likewise fails as a matter of Idaho law. 
The tenn "Quasi Contract" is used interchangeably with the term "unjust enrichment" 
as well as the term "contract implied in law." See e.g. Cannon Builders, Inc. v. Rice, 126 Idaho 616, 
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888 P.2d 790 rct. App. 1995); lvfaller o/Estate o/Keeven, 126 Idaho 290,882 P.2d 457 (Ct. App. 
1994). The "modem designations" for these terms are "unjust enrichment" and/or "restitution," See 
e.g. Smith v. Smith, 95 Idaho 477,511 P.2d 294 (1973). 
The essence of an action based upon unjust enrichment is a claim that a defendant has 
been enriched by a plaintifr and that it would be inequitable for a defendant to retain that benefit 
without compensating plaintiff for the value of such benefit. See e.g. Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 
101 Idaho 663,619 P.2d 1116; BHA Investments Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 63 P.3d 474 (2003). 
The party making the claim of unjust enrichment bears the burden of proof, and establishing facts 
showing each ofthe elements necessary to establish a claim for unjust enrichment. See e.g., Kinzer 
v. Westgate, 129 Idaho 621 (Ct. App. 1997); Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 887 P.2d 1076 (Ct. 
App. 1994); Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316, 924 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1994). The Idaho Appellate 
Courts have listed the elements for a claimant to make out a prima facie case of unjust enrichment 
or quasi-contract as follows: 
The elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) a benefit is conferred upon 
defendant by plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of the 
benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that 
would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without 
payment of the value thereof. 
Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746. 759,133 P 3d 12JJ (2006); In re: Estate o/Boyd, 134 Idaho 
669, 8 P.3d (Ct. App. 2000). A plaintiff claiming he or she has been unjustly enriched also bears 
the burden of proving the damages element for supporting such cause of action. Under the theory 
of Quasi-Contract or unjust enrichment, the measure of damages is not the value of any money, labor 
or materials provided by a plaintiff to a defendant, "but the amount of benefit defendant received 
which would be unjust for defendant to retain." Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316,322,924 P.2d 217 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 22 
000161 
(Ct. App. 1994). The focus on a measure of damages in a claim for unjust enrichment, in other 
words, is 011 the value of benefit actually realized by a defendant which in good conscience it would 
be unfair to retain without making remuneration to the plaintiff. Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 
Idaho 290,882 P.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1994); Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316,322,924 P.2d 217 (Ct. 
App.1994). 
In the present case, it is unclear what "benefit" the plaintiff is claiming he bestowed 
upon his parents. The bottom line is he went to work at his parents' business from 1997 through 
early 2006, and he was paid a salary for such services. That is frankly all there is to it. 
The plaintiff had an employment contract with Thomas Motors pursuant to which he 
agreed to work there, and the employer (Thomas Motors) agreed to pay him for such services. There 
is no dispute in this case that the plaintiff was in fact paid the agreed upon salary throughout the time 
he was employed at Thomas Motors. In fact, it is undisputed that about a year and a half into 
working for his father's then new business, he was given salary raises such that he was making as 
much or more than he had previously made at any point in his working life beforehand. R. Drew 
Thomasdepo,p . .:/9, II. 18-25;p. 50, II. 1-25;p. 51, 11.1-12; depoExhibit 1. 
This point is raised because it appears that plaintiff has claimed that when he first 
went to work for his father, he took the job offer at a "greatly reduced salary." Whatever the truth 
of that may be, it is again undisputed that less than two years into his employment with Thomas 
Motors he was making every bit as much as he had ever made in his entire wage earning life, and 
certainly commensurate with the monies he was making at his prior employer, Lanny Berg 
Chevrolet. Id. 
More important for the present purpose, however, is the fact that he agreed to accept 
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a salary from his employer, and the employer paid him that salary pursuant to the employment 
agreement. Otherwise said, while the plaintiff does not specify what "benefit" was purportedly 
received by the defendants that it would be inequitable for them to retain, it would at least appear 
that the only possible benefit that the defendants received from the plaintiff while he worked at 
Thomas Motors, was just that - - the benefit of his employment services. But, he was paid for that 
on terms that he had agreed to. Idaho law is very clear in holding that a recovery for unjust 
enrichment cannot be had "where there is an enforceable express contract already covering the same 
subject matter." Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 829 P.2d 1361 (Ct. App. 1991); l-vfarshall v. 
Bear, 107 1daho201, 687 P.2d591 (Ct. App. 1984); Triangle Min. Co. Inc. v. StaujferChemicaICo., 
753 F.2d 734 (lvth. Idaho 1985). Here, there was an express contract already in place regarding the 
supposed "benefit" the plaintiff apparently claims to have bestowed upon the defendants, namely the 
employment contract pursuant to which he was paid the agreed upon salary. As such, the plaintiff 
is clearly barred by Idaho law from making any kind of claim for unjust enrichment arising out of 
his employment services with Thomas Motors. 
Moreover, the plaintiff here can hardly prove he bestowed a benefit upon the 
defendants that would be "inequitable for the defendants to retain. He never contributed any monies 
to the business at any point, nor did he assume any of its financial risks. On the contrary, while the 
plaintiff was the general sales manager of the business, the business lost vast sums of money in 7 of 
its 9 years of existence, and the defendants are the ones who actually lost every cent of those monies. 
(See, Affidavit of Ron Thomas. ~ 11 at pp. 4-5). 
D. Count Four - Breach of Contract (in the Alternative). 
Count Four of the plaintiff's Verified Complaint attempts to state a cause of action 
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for a breach of the written agreements. The plaintiff makes a point in the complaint of noting this 
count is plead "in the alternative." See Verified Complaint and Demand/or Jury Trial at p. 7. In 
fact, the plaintiff notes in a footnote that it is the plaintiff s position that no written contract was ever 
validly executed between the parties to this lawsuit. Id, n.2. Nevertheless, the plaintiff throws in 
a cause of action in which he is inexplicably claiming the defendant somehow breached the written 
agreements. 
It would frankly seem more than obvious this cause of action should be dismissed as 
a matter of law. The plaintiff would of course bear the burden of proving each of the elements 
attached to this breach of contract claim. However, the plaintiffhas openly testified to his beliefthat 
there was no written agreement ever validly executed between these parties. With that testimony, 
there is simply no way that the plaintiff could ever possibly establish the elements for this breach of 
contract cause of action. 
In addition, as addressed earlier, the plaintiff openly acknowledges he made 
absolutely no effort to comply with any of the obligations imposed upon him under these written 
agreements. He specifically testifies he "didn't do anything" to comply with any of these 
requirements. See R. Drew Thomas depo. p. / / 9, l. 4. His reasoning for that, of course, is based 
upon the allegation that his father orally told him about a month after the plaintiff had signed these 
written agreements that he would not hold him to them. As such, the plaintiff claims to have 
operated with the understanding and belief that the written agreements were not in effect, and he 
acted accordingly. That is, he did absolutely nothing to satisfy any of the contractually imposed 
requirements upon him, such as making any payments due under the payment schedule for buying 
the business, making any payments towards the commercial lease andlor purchase of the land, 
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applying to become an authorized franchisee, etc. 
This takes the concept of "alternative pleading" to an unreasonable and inappropriate 
level. It is one thing to state alternative causes of action based on the same set of facts. It is quite 
another to make an "in the alternative" cause of action that belies and flies squarely in the face of 
that party's own testimony. Literally everything the plaintiff has testified about concerning these 
written agreements establishes beyond any doubt whatsoever that he cannot possibly establish the 
defendants breached these written agreements. The plaintiff himself breached these agreements in 
multiple ways, and he himself acknowledges there is no doubt about this. Accordingly, this cause 
of action should likewise be dismissed as a matter of law. 
E. Count Five - Fraud. 
The last count of the plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action based upon fraud. 
This claim likewise fails as a matter of law. The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate beyond 
any question that the plaintiff cannot establish the elements of actionable fraud, and can certainly not 
even come close to doing so by clear and convincing evidence. 
The elements for actionable fraud are very well established in Idaho. As stated 
repeatedly by the Idaho Appellate Courts: 
A prima facie case for fraud requires a claimant to prove nine 
elements: (I) a statement or a representation of facts; (2) its falsity; 
(3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the 
speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of 
the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable 
reliance: and (9) resultant injury. 
Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,872,993 P.2d 1197 (1999). See 
also e.g.. Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc .. 141 Idaho 604, 114 P. 3d 974 (2005); Lettunich v. Key 
Bank Nat. Ass 'no 1-11 Idaho 362. 109 P.3d 1104 (2005/ It is equally well-established in Idaho that 
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the party claiming fraud bears the burden of proving each of the nine elements of fraud by "clear and 
convincing evidence." See e.g., Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 46 P.3d 518 (20020; Sowards 
V. Rathbun, J3.f. Idaho 702, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331,597 P.2d 217 (1979). 
One of the typical problems facing a claimant attempting to prove fraud relates to the 
fact the claimant must not only prove that the speaker made a misrepresentation of fact at some point 
in time, but also that the speaker knew ofthe falsity of such representation at the time such promise 
was made. That IS particularly true when the statements or promise being alleged as the basis of 
fraud relate to future events. In fact, the Idaho Appellate Courts have repeatedly stated that 
actionable fraud must involve a representation that "must concern past or existing material facts." 
See, e.g., Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 61 P.3d 557 (2002); 
Weatherheadv. Gr(ffln, 123 Idaho 697,851 P.2d993 (1992). The Idaho Appellate Courts have also 
specifically held that an action for fraud will typically not exist for statements of future events: 
An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of 
future events. The law requires the piaintiffto form his or her own 
conclusions regarding the occurrence of future events. [The 
defendant] was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that [the plaintiff] had no present intention of following through on 
the representations he complains of at the time the statements were 
made in order for the statements to be actionable. [The defendant] 
presented no such evidence; therefore, the district judge's dismissal 
of his misrepresentation claim is affirmed. 
Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 136 Idaho 200,207,61 P.3d 557 (2002). In the present 
case, of course, the plaintiffs claim for fraud is based emirely on the alleged statements and/or 
promises made by the defendant Ron Thomas in the summer of 1997, that is before the plaintiff left 
his current employer to go work for his father. The allegations contained in Count Five of the 
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint make this clear. The plaintiff there alleges his father made promises 
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at that point that if the plaintiff would leave his employment at Lanny Berg, and go to work for his 
father, the dealership "would be yours" when his father turned 63 years old, which was in April of 
2005, some 8 years away at that point. The plaintiff thus claims that the detrimental reliance he 
placed on the allegedly false statements was to leave his then current employer and go to work for 
his father at a "greatly reduced salary." This allegation thus relates to statements purportedly made 
by the defendant that related to a "future event," specifically an event that would take place 8 years 
in the future. 
The plaintiffthus bears the burden in this case, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
the defendant Ron Thomas not only made such statements or promises to begin with, but also that 
such statements regarding his intention to sell the plaintiff the dealership business when the 
defendant retired some 8 years later, was actually a false statement when made. As illustrated in the 
Thomas decision quoted above, the plaintiffs inability to produce affirmative evidence establishing 
that particular element is fatal to the claim, and warrants the entry of summary judgment. The same 
result should apply here, because there is simply no way the plaintiff could produce competent 
evidence establishing by "clear and convincing evidence" that if Mr. Thomas made such statements 
assuring the plaintiff that he would sell the plaintiff the dealership business when he retired about 
8 years later, that such statement was actually false at the time it was made. 
In fact, the undisputed facts of this case clearly establish otherwise. Some 3 years 
after these statements were allegedly made by the defendant Mr. Thomas, there is no question there 
were written agreements prepared by an attorney hired by the defendants for the precise purpose of 
selling the business to the plaintiff. The plaintiff in fact signed those agreements in September of 
2000. The undisputed fact that the defendant Mr. Thomas paid a lawyer hefty sums to prepare 
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written agreements memorializing a specific agreement to sell his son the business in September of 
2000 clearly and unequivocally demonstrates that if he had made any statements years earlier 
suggesting an intention to sell his son the business, that such statements were true when made, not 
false when made. There is simply no evidence the plaintiff could offer that could in any way 
demonstrate that any statements made by Mr. Thomas back in the summer of 1997 about selling his 
son the business, were false statements when made, particularly under the "clear and convincing 
evidence" standard. 
Another instructive decision by the Idaho Supreme Court here is that of Magic 
Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Duiso{, 126 Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (J 995). There, the plaintiff Magic 
Lantern was a movie theater operator in the Sun Valley area. The defendant was a developer who 
planned on developing a mini-mall that was intended to include a new movie theater. Magic 
Lantern, 126 Idaho at 806. The plaintiff Magic Lantern ultimately claimed that a deal was struck 
with the developer. ld. Less than a year later, the defendant "decided not to proceed with the 
project" and advertised the property for sale. A separate limited partnership purchased the property 
and ultimately agreed to lease space in the project to another movie theater operator (not the 
plaintiff). Id. The plaintiff thereafter sued and, among other things, alleged fraud. The fraud claim 
was dismissed on summary judgment, and the trial court's decision in this regard was unanimously 
upheld on appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court held as follows: 
The representations that CPP [the defendant] would build a cinema 
by November 1990 and would sell it to Magic Lantern [the plaintiff] 
for $400,000 to $450,000 are statements concerning future events. 
Generally, the representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud 
must concern past or existing material facts. Representations 
concerning future events are usually not considered actionable. A 
promise or statement that an act will be undertaken, however, is 
actionable if it is proven that the speaker made the promise without 
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intending to keep it. Therefore, CPP's [the defendant's] 
representations as to future events would be actionable only if Magic 
Lantern [the plaintiff] could show that CPP made these 
representations without intending to honor them. 
CPP presented evidence that CPP had intended to do business with 
Magic Lantern as represented and that CPP abandoned the project 
only after the negotiations with Magic Lantern did not produce an 
agreement. Magic Lantern did not produce any evidence suggesting 
that at the time of the alleged representations CPP did not intend to 
carry out the project and to include Magic Lantern as represented. 
Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment 
dismissing the fraud claim. 
Magic Lantern, J 26 Idaho at 807 (emphasis added). The same basic factual point is true here. That 
is, there is no question that the evidence in this case demonstrates that the defendants expressed a 
specific intention to sell the business to the plaintiff, in written agreements prepared at the behest 
of the defendants by an attorney, several years after the plaintiff alleges the defendants made 
promises about seHing him the business back in the summer of 1997. Otherwise stated, there is 
simply no evidence that could possibly justify or establish that if the plaintiff could prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the defendant Ron Thomas promised to sell him the business when the 
piaintiffleft his employment in the summer of 1997, that such statements were actually false when 
made. While there are other points to make about this offensive fraud claim made by the 
plaintiff/son against his parents, this point alone is fatal to such fraud claim, and there is no genuine 
issue of material fact about it. Summary judgment is accordingly warranted on Count Five of the 
Plaintiffs Complaint as well. 
CONCI~USION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendants respectfully submit there are no genuine 
issues of material fact regarding each of the plaintiffs causes of action being entirely devoid oflegal 
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and factual merit. The defendants respectfully request that summary judgment be entered on all five 
counts of the plaintiffs complaint, and this case be dismissed with prejudice. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this J!i.!!day of July, 2007. 
HEPWORTH. LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this ~fLaay of July, 2007, he caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
William A. Morrow 
Dennis R. Wilkinson 
WHITE, PETERSON, P A 
5700 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
LXI u.s. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
LX)" u.s. Mail 
[ J Hand Delivered 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
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Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
H. Ronald Bjorkman (lSB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby deposes and states: 
1. I am a defendant in the above-referenced matter, and make this Affidavit on the 
basis of my own persona} knowledge and/or belief. 
2. I am currently 65 years old. I was born on April 12, 1942. I tumed 63 years old 
on April 12,2005. 
 I worked as a salesman for Johannsen Motors in Emmett, Idaho, for approximately 
26 years. The owner of Johannsen Motors was Earling Johannsen. In the mid-1990's, I decided to 
branch out on my own and purchased a bare piece of land, and tumed it into a used car sales lot, 
which I called "Lot-of-Cars." A year or two after I left Johannsen Motors, to run Lot-of-Cars, Mr. 
Johannsen approached me about the prospect of buying him out of Johannsen Motors and various 
pieces ofland he had surrounding the location at Johannsen Motors. My wife Elaine and I eventually 
agreed to do so. After reviewing some ofthe documents pertinent to that time frame, the purchase 
of Johannsen Motors by myself and my wife occurred in 1997. 
4. My wife and I wanted to run this new business under the name "Thomas Motors." 
We arranged to create a corporate entity, specifically a Subchapter S Corporation, called Thomas 
Motors, Inc. We submitted corporate filings with the Idaho Secretary of State's office for Thomas 
Motors, Inc. which were formally filed on November 5,2007. Until my application to become an 
authorized franchisor for the Dodge/Chrysler Corporation was approved, however, we continued to 
run the dealership business under the name Johannsen Motors for a short time. Once I was approved 
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as an authorized franchisor for Dodge/Chrysler, we ran the business under the name Thomas Motors. 
We continued to run the business under the name Thomas Motors until it was sold in early 2006. 
5. I did hire my son Drew Thomas to work at Thomas Motors, specifically, as the 
general sales manager. He did in fact work as the general sales manager while the business was run 
under the name Thomas Motors. 
6. In the summer of 2000 I made arrangements to have a lawyer prepare formal 
written agreements for the purpose of having my son, Drew Thomas, purchase Thomas Motors. The 
attorney's name was Carl Harder, who is since deceased. Mr. Harder prepared the agreements, as 
requested, and I arranged to have him paid for such legal services through Thomas Motors. As I 
recall at this time, I believe I paid him about $6,000 to prepare such agreements. Once they were 
finished, they were signed by my son Drew, as well as myself and my wife. 
7. Attached as Exhibit "A" hereto is a true and correct copy of one of the three 
agreements prepared by Mr. Harder, which is an "Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business 
Assets." As reflected in this Agreement, its general purpose was for my son Drew to purchase the 
business assets of Thomas Motors from myself and my wife, on specified terms, including price, the 
payment schedule, etc. 
8. Attached as Exhibit "B" hereto is a true and correct copy of a second agreement 
prepared by Mr. Harder, which is specifically a "Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement." As 
reflected in this Agreement, its purpose was for my son Drew to continue leasing some of the 
property that we owned, upon which Thomas Motors was located, and eventually to buy that same 
land upon which Thomas Motors was located. 
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9. Attached as Exhibit "c" hereto is the third of the agreements prepared by Mr. 
Harder in the summer of 2000, which is entitled a "Management Contract." As reflected in this 
document, its general purpose is to identify my son Drew as being employed as the general manager 
at a specified salary ($5,000 per month). At that point, my son Drew Thomas was already serving 
in the capacity as a general manager for Thomas Motors; this document generally served the purpose 
of formalizing his job title, as well as laid out some of the specific responsibilities associated with 
that job title. 
10. When the above-referenced agreements were prepared and signed in September 
of2000, as referenced above, it was my intention to sell the Thomas Motors business, and the parcels 
of land upon which Thomas Motors was located, to my son under the specific terms reflected in 
Exhibits "A" and "B" hereto. As reflected in those agreements, my son was required to make 
payments under a specified payment schedule. As time passed, it became obvious that he would not 
be able to make such payments, and I understood that he was simply going to be unable to follow 
through with these agreements. My son Drew Thomas made no payments to my wife or I for any 
purpose connected with these agreements, nor did he ever contribute any monies to the Thomas 
Motors business at any point. Had my son been able to make the payments associated with buying 
Thomas Motors, as referenced in Exhibits "A" and "B" hereto, I would have sold him the business 
as the agreements contemplated. 
11. My wife and I owned the Thomas Motors business from 1997 through the end 
of the calendar year 2005. For most of those years, the Thomas Motors business lost money. 
Attached as Exhibit "D" hereto are true and correct copies of the first page of the federal tax returns 
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that were filed for our Thomas Motors business, which were filed with the Internal Revenue Service. 
This front page of said tax returns reflect the overall amount of profit or loss reported for the Thomas 
Motors business for each of the tax years covered. As reflected on the tax returns, Thomas Motors 
lost money in seven of the nine years of its existence. More specifically, the front page of the tax 
returns attached as Exhibit "D" reflect the following income or loss from business activities in each 
of the years of its existence as follows: 
1997 - (-$51,613.00) 
1998 - (-$34,940.00) 
1999 - +95,286.00 
2000 - (-$72,350.00) 
2001 - +46,164.00 
2002 - (-$36,824.00) 
2003 - (-$11,204.00) 
2004 - (-$36,043.00) 
2005 - (-$260,252.00) 
The tax return figures reflected above thus show total losses from 1997 through the 
end of the calendar year 2005 during 7 of the 9 years for a total of$503,226.00 and profit for 2 years 
of only $141,450.00, for net overall losses from 1997 through 2005, inclusive, being $361,776.00. 
12. Initially, the line of credit I had arranged for the purpose of running Thomas 
Motors was with First Security Bank, which eventually became Wells Fargo Banle In order to obtain 
such line of credit, I had to provide the bank with a personal guaranty for the line of credit on 
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Thomas Motors, Inc. As the business continued to lose money, I became what we refer to as "out 
of trust" with this lending institution who provided our line of credit. This generally meant we were 
not generating enough income from the business to keep up with the loans associated with our line 
of credit, and therefore falling short on our financial obligations to the bank. In the time frame 
between 2000 and 2001, Thomas Motors was more than $300,000 out of trust with First 
Security/Wells Fargo. There were meetings with the bank representatives, and the lending institution 
indicated an intent to call in the loan. I arranged for alternative financing with another lending 
institution, specifically Key Bank. At that point. Key Bank paid off the Wells Fargo loan and 
became the lending institution that financed our line of credit. I had to provide Key Bank with a 
personal guaranty as well, for the line of credit on Thomas Motors, Inc. As the business again 
continued to lose money, I eventually became "out of trust" with Key Bank as well. Throughout 
the years of owning Thomas Motors, I had to take monies from other financial sources my wife and 
I had, including our own personal accounts, and put it into Thomas Motors to try and keep the 
business afloat. In fact, over the years I had to take substantially more than a half a million dollars 
out of accounts my wife and I had, aside from Thomas Motors, and contributed such monies directly 
to Thomas Motors for the purpose of trying to keep that business afloat and not have the loans with 
the bank defaulted. 
13. In short, Thomas Motors was a very serious drain on the financial resources my 
wife and I had over the years, to the point that it was a financial disaster. Towards the end of the 
calendar year 2005, I was approached by the representative of the lending institution which provided 
the line of credit for my other car business, Lot-of-Cars, who understood that I was taking monies 
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used from the profitable Lot-of-Cars business, and putting it into Thomas Motors, which was 
anything but a profitable business. He indicated to me in very strong terms a threat that his bank may 
very well call in the loan we had for the line of credit on Lot-of-Cars, ifI did not do something about 
selling or getting rid of Thomas Motors. At that point, I was already agreed that I had no practical 
financial choice but to try and sell the business of Thomas Motors, and even if! was unable to sell 
it, to put it up for auction. I hired a broker for this purpose, Mr. Mark Bottles, who advertised the 
business for sale in various journals and publications. After initially unable to locate a buyer, 
Thomas Motors was put up for "auction." This auction was actually scheduled to take place in 
January of2006. However, shortly before the date for the auction, Mr. Bottles approached me and 
asked what I would give him in the way of a commission if he could find a buyer for the business, 
as opposed to going through with the auction. I indicated to him that I would pay him a $100,000 
commission if he could tind a legitimate buyer, and thus avoid the auction. Mr. Bottles in fact 
eventually procured a buyer in the form of a group of investors that included Mr. Bill Buckner. My 
wife and I then sold the Thomas Motors business to this group of investors that included Mr. 
Buckner in early 2006. The formal documents were thereafter prepared, and the final agreements 
regarding this sale were memorialized in March of 2006. 
14. The investment group that included Mr. Buckner was also interested in buying 
not only Thomas Motors, and the land upon which it was located, but various other parcels of land 
that my wife and I owned separately, that are adjacent to or in the same area as the location of 
Thomas Motors. My wife and I accordingly sold to Mr. Buckner's group not only the Thomas 
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Motors business and the land upon which it was located, but various other quite valuable parcels of 
land. 
f1=:-
DA TED this ~ day of July, 2007. 
~ ONALD O. THOMAS L-.. 
sf::} \ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this L day of July, 2007. 
~llv~~<~ 
Notary PUbli9.l9r Idaho 
Residing at: . Q~ 
My Commission expires: I )... \ I \ \ $6.... 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofIdaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this /'i;!day of July, 2007, he caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
William A. Morrow 
Dennis R. Wilkinson 
WHITE, PETERSON, PA 
5700 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
!Xl U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
IYJ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
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AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF BUSINESS ASSETS 
THIS AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF BUSINESS ASSETS 
("Agreement") dated this 1st day of September 2000, is entered into by and among THOMAS 
MOTORS, INC., an Idaho corporation ("Seller"), R. DREW THOMAS, a single person 
("Buyer"), and RONALD O. THOMAS and ELAINE K. THOMAS, husband and wife 
("Shareholders"). 
In consideration of and in reliance upon the mutual covenants contained in this 
Agreement, the parties hereby agree as follows. 
Section 1. Premises. This Agreement is made and entered into by the parties in part upon 
the representations and warranties contained in this Section 1, which representations and 
warranties are not mere recitals, but fundamental premises upon which the transaction described 
in this Agreement is based. 
1.1 Seller is an Idaho business corporation engaged in the business of selling 
and servicing Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles and related parts and 
accessories from premises located at 2121 Service Avenue, Emmett, Idaho 83617 (the "Business 
Real Property"), under franchises issued by Daimler-Chrysler Corporation. 
1.2 Buyer wishes to purchase from Seller, and Seller is willing to sell to 
Buyer, all assets relating to Seller's Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep franchise for Emmett, 
Idaho, conditioned upon the granting to Buyer of an exclusive franchise for the sale of new 
Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in the same geographical area as Seller's 
franchise. 
1.3 Buyer (or a business entity that Buyer shall own) also wishes to lease two 
(2) of the three (3) parcels ofthe real property and improvements which constitute the Business 
Real Property, and wishes eventually to purchase one (1) ofthose parcels and another adjoining 
parcel of real property. Consequently, the purchase of Seller's business assets shall be 
conditioned upon the execution and delivery of the Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement 
among the parties and Ronald O. Thomas and Elaine K. Thomas, husband and wife, dated 
September 1,2000 (the "Lease"). 
Section 2. 
meanings: 
Definitions. In this Agreement, the following words shall have the indicated 
2.1 "Closing" shall refer to the consummation ofthe transaction contemplated 
under this Agreement in accordance with the terms hereof, and "Closing Date" shall refer to 
September 1, 2001. 
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2.2 "Seller's Business" shall refer to any and all activities conducted by Seller 
in Emmett, Idaho, relating to the marketing and sale of new Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep 
motor vehicles and associated parts and accessories, and the repair and servicing of new or used 
Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles. 
2.3 "Purchased Assets" shall refer to those assets which are identified in 
Section 3 as being purchased and sold by the parties under this Agreement. The Purchased 
Assets specifically shall not include Seller's accounts receivable and Franchisor holdbacks, 
which shall be retained by Seller. 
2.4 Seller's "Equipment" shall refer to all non-inventory items of tangible 
personal property presently owned or used by Seller in connection with Seller's Business, 
including all of Seller's machinery, tools, signs, office equipment, computer equipment, 
computer programs, microfiches, parts lists, repair manuals, sales or service brochures, furniture 
and fixtures, and all of Seller's leasehold improvements to the Business Real Property. Within 
twenty (20) days after the Date of this Agreement, Seller shall provide to Buyer a list of the 
"Certain Excluded Equipment" being retained by Seller, which list shall be attached to this 
Agreement as Exhibit "A" and which list shall include, without limitation, a grinder and a brake 
lathe. The parties recognize and agree that Seller's Equipment does NOT include any assets of 
Thomas Auto Parts, Inc., which also operates on the Business Real Property and whose assets 
include its fixtures, equipment and inventory of motor vehicle parts and accessories. 
2.5 Seller's "Intangible Assets" shall refer to Seller's telephone and fax 
numbers, service customer lists, sales customer lists, vehicle sales records, vehicle service 
records, all rights of Seller under contracts assigned to and assumed by Buyer pursuant to this 
Agreement, all goodwill associated with Seller's Business, and all other intangible rights and 
interests of any value relating to Seller's Business; provided, however, that Seller's Business 
name ("Thomas Motors") is included within the Intangible Assets being sold by Seller 
hereunder. 
2.6 "Business Real Property" shall refer to all of Seller's rights under the 
Lease, including, without limitation, the rights to lease certain of the parcels described in the 
Lease and the rights and obligation to purchase certain of the parcels described in the Lease 
pursuant to the tenus of Exhibit B to the Lease. 
2.7 "Franchisor"shall refer to Daimler-Chrysler Corporation. 
2.8 "New Vehicle" shall refer to a Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor 
vehicle which: (A) is unregistered and unused, (B) is from the 1999,2000 or 2001 model year, 
(C) has been driven for less than two hundred (200) odometer miles, and (D) may be represented 
or warranted to consumers as "new" under Idaho law. "Rollback Vehicle" shall mean an 
unrr'gistered vehicle from the 1999,2000 or 2001 model year which has been sold to a customer 
by Seller but returned because of the customer's inability to obtain financing for the purchase. 
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"Demonstrator Vehicle" shall mean an unregistered vehicle from the 1999,2000 or 2001 model 
year which has been used and operated by Seller on dealer plates for sales demonstration 
purposes. "Used Vehicle" shall mean any vehicle which is not a New Vehicle, a Demonstrator 
Vehicle or a Rollback Vehicle as defined in the three preceding sentences. 
2.9 "Date of this Agreement" shall refer to the first date upon which this 
Agreement has been signed by all of the parties. 
Section 3. Purchased Assets. Seller agrees to sell to Buyer, and Buyer agrees to purchase 
from Seller, those assets of Corporation specifically identified in Sections 4,5,6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 and 13 of this Agreement (the "Purchased Assets"). Corporation's accounts receivable and 
Franchisor holdbacks specifically are excluded from this transaction. 
Section 4. Inventory of New Vehicles, Demonstrator Vehicles and Rollback Vehicles. 
Buyer shall purchase Seller's entire inventory of new Chrysler, Plymouth, Dodge and Jeep motor 
vehicles, as that inventory exists on the Closing Date. Buyer also shall purchase Seller's entire 
inventory of Demonstrator Vehicles and Rollback Vehicles. Immediately prior to Closing, 
Buyer and Seller shall jointly review Seller's outstanding purchase orders for New Vehicles 
ordered from Seller by customers but not delivered prior to Closing. At Closing, Seller shall 
assign to Buyer, and Buyer shall assume from Seller, all of Seller's rights (including customer 
deposits) and obligations (including sales commissions) under such purchase orders. At Closing, 
Seller shall reimburse Buyer for all deposits made to Seller with respect to ordered but 
undelivered New Vehicles. 
Section 5. Inventory of Used Vehicles. Buyer shall purchase Seller's entire inventory of 
Used Vehicles, as that inventory exists at Closing, including Seller's parts trucks, service 
vehicles and courtesy vehicles. Those Used Vehicles that are not financed through Seller's 
flooring line of credit with First Security Bank of Idaho, N .A., however, shall not be part of the 
Fixed Purchase Price, but Buyer instead shall pay for those Used Vehicles pursuant to 
Section 14.2. 
Section 6. Inventory of New Parts and Accessories. Buyer shall purchase Seller's entire 
inventory of vehicle parts and accessories manufactured by Franchisor and/or third party 
suppliers, as that inventory exists on the Closing Date. Buyer shall purchase that entire inventory 
"AS IS" as of the Closing Date. Prior to Closing, Seller shall maintain Seller's inventory of parts 
and accessories at a level consistent with good business practices and Seller's normal and regular 
course of business. 
Section 7. Equipment. Buyer shall purchase Seller's Equipment. Buyer acknowledges that 
Seller is retaining, and is not selling to Buyer those excluded items of Seller's Equipment, as 
contemplated in Section 2.4. 
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Section 8. Supplies. Buyer shall purchase all of the gas, oil, nuts, bolts, and other 
automotive and office supplies which are held for use in Seller's Business. 
Section 9. Contractual Rights and Obligations. At Closing, Buyer shall assume all rights 
and obligations of Seller under all equipment leases and other contracts. Seller warrants that all 
of Seller's obligations under those contracts are current as of the Date of this Agreement. Buyer 
agrees to indemnify Seller against all obligations under those contracts, whether they relate to 
periods before or after Closing. 
Section 10. Repair Work in Progress. Buyer shall purchase all of Seller's vehicle repair 
work-in-progress (in-house and subcontracted). 
Section 11. . Intangible Assets. Buyer shall purchase all of Seller's Intangible Assets. 
Section 12. Seller's Cash, Bank Accounts, and Notes Receivable. Buyer shall purchase all 
of Seller's cash, banking accounts and deposits, and notes receivable. Buyer shall take such 
actions as Buyer deems appropriate to collect those notes receivable, and Seller shall not be 
liable to Buyer to the extent that any of Seller's notes receivable are not collected by Buyer. 
Buyer shall retain for Buyer's own account any payment with respect to Seller's notes receivable 
arising out of the operation of Seller's Business prior to Closing. 
Section 13. Franchisor Credits. Buyer shall purchase all of Seller's credits, deposits or other 
amounts due it by Franchisor as of the Date of this Agreement, except for Franchisor holdbacks 
that shall be retained by Seller. 
Section 14. Purchase Price and Payment. 
14.1 Fixed Purchase Price. Buyer shall pay Seller, as the total purchase price 
for the Purchased Assets (other than those Used Vehicles described in Sections 5 and 14.2) the 
amount of Eight Hundred Fifty Thousand and No/I 00 Dollars ($850,000.00), as such amount 
may be reduced by distributions made to Shareholders prior to the Closing Date pursuant to the 
tenus of that certain Management Contract dated September 1, 2000 between the parties ("Fixed 
Purchase Price"). Buyer shall pay Seller the Fixed Purchase Price in monthly installments 
amortized over a period of twenty (20) years from and after the Closing, including interest at the 
prime rate of interest charged by First Security Bank ofIdaho, N.A. plus two hundred (200) basis 
points, with the amortization to be adjusted concurrently with each adjustment of such prime rate 
of interest; provided, however, that the interest in no event shall be less than ten percent (10%). 
Notwithstanding such amortization schedule, Buyer shall pay Seller the entire unpaid balance of 
the Fixed Purchase Price and all accrued interest on September I, 2008. 
14.2 Additional Purchase Price. In addition to the Fixed Purchase Price 
provided in Section 14.1, Buyer shall pay Seller, as the purchase price for each Used Vehicle that 
is not financed through Seller's flooring line of credit with First Security Bank ofIdaho, N.A., 
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Seller's cost as reflected on its books and records for such Used Vehicle at the time Buyer sells 
each such Used Vehicle. 
Section 15. Assumed Liabilities. In addition to the purchase ofthe Purchased Assets, Buyer 
also shall, in conjunction with such purchase, assume and take responsibility for any and all 
liabilities, debts or obligations of Seller (including Seller's trade payables, account payables, 
notes payable to Shareholders and obligations to employees), exclusive of any income tax 
liabilities of Shareholders. 
Section 16. Warranties of Seller. Seller and Shareholders make the following warranties to 
Buyer, with the intent that Buyer rely thereon: 
16.1 Corporate Organization. Seller is a corporation organized, validly 
existing, and in good standing under the laws of the State ofIdaho. Seller is qualified to do 
business in the State of Idaho, and has full power and authority to own, use, and sell its assets. 
16.2 Corporate Authority. Seller's Board of Directors and Shareholders have 
authorized the execution and delivery of this Agreement to Buyer and the carrying out of its 
provisions. This Agreement will not violate any judicial, governmental or administrative decree, 
order, writ, injunction, or judgment, and will not conflict with or constitute a default under 
Seller's bylaws, or any contract, agreement, or other instrument to which Seller is a party or by 
which it may be bound. 
16.3 Employee Issues. No employees of Seller are members of any union. 
Within ten (10) days after the Date of this Agreement, Seller shall provide to Buyer the 
following: (A) a census of Seller's employees, (B) a written disclosure of all benefits made 
available to Seller's employees (including qualified and non-qualified retirement plans), and (C) 
access to all personnel files for Seller's employees. All employee benefit plans maintained by 
Seller for its employees shall be fully funded prior to Closing. Seller shall pay all wages, 
commissions, accrued vacation pay and other accrued compensation earned by Seller's 
employees prior to Closing (together with all accrued FICA and withholding taxes). Seller shall 
terminate the employment of all of Seller's employees effective as of the close of business on the 
Closing Date. At Buyer's sole discretion, Buyer may (but shall not be obligated to) hire any of 
Seller's employees. 
16.4 Undisclosed Liabilities and Contractual Commitments. Except as 
otherwise disclosed in this Agreement, the following statements are true as ofthe Date of this 
Agrec1 1ent and shall be true at Closing: (A) Seller does not have any liabilities which might have 
a material impact on Buyer's use of the Purchased Assets, (B) Seller is not a party to any 
contracts or commitments which might have a material impact on Buyer's use ofthe Purchased 
Assets, (C) no law suit or action, administrative proceeding, arbitration proceeding, 
governmental investigation, or other legal or equitable proceeding of any kind is pending or 
threatened against Seller which might adversely affect the value of the Purchased Assets, and (D) 
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Seller has all licenses, permits and authorizations required by any federal, state or local 
governmental or regulatory agency in order to operate Seller's Business, and knows of no reason 
why any such license or permit might be subject to revocation. If any claim is asserted against 
Buyer after Closing with respect to any obligation of Seller which Seller has failed to disclose to 
Buyer in writing, or which Seller has disclosed but failed to pay, then Buyer shall give prompt 
written notice of that claim to Seller. Seller shall indemnify Buyer with respect to all such 
obligations. 
16.5 Condition of Equipment. Each item of Seller's Equipment shall be sold 
"AS IS" as of the Closing Date. Seller will continue to perform routine maintenance and repairs 
with respect to Seller's Equipment prior to Closing. 
16.6 Good Title. Seller has, and shall transfer to Buyer at Closing, good and 
marketable title to all of the Purchased Assets, free and clear of all security interests, liens, 
equitable interests, leases, assessments, restrictions, reservations, or other burdens of any kind, 
other than those existing in favor of First Security Bank ofIdaho, N.A. and assumed by Buyer. 
All current and accrued taxes which may become a lien against any of the Purchased Assets shall 
have been paid by Seller prior to Closing (including property taxes, sales taxes and excise taxes). 
16.7 Franchisor's Consent. Seller shall take all actions which are reasonably 
necessary on Seller's part to obtain the consent ofthe Franchisor to the issuance to Buyer of an 
exclusive franchise for the sale of new Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in the 
same geographical area as Seller's current franchise in Emmett, Idaho. 
Section 17. Conduct of Business Pending Closing. Seller warrants that during the period 
beginning on the Date of this Agreement and ending at Closing: (A) Seller shall continue to 
operate Seller's Business in the usual and ordinary course, and in substantial conformity with all 
applicable laws, ordinances, regulations, rules or orders; (B) Seller shall not allow any liens to be 
placed against any of the Purchased Assets unless those liens are discharged prior to Closing; (C) 
Seller shall not take any action which may cause a material adverse change in the operations of 
Seller's Business; (D) Seller shall not conduct any sale which shall use the words or phrases 
"Going Out of Business Sale" or other words or phrases having similar meanings; and (E) Seller 
shall use its best efforts to preserve the value of the Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep 
franchise in Emmett, Idaho. Notwithstanding the warranties made by Seller in this Section 17, 
Buyer acknowledges and agrees that Buyer shall be responsible for the performance of those 
warranties pursuant to the terms of that certain Management Contract dated September 1,2000. 
Section 18. Representations and Warranties of Buyer. Buyer hereby makes the following 
representations and warranties to Seller, with the intent that Seller rely thereon: This Agreement 
will not violate the provision of any judicial, governmental or administrative decree, order, writ, 
injunction, or judgment, or conflict with or constitute a default under, any contract, agreement, or 
other instrument to which Buyer is a party. 
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Section 19. Additional Conditions Precedent to Buyer's Obligations. The obligation of 
Buyer to close this transaction is subject to each ofthe following conditions (each of which is for 
the benefit of Buyer and may be waived by Buyer), and Buyer shall have the right to rescind this 
Agreement if any of the following conditions is not satisfied in accordance with its terms: 
19.1 Buyer shall have obtained from Franchisor, prior to the Closing Date, an 
exclusive franchise to sell new Chrysler, Dodge, Plymouth and Jeep motor vehicles in the same 
geographical area as Seller's current franchise in Emmett, Idaho (as evidenced by the issuance to 
Buyer by Franchisor of an appropriate Dealership Sales and Service Agreement, and the approval 
of Buyer as the publicly-owned Dealer-Operator of the franchise), and Buyer agrees to use its 
best reasonable efforts to obtain that franchise. 
19.2 Buyer shall be reasonably satisfied with any facility improvement 
requirements which are imposed by Franchisor. 
19.3 All of Seller's agreements and warranties set forth in this Agreement shall 
be true, correct, complete and not misleading at Closing; provided that Buyer's decision to close 
this transaction shall not release Seller from liability to Buyer for any warranty which is 
subsequently determined to be incorrect, incomplete or misleading. 
Section 20. Closing. The parties shall make all reasonable efforts to close the purchase and 
sale under this Agreement at or before 5:00 p.m., Mountain Daylight Time, on or before the 
Closing Date, at the offices of Seller, or at such other location as shall be selected by mutual 
agreement of the parties. 
20.1 If this transaction closes as provided in this Agreement, then actual 
possession and all risk of loss, damage or destruction with respect to the Purchased Assets, shall 
be deemed to have been delivered to Buyer at 11 :59 p.m., Mountain Daylight Time, on the 
Closing Date. 
20.2 At Closing, and coincidentally with the performance of the obligations to 
be performed by Buyer at Closing, Seller shall deliver to Buyer the following: (A) all bills of 
sale, assignments and other instruments of transfer, in form and substance reasonably satisfactory 
to Buyer, which shall be necessary to convey the Purchased Assets to Buyer; and (B) all other 
. documents required under this Agreement. 
20.3 At Closing, and coincidentally with the performance of all obligations 
required of Seller at Closing, Buyer shall deliver to Seller the following: (A) payment for the 
Purchased Assets; and (B) all other payments and documents required under this Agreement. 
Buyer shall be responsible for all sales taxes payable in connection with the transaction. 
20.4 If Closing does not take place on or before the Closing Date because there 
has been a failure of any condition precedent set forth in Section 19, then: (A) all rights and 
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obligations of both parties under this Agreement shall tenninate, and (B) this Agreement and all 
predecessor agreements shall thereafter be void and of no effect. 
20.5 Both parties agree to make a good faith effort to execute and deliver all 
documents and complete all actions necessary to consummate this transaction. 
Section 21. Survival of Representations. All representations, warranties, indemnification 
obligations and covenants made in this Agreement shall survive the Closing, and shall remain in 
effect until the expiration of the latest period allowable in any applicable statute of limitations. 
Section 22. Assignment by Buyer. Buyer shall have the right to assign all of its rights and J 
obligations under this Agreement to a business entity owned exclusively by Buyer. 
Section 23. Lease and/or Purchase of Business Real Property. As a condition to the 
Closing of the transaction contemplated under this Agreement, Seller shall assign to Buyer (or a 
related entity) the Lease, including, without limitation, its tenns regarding the lease of Parcels I 
and 2 of the Business Real Property, the future substitution of Parcel 3 for Parcel 2 during the 
term of the Lease, and the purchase of Parcels I and 3 of the Business Real Property. 
Section 24. Miscellaneous. 
24.1 There are no oral agreements or representations between the parties which 
affect this transaction, and this Agreement supersedes all previous negotiations, warranties, 
representations and understandings between the parties. True copies of all documents referenced 
in this Agreement are attached to this Agreement. If any provision of this Agreement shall be 
determined to be void by any court of competent jurisdiction, then that determination shall not 
affect any other provision of this Agreement, and all other provisions shall remain in full force 
and effect. If any provision of this Agreement is capable of two (2) constructions, only one (1) 
of which would render the provision valid, then the provision shall have the meaning which 
renders it valid. The section headings in this Agreement are for convenience purposes only, and 
do not in any way define or construe the contents of this Agreement. 
24.2 This Agreement shall be governed and perfonned in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Idaho. Each of the parties hereby irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of Gem County, Idaho, and agrees that any legal proceedings with respect to this 
Agreement shall be filed and heard in the appropriate court in Gem County, Idaho. 
24.3 This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which 
shall be an original, and all of which shall constitute a single instrument, when signed by both of 
the parties. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the successors 
and assigns of the respective parties. 
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24.4 Waiver by either party of strict performance of any provision of this 
Agreement shall not be a waiver of, and shall not prejudice the party's right to subsequently 
require strict performance of, the same provision or any other provision. The consent or approval 
of either party to any act by the other party of a nature requiring consent or approval shall not 
render unnecessary the consent to or approval of any subsequent similar act. 
24.5 All notices provided for herein shall be in writing and shall be deemed to 
be duly given when mailed by United States certified mail, postage prepaid, to the last known 
address of the party entitled to receive the notice, or when personally delivered to that party. 
24.6 Time is of the essence of this Agreement. 
24.7 Should any party hereto institute any action or proceedings to enforce or 
interpret any provision hereof, or for damages by reason of any alleged breach of any provision 
of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the losing party or 
parties such amount as the court may adjudge to be reasonable attorney fees for services rendered 
to the prevailing party in such action or proceeding. The term "prevailing party" as used in this 
section shall include, without limitation, any party who is made a defendant in litigation in which 
damages and/or other relief may be sought against such party and a final judgment or dismissal 
or decree is entered in such litigation in favor of such party defendant. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement on the dates 
indicated below. 
SELLER: 
THOMAS MOTORS, INC. 
B~~~: 
onald O. Thomas, PresIdent // 
Dated: ?f - /' Lf '- 0 c.J 
- / / / 
~/ / 
Dated:_O~CZ+-l-/t-l-/-/--'I;{--Jo/ctJ~ __ 




RONALD O. THOMAS 
~/(~~ Dated: __ ? __ /_h_-_O_cJ __ 
ELAINE K. THOMAS 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
CERTAIN EXCLUDED EQUIPMENT 
1. Grinder 
2. Brake lathe 
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COMMERCIAL LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
TIDS COMMERCIAL LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT ("Lease"), 
dated this 1 st day of September 2000, is entered into by and between RONALD O. THOMAS 
and ELAINE K. THOMAS, husband and wife, of the County of Gem, State of Idaho 
(collectively referred to herein as "Landlord"), THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation ("Tenant"), and R. DREW THOMAS, a single person, of the County of Gem, State 
of Idaho ("General Manager''). 
Section 1. Real Property and Improvements. 
1.1 Lease of Property. Landlord hereby leases to Tenant, and Tenant hereby 
leases from Landlord, those two (2) certain parcels of real property located in Gem County, 
Idaho, and more particularly described as Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 on Exhibit A attached to this 
Lease and incorporated by this reference as if set forth in full (collectively the "Leased 
Property"), Parcell of which Leased Property contains an automotive sales and service facility 
(the "Premises"), and Parcel 2 of which Leased Property contains an automotive sales lot. The 
Leased Property and the Premises are sometimes collectively referred to as the "Property" in 
this Lease. 
1.2 Substitution of Parcel 3. Parcel 3 of real property located in Gem 
County, Idaho and more particularly described on Exhibit A, which adjoins Parcell, shall be 
substituted for Parcel 2 under the tenns of Section 1.1 at any time prior to September 1, 2005, 
which date of substitution shall be made by Tenant's assignee by giving Landlord at least ninety 
(90) days advance written notice. In the event such notice has not been given at least ninety (90) 
days in advance of September 1, 2003, the parties shall review the space and property utilization 
plans of the dealership and mutually detennine exactly when the substitution shall occur. In 
recognition of the fact that Parcel 3 is undeveloped real property, Tenant's assignee shall have 
the right to begin construction of improvements to prepare Parcel 3 to be an automotive sales lot 
as soon as such notice has been given, subject to the provisions of Section 5. From and after the 
date of such notice, the Leased Property shall include all three (3) parcels until the time of the 
effective date of that notice, and thereafter the Leased Property shall include only Parcels 1 and 
3. 
1.3 Purchase of Assets. The parties acknowledge that, concurrently herewith, 
Tenant and General Manager are entering into that certain Management Contract (the 
"Contract''), by which the General Manager first shall operate Tenant's automotive sales and 
service business (the "Business'') for a period of up to one (1) year from and after September 1, 
2000. The parties further acknowledge that, concurrently herewith, the parties are entering into 
that certain Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets (the "Agreement"), by which 
General Manager thereafter shall acquire from Tenant all the assets used by Tenant in connection 
with the operation of the Business on Parcell of the Leased Property and Parcel 3. All three (3) 
COMMERCIAL LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT - 1 
000193 
parcels of real property are sometimes collectively referred to as the "Real Property") in this 
Lease. The full legal descriptions for all three (3) parcels of real property shall be inserted into 
Exhibit A within thirty (30) days after the date of this Lease, which legal descriptions shall 
reflect changes on the south boundary of Parcel 1 to straighten the property line thereby affecting 
the size of the current bull pen. The commencement of this Lease is conditioned upon the 
execution and delivery of the Contract and the Agreement. 
Section 2. Term. 
2.1 Initial Term. The initial term of this Lease (the "Initial Term") is seven 
(7) years, beginning on September 1, 2000 (the "Commencement Date") and terminating on 
August 31, 2007, unless terminated earlier pursuant to the provisions of this Lease. 
2.2 Termination upon Purchase. The Initial Term shall terminate 
concurrently with the General Manager's purchase of Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real Property 
pursuant to the terms of Section 22.1 and Exhibit B ofthis Lease. 
Section 3. Rent. Tenant shall pay to Landlord, as rent for the Property, the following 
amounts, determined and payable in the manner and at the times set forth below: 
3.1 Security Deposit. Initially, no security deposit shall be required of 
Tenant. However, should Tenant commit a material default under the terms ofthis Lease, 
Landlord shall then have the right to require Tenant to pay to Landlord a security deposit equal to 
two (2) months' rent. If a security deposit is paid, Landlord may use all or any part of the 
security deposit for the payment of any loss or damage occasioned by Tenant's default: If any 
portion of the security deposit is so used, Tenant shall, upon receipt of notice from Landlord, 
deposit cash with Landlord in an amount sufficient to restore the security deposit to its original 
amount. No interest shall be paid on the security deposit, and Landlord shall not be required to 
keep it separate from Landlord's general funds. Upon full and timely performance of Ten ant's 
obligations under this Lease, the security deposit (or remaining balance thereof) shall be returned 
to Tenant at the expiration ofthe Initial Term through the General Manager's purchase of the 
Business and Parcels 1 and 3 of the Real Property, or upon the termination of the Contract. 
3.2 Rent. Tenant shall pay to Landlord, as annual rent, without abatement or 
off-set unless expressly allowed by this Lease, the monthly amount of Ten Thousand and Noll 00 
Dollars ($10,000.00) for Parcell (and Parcel 3 when it is added to the Leased Property) and the 
monthly amount of One Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,350.00) for Parcel 2 as long 
as it is a part of the Leased Property ("Base Rent"), payable in advance on the first (1st) day of 
each calendar month beginning on the Commencement Date. All rent shall be in lawful money 
of the United States of America. Each monthly payment of Base Rent is due on the first (l st) 
calendar day of each month during the Lease term without the requirement of any notice or other 
reminder from Landlord to Tenant. The Base Rent shall be the same regardless of whether and 
when Parcel 3 is substituted for Parcell. 
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3.3 Additional Rent. All amounts in addition to Base Rent which, pursuant 
to this Lease are to be paid by Tenant to or on behalf of Landlord, shall be considered 
"additional rent" for all purposes under this Lease. 
3.4 Late Fee. If a monthly Base Rent payment is not received by Landlord by 
the tenth (10th) calendar day of the month, Tenant shall be charged a late fee of One Hundred 
and No/IOO Dollars ($100.00) per day (but not to exceed One Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars 
[$1,000.00] per monthly payment) retroactive to the first (1st) day ofthe month for each separate 
monthly Base Rent payment that is late. Late fees shall be additional rent due with the monthly 
Base Rent payment. Tenant agrees that the late fee: (a) is a reasonable estimate ofthe costs that 
Landlord would incur by reason of a late payment, and (b) is in addition to all other rights of 
Landlord and shall not prevent Landlord from exercising any other right or remedy available to 
Landlord by reason of Ten ant's failure to pay rent when due. 
3.5 Application of Payments. Payments made by Tenant to Landlord shall 
first be applied to late fees, if any, then to additional rent, if any, then to any other amounts due 
from Tenant to Landlord, if any, and last to Base Rent, as adjusted. 
3.6 Net Lease. The parties intend that this shall be a net lease and that all rent 
payable by Tenant to Landlord hereunder shall be net of all costs and expenses relating to the 
Property, and that all such costs and expenses paid or incurred during the term of this Lease, 
including, but not limited to taxes, insurance, utilities, repairs and maintenance, shall be paid by 
Tenant, unless otherwise expressly provided in this Lease. 
Section 4. Use of the Property. 
4.1 Permitted Use. Initially, the sole permitted use of the Property under this 
Lease shall be the operation of an automotive sales and service business (the "Permitted Use"). 
Any different use of the Property by Tenant shall require the prior written consent of Landlord, 
which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned or delayed. 
4.2 Limitations on Use. Except with the prior written consent of Landlord 
(which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned or delayed), no industrial, 
manufacturing or processing activity (except as is usual and incidental to the Permitted Use) shall 
be conducted on the Premises. Tenant shall not: (a) use the Property in any manner that would 
constitute waste nor shall Tenant allow the same to be committed thereon; (b) abuse walls, 
ceilings, partitions, floors, wood, stone, iron work, landscaping or other parts of the Property; (c) 
use plumbing, fire control, fire sprinkler, electrical, security, telecommunications, heating, 
cooling, ventilation, elevator or other Property services, systems or facilities for any purpose 
other than that for which it was constructed; (d) make or permit any noise or odor objectionable 
to the public to emit from the Property; (e) create, maintain or permit a nuisance in or about the 
Property; (f) permit or do anything that is contrary to any statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations 
and laws of any federal, state, or local governmental body or agency; (g) permit or do anything 
COMMERCIAL LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT - 3 
000195 
that is contrary to any applicable rules and regulations of the National Fire Protection 
Association, the applicable Fire Rating Bureau and any similar bodies; or (h) permit or do 
anything that is contrary to any covenant, condition or restriction contained in this Lease. 
4.3 Hazardous Material Use. Tenant shall not cause or permit any 
Hazardous Material to be brought upon, kept, or used in or about the Premises or Real Property 
by Tenant, its agents, employees, contractors, customers, clients, guests or invitees, except as 
incidental to Tenant's Permitted Use of the Property. Tenant shall comply with all applicable 
laws and regulations regulating the use, reporting, storage, and disposal of Hazardous Material. 
4.4 Hazardous Material Definition. As used in this Lease, the term 
"Hazardous Material" means any hazardous or toxic substance, material or waste which is or 
becomes regulated by any federal, state or local governmental authority or political subdivision. 
The term "Hazardous Material" includes, without limitation, any material or substance that is (a) 
defined as a "hazardous substance" under applicable federal, state or local law, (b) petroleum, (c) 
asbestos, (d) polychlorinated biphenyl ("PCB"), (e) designated as a "hazardous substance" 
pursuant to Section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § l321), (f) 
defined as a "hazardous waste" pursuant to Section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 
U.S.C. §6903), (g) defined as a "hazardous substance" pursuant to Section 101 of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (42 U.S.C. §960l), 
(h) defined as a "regulated substance" pursuant to Section 9001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act 
(Regulation of Underground Storage Tanks), 42 U.S.C. §6991, (i) considered a "hazardous 
chemical substance and mixture" pursuant to Section 6 of the Toxic Substance Control Act (15 
U.S.C. § 2605), or (j) defined as a "pesticide" pursuant to Section 2 of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (7 U.S.c. § 136). 
4.5 Disposal of Refuse. Tenant shall store all trash and garbage within the 
Leased Property or in an area designed as appropriate therefor by Landlord. Tenant shall arrange 
for and bear the expense of prompt and regular removal of trash and garbage from the Leased 
Property. 
4.6 Approvals, Permits and Easements. During the term of this Lease, 
Tenant shall have the right to apply for and obtain any approvals, permits or licenses from any 
governmental entity required for the use of the Premises as contemplated herein and, in 
connection therewith, Landlord agrees to cooperate, provided that all costs and expenses therefor 
shall be the sole obligation of Tenant. 
4.7 Security Services. Tenant acknowledges and agrees that Landlord has no 
responsibility for security at the Property, and is not responsible for providing armed or unarmed 
guards or watchmen, monitoring systems, security systems, fences, gates or any other security or 
security systems. Tenant shall provide and maintain Security Services for the Property that are 
appropriate for Tenant's use. The term "Security Services" includes, but is not limited to, any 
watchmen, locks, fences, alarms, doors, or other services, devices, procedures, barriers or other 
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measures for the purpose of protecting, safeguarding, defending, or policing persons or property 
from any theft, vandalism or other loss or damage. Tenant may use or install fences, locks, 
alarms, doors or other devices to provide Security Services, and the installation of any Security 
Services shall be (a) consistent with the overall design and use of the Premises and Real 
Property, and (b) subject to the terms of this Lease regarding "alterations, improvements and 
additions" in Section 5 below. 
Section 5. Improvements by Tenant. Tenant shall not make any alteration, improvement 
or addition to the Property without the prior written consent of Landlord, which consent may not 
be unreasonably withheld, conditioned or delayed. All alterations, improvements, and additions: 
(a) shall be performed at the sole cost and expense of Tenant in compliance with all laws and 
regulations of any federal, state, or local governmental body, and (b) shall become and remain 
the property of Landlord. In contracting for any alterations, improvements or additions, Tenant 
shall not act as the agent of Landlord. 
Section 6. Quiet Enjoyment. Landlord agrees that Tenant, upon paying the rent and 
performing the terms of this Lease, may quietly have, hold and enjoy the Property during the 
term hereof. 
Section 7. Taxes and Assessments. 
7.1 Payment of Taxes and Assessments. During the term of this Lease, 
Tenant shall pay when due and before delinquency all ad valorem real property taxes levied and 
assessed against the value of the Real Property and improvements thereon, and all personal 
property taxes levied and assessed against Tenant's trade fixtures and equipment and other 
personal property placed upon, or owned by Tenant in, on or about the Premises or the Real 
Property. 
7.2 Right to Contest Tenant, at Tenant's expense, shall have the right to 
contest the amount or validity of all or any part ofthe ad valorem real property taxes and 
assessments required to be paid by Tenant hereunder; provided, however, that Tenant shall 
indemnify Landlord against any loss or liability by reason of such contest. Notwithstanding such 
a contest, all taxes otherwise due and payable to Landlord by Tenant shall be paid upon demand, 
but any refund thereofby any taxing authority shall be the property of Tenant. 
7.3 New Taxes. Tenant shall reimburse to Landlord promptly upon demand 
any and all taxes and other charges payable by Landlord to any governmental entity (other than 
net income, estate and inheritance taxes) whether or not now customarily paid or within the 
contemplation ofthe parties, by reason of or measured by the rent payable under this Lease, or 
allocable to or measured by the area or value of the Premises and/or Real Property, or upon the 
use and occupancy by Tenant of the Premises and/or Real Property, or levied for services 
rendered by or on behalf of any public, quasi-public or governmental entity. 
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Section 8. Maintenance of Property; Utilities. 
8.1 Routine Maintenance and Repair. Tenant shall, at its sole cost and 
expense, at all times be responsible for routine repairs and maintenance of the Property as shall 
be necessary to maintain the Property in the condition not less than the condition of the Property 
existing as of the commencement of this Lease, normal wear and tear excepted. 
8.2 Structural and Systems Maintenance. In addition to routine repairs and 
maintenance as provided in Section 8.1 above, Tenant shall be responsible for paying for the 
structural and systems maintenance of the Property and, in connection therewith, shall (a) make 
the repairs and replacements necessary to maintain the structural integrity of the Premises, 
including repairs and maintenance of the foundations and load-bearing walls, (b) repair and 
maintain in good working order the roof, paved parking areas, and the heating, ventilating, air 
conditioning, plumbing, and electrical systems, and (c) maintain the light ballasts. 
8.3 Tenant's Liability for Repairs and Maintenance. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of this Lease, Tenant shall be liable for and shall promptly repair all damage to 
the Premises or Real Property caused by Tenant or Tenant's partners, officers, directors, 
employees, invitees, guests, customers, clients or licensees, regardless whether the damage is 
caused by the negligence of Tenant or such other persons. All repairs made by Tenant shall be at 
least equal to the original work in class and quality. If Tenant fails to so maintain or repair, (a) 
Landlord (or its agents) may, but is not required to, enter the Premises at any reasonable time to 
perform maintenance or make repairs, and (b) Tenant shall pay to Landlord the cost of the 
maintenance or repairs performed by Landlord as additional rent due with the next monthly Base 
Rent payment. 
8.4 Utilities. Tenant shall pay for all heat, air conditioning, water, light, 
power and/or other utility service, including garbage and trash removal and sewage disposal, 
including all hookup fees or charges in connection therewith, used by Tenant in or about the 
Premises and Real Property during the term of this Lease. Tenant shall not be liable for any 
interruption or failure in the supply of any utility or service to the Property. 
Section 9. Insurance. 
9.1 Tenant's Obligations. Tenant shall purchase and keep in force the 
following types of insurance in the amounts specified and in the form hereafter provided: 
(a) Fire and Extended Coverage. A policy or policies of fire and 
extended coverage insurance covering the Real Property and the Premises, in an amount not less 
than ninety percent (90%) of the full replacement cost (exclusive of the cost of excavations, 
foundations and roofing), against any peril within the classification "fire and extended coverage" 
or, at Landlord's election, "all-risk coverage." In addition, Tenant shall purchase and keep in 
force rent insurance insuring Landlord against loss of rent during the period of repair or 
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replacement of all or any portion of the Premises in the event ofloss or damage. The insurance 
provided for in this Section 9.I(a) may be brought within the coverage of a blanket policy or 
policies of insurance carried and maintained by Tenant. 
(b) Public Liability and Property Damage. A policy or policies of 
comprehensive general liability insurance with broad form general liability endorsement, or 
equivalent, with limits of not less than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000) per person and One 
Million Dollars ($1,000,000) per occurrence of bodily injury and property damage combined. 
The policy or policies shall also insure against liability arising out of the use, occupancy or 
maintenance of the Premises and the Real Property. Said policy or policies shall designate 
Landlord as an additional insured and shall specifically insure the performance by Tenant ofthe 
indemnity agreement(s) contained in Section 16.5 ofthis Lease. 
(c) Tenant's Leasehold Improvements and Personal Property. 
Insurance covering all of the items comprising Tenant's leasehold improvements, trade fixtures, 
equipment and personal property from time to time, in, on or upon the Real Property and the 
Premises in an amount not less than ninety percent (90%) of their full replacement cost from time 
to time, providing protection against any peril included within the classification "fire and 
extended coverage," together with insurance against sprinkler damage, vandalism and malicious 
mischief and earthquakes. Any policy proceeds shall be used for the repair or replacement of the 
property damaged or destroyed. Landlord shall have no obligation to provide any insurance with 
respect to the Real Property or the Premises. Except as provided herein, each of Landlord and 
Tenant (a) is not obligated to obtain, (b) is not obligated to be named in, (c) shall have no right to 
any proceeds of, and (d) waives all claims on, insurance purchased by or for the benefit of the 
other party. 
9.2 Policy Form. All policies required to be provided by Tenant shall be 
issued in the names of Landlord and Tenant and evidence thereof shall be delivered to Landlord 
within ten (10) days after the date ofthis Lease and thereafter within thirty (30) days prior to the 
expiration of the term of each policy. All policies shall be with an insurer with a Best's rating of 
B+ or higher, and shall contain a provision that the insurer shall give Landlord twenty (20) days 
notice in writing in advance of any cancellation or lapse or the effective date of any reduction in 
the amounts of the insurance. All public liability, property damage and other casualty policies 
required to be provided by Tenant shall be written as primary policies, not contributing with and 
not in excess of coverage which Landlord may carry. 
9.3 Adjustment of Coverage. Not more frequently than every five (5) years 
during the term of this Lease if, in the opinion of Landlord based on industry and local standards 
and Tenant's use of the Premises, the amount of public liability and property damage insurance 
required to be provided by Tenant is at that time not adequate, Tenant shall increase the 
insurance coverage as reasonably determined by Landlord to be adequate. 
COMMERCIAL LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT - 7 
00019U 
9.4 Waiver of Subrogation. To the extent permitted by their respective 
insurers, Landlord and Tenant (and each person claiming an interest in the Property through 
Landlord or Tenant, including all subtenants of Tenant) release and waive their entire right of 
recovery against the other for direct, incidental or consequential or other loss or damage arising 
out of, or incident to, the perils covered by insurance carried by each party, whether due to the 
negligence of Landlord or Tenant. Ifnecessary, all insurance policies shall be endorsed to 
evidence this waiver. 
9.5 Failure to Insure. If Tenant shall fail to purchase and keep in force the 
insurance required by this Lease, (a) Tenant shall be in default hereunder, shall be deemed to be 
self-insured and shall bear all risk of loss or damage, and (b) Landlord may, but shall not be 
required to, purchase and keep in force the required insurance, or any portion thereof, in which 
event Tenant shall reimburse Landlord the full amount of Landlord's cost with respect thereto 
within five (5) days after written demand therefor is delivered to Tenant. 
Section 10. Damage or Destruction. 
10.1 Termination or Repair. If all or any portion of the Premises or Real 
Property are damaged or destroyed by flre or other casualty, Landlord shall deliver to Tenant 
written notice within thirty (30) days ofthe damage or destruction stating whether the Premises 
and Real Property can be restored within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the damage or 
destruction. Landlord shall have no obligation to expend more in repairing, restoring or 
rebuilding than the proceeds of insurance available for such purposes. If, in Landlord's 
reasonable judgment, the insurance settlement, permit and construction work for repairing and 
rebuilding the damaged or destroyed portion of the Premises or Real Property can be completed 
within the 180-day period with the available insurance proceeds, Landlord shall promptly 
proceed to repair or rebuild the damaged or destroyed portion of the Premises or Real Property. 
If, in Landlord's reasonable judgment, the insurance settlement, permit and construction work for 
repairing and rebuilding the damaged or destroyed portion of the Premises or Real Property 
cannot be completed within the ISO-day period with the available insurance proceeds, either 
Landlord or Tenant may tenninate this Lease upon thirty (30) days' written notice to the other 
party. 
10.2 Abatement or Apportionment of Rent. If the Lease is not terminated, 
and if the damage or destruction to the Premises or Real Property is not caused by the act or 
failure to act of Ten ant, its partners, officers, employees, agents, guests, customers, clients or 
invitees, then a just portion of the rent shall abate as of the date of the damage or destruction until 
the Premises and Real Property are repaired or rebuilt. If the Lease is terminated, the rent shall 
be apportioned as of the date of the damage or destruction. 
10.3 Alterations, Improvements and Additions. With respect to any damage 
or destruction of Tenant's alterations, improvements or additions made to the Premises, (a) this 
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